http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htseamo/articles/20110520.aspx

 

Pirate Economics

May 20, 2011: In the first three months of this year, Somali pirates
attacked 97 ships (and captured 15), compared to 35 attacked in the first
three months of 2010. Last year, pirates got paid over $200 million in
ransom. Most of that was taken by the pirate gang leaders, local warlords
and Persian Gulf negotiators who deal with the shipping companies. But for
the pirates who took the ship, then helped guard it for months until the
money was paid, the take was still huge. Pirates who actually boarded the
ship tend to receive at least $150,000 each, which is ten times what the
average Somali man makes over his entire lifetime. Even the lowest ranking
member of the pirate gang gets a few thousand dollars per ransom. The
general rule is that half the ransom goes to the financiers, the gang
leaders and ransom negotiators. About a quarter of the money goes to the
crew that took the ship, with a bonus for whoever got on board first. The
pirates who guard the ship and look after the crew gets ten percent, About
ten percent goes to local clans and warlords, as protection money (or
bribes). There is no shortage of eager young Somalis seeking to join the
pirate gangs. Most will not get much more than weapons, food, and the use of
a speed boat. If they want to make more, they have to capture a ship and
hold it for ransom. The dozen or so pirate gangs, led by men who were local
warlords or tribal leaders, get really rich. There are plenty of local
warlords and merchants who will finance new pirate gangs, in return for up
to 50 percent of whatever that gang gets in ransoms over a certain period.
The money men will advance several hundred thousand dollars, often selling
needed weapons and equipment, as well as providing technical advice. For the
pirates, it's a business. 

For the last three years, Somali pirates have been operating as far east as
the Seychelles, which are a group of 115 islands 1,500 kilometers from the
African coast. The islands have a total population of 85,000 and no military
power to speak of. They are defenseless against pirates. So are many of the
ships moving north and south off the East Coast of Africa. While ships
making the Gulf of Aden run know they must take measures to deal with pirate
attacks (posting lookouts 24/7, training the crew to use fire hoses and
other measures to repel boarders, hanging barbed wire on the railings and
over the side to deter boarders), this is not so common for ships operating
a thousand kilometers or more off the east coast of Africa. Ships in this
area were warned last year that they were at risk. Now, the pirates are out
in force, demonstrating that the risk is real. 

But these cargo ships and tankers are big business. The big ones cost over
$50,000 a day to operate and are at sea most of the time if they want to
make a profit. The crews are small (rarely over 30 people) because the ships
are highly automated. Extra insurance for pirate risk can run several
thousand dollars a day, or more, depending on exactly what route the ship
takes and how much security you want. These rates keep changing, and
generally increasing, as the pirates change tactics. If a ship wants to
guarantee safety, it can pay up to $50,000 a day for it (insurance, security
personnel on board, extra equipment). Most ships buy some insurance and take
their chances. They do that because only 1-2 percent of ships are even
attacked. 

The pirates are media savvy, and are pushing the line that they are simply
patriots, getting payback for the foreigners who illegally fish in Somali
waters (common) and dump toxic wastes off the coast (rare, but makes for
great headlines). There are over a thousand gunmen attached to pirate gangs
in the north, although the group operating off the east coast pay "taxes" to
al Shabaab for the use of several fishing villages. Most of the ships seized
late last year were taken closer to the Yemeni coast, thus showing that the
entire Gulf of Aden (between Yemen and Somalia, with the Indian ocean to the
east and the entrance to the Red Sea to the west) was subject to pirate
attacks. Despite the scary headlines this has generated, world trade, or
even traffic to the Suez Canal (at the north end of the Red Sea) is not
threatened. While ten percent of world shipping traffic goes through the
Gulf of Aden each year, most of it is in ships too fast for the pirates to
catch, and too large for them to easily get aboard. These ships pay higher
fuel costs (for the high speed transit), higher insurance premiums, and two
days of "danger pay" for their unionized crews, and that's it. This
increases the annual operating costs of these ships by a fraction of one
percent. But for smaller, and slower, freighters, mostly serving local
customers, the pirates remain a problem. These ships tend to be owned by
African and Arab companies, and manned by African and Arab crews.

In dealing with a piracy problem like this, you have three main choices. You
can do what is currently being done, which is patrolling the Gulf of Aden
and shooting only when you see speedboats full of gunmen threatening a
merchant ship. The rule appears to be that you fire lots of warning shots,
and rarely fire at the pirates themselves. This approach has saved a few
ships from capture, and the more warships you get into the Gulf, the more
pirate attacks you can foil. But it won't stop the pirates from capturing
ships. Establishing a similar anti-piracy patrol off the east coast of
Africa would cost over half a billion dollars a year, at least.

A second approach is to be more aggressive. That is, your ships and
helicopters shoot (pirates) on sight and shoot to kill. Naturally, the
pirates will hide their weapons (until they are in the act of taking a
ship), but it will still be obvious what a speedboat full of "unarmed" men
are up to. You could take a chance (of dead civilians and bad publicity) and
shoot up any suspicious speedboat, or larger mother ship. Some of the
pirates would probably resort to taking some women and children with them.
Using human shields is an old custom, and usually works against Westerners.
More pirate attacks will be thwarted with this approach, but the attacks
will continue, and NATO will be painted as murderous bullies in the media.

The third option is to go ashore and kill or capture all the pirates, or at
least as many as you can identify. Destroy pirate boats and weapons. This is
very dangerous, because innocent civilians will be killed or injured, and
the property of non-pirates will be damaged. The anti-piracy forces will be
condemned in some quarters for committing atrocities. There might even be
indictments for war crimes. There will be bad publicity. NATO will most
likely avoid this option too. The bottom line is that the pirate attacks,
even if they took two or three times as many ships as last year, would not
have a meaningful economic impact on world shipping. Total cost to shipping
companies (ransoms, extra fuel, security equipment and services) is over $5
billion a year. 

For example, the international anti-piracy patrol in the Gulf of Aden costs
$300 million a year, a fraction of a percent of the defense budgets of the
nations involved. Politicians and bureaucrats can stand that kind of pain,
and will likely do so and refrain from doing anything bold in Somalia.

 



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