Egypt: Why Are the Churches Burning?
Yasmine El Rashidi
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/may/17/egypt-why-are-churches-burn
ing/

On a recent afternoon this month, in a busy downtown Cairo street, armed men
exchanged gunfire, threw rocks and Molotov cocktails, and freely wielded
knives in broad daylight. The two-hour fight, which began as an attempt by
some shop-owners to extort the customers of others, left eighty-nine wounded
and many stores destroyed. In the new Egypt, incidents like this are
becoming commonplace. On many nights I go to bed to the sound of gunfire,
and each morning I leaf through newspapers anticipating more stories of
crime. Stopped at gun-point; car stolen; head severed; kidnapped from
school, held at ransom; armed men storm police station opening fire and
killing four; prison cells unlocked—91 criminals on the loose. Many people I
know have already bought guns; on street corners metal bludgeons are being
sold for $3; and every week I receive an email, or SMS, or Facebook message
about a self-defense course, or purse-size electrocution tool, or new
shipments of Mace. "These are dangerous times," my mother told me recently
as she handed me a Chinese-made YT-704 "super high voltage pulse generator."
"You have to take precautions, keep it in your bag."

Even more worrying, it seems increasingly clear that a variety of groups
have been encouraging the violence, in part by rekindling sectarian tensions
that had disappeared during the Tahrir Square uprising, when Muslim and
Coptic protesters protected one another against Mubarak's thugs. Since then,
there have been a series of attacks on Copts, and the perpetrators seem to
include hardline Islamists (often referred to as Salafis), remnants of the
former regime, and even, indirectly, some elements of the military now in
charge, who have allowed these attacks to play out—all groups that in some
way have an interest in disrupting a smooth transition to a freely elected
civil government and democratic state.

On the weekend of May 7 and 8, in the Cairo district of Imbaba—an
impoverished working-class neighborhood that has been a stronghold of
militant Islamists in the past—a group of Salafis tried to force their way
into Saint Mina Church, a local Coptic house of worship. They were demanding
the release of a woman, Abeer, an alleged convert to Islam whom they
claimed—without evidence—the church was holding against her will.
(Christians here have long alleged that Islamists kidnap their girls, rape
them, and force them to convert to Islam. In recent weeks, those allegations
have grown. Now, some Salafis have been making similar charges about
Copts.).

The day before, via Twitter, they had called on Muslims to come to the
church to "free a Muslim sister," and on Saturday night, a handful of
Salafis and some thugs gathered outside the church, waving sticks and
swords, chanting Allahu Akbar (Allah is the Greatest), provoking onlookers.
A Christian man pulled out a gun and fired at them from a café nearby, and
Christian residents from neighboring buildings followed suit, shooting from
balconies. Before long, a battle had begun. The Muslim men and a growing
crowd of hooligans brought out Molotov cocktails, rifles, handguns,
bludgeons and knives. Eventually, the church was set on fire.

It was several hours before the police, fire department, and army showed up,
and even then, witnesses told me, "they just stood by watching." By the time
they began firing tear-gas and dispersing the crowds, the Islamists and
their now-large entourage of young men (many of whom were later revealed to
be thugs with criminal records) had decided to move on. "They announced they
were heading to another church to destroy it," one eyewitness, a lawyer (and
Muslim), told me, "and off they went." The army just watched them march off,
weapons in hand.

At the second Coptic church, also in Imbaba, two kilometers away, the mob
wreaked havoc. A video shows a group of several hundred men marching towards
it, breaking open its metal door, and smashing everything in sight. One man
held a gun. Some were bearded; others young and clean shaven. The two
attacks left fifteen people dead (including both Muslims and Copts) and 242
injured—some struck by stray bullets or broken glass, rocks, and wood;
others burned in the fire. Many more were nearly comatose from inhaling
large amounts of tear gas.

By the time I got to the second church early Sunday morning, it was a scene
of devastation. The church priest, Father Metias, sat on a wooden bench in
the middle of the burned building consoling sobbing Christians, who kissed
his hand. "Even if it wasn't this woman, Abeer, who they claim was held by
the church, they would find another excuse. Before Abeer there was Camilia,"
he told me, referring to a similar case in which Salafis claimed that a
Coptic woman named Camilia had converted to Islam and was being held in
another church. (Camilia eventually appeared on TV refuting the Salafi
claims. Abeer, on the other hand, whose whereabouts during the attacks
remain unclear, has since handed herself over to the military and is being
investigated on several charges.) "These Salafis are radical, they want to
eradicate the Copts from the country," the priest said. "But I hold the army
and leaders responsible. There is a security vacuum. Those who commit crimes
are not being held accountable."

By far the largest Christian minority in the Middle East, Egypt's Copts
account for some ten percent of the country's population of 82 million.
Since Mubarak's resignation on February 11, hardline Salafis —who were kept
under tight control by the former regime—have become vocal opponents of the
church. Although they command only a small fraction of the followers of the
mainstream Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis' brand of purist Islam is popular
among some in conservative and working class districts, where there is
growing resentment that the revolution hasn't brought any tangible benefits.
Leading up to the March constitutional referendum, they promoted "yes" as a
vote for "religion and stability," and they are increasingly turning to the
same outreach strategies long-used by the Brotherhood to win supporters. In
some areas, Salafi Sheikhs have been using their Friday sermons to incite
violence against Copts, whom they regard as infidels, and preach against
democracy, which they say is not compatible with their goal of establishing
an Islamic State.

The first major attack on the Coptic community occurred on March 4, when
armed thugs bulldozed a church to its foundations on the outskirts of Cairo,
allegedly over an illicit relationship between a Coptic man and a Muslim
woman. The incident was followed by riots and clashes that left 13 people
dead and 140 wounded. Yet rather than arresting and charging those
responsible—sending them for quick military trials as it increasingly does
with peaceful youth protesters—the military simply called on a Salafi
Sheikh, Mohamed Hassan, to visit the area and try to reconcile Copts and
Muslims.

Outraged by this response, several thousand Copts from across Cairo marched
that night to the State TV and Radio Building, ten minutes from Tahrir, and
set up camp nearby. They were demanding that the military bring the
attackers to justice, rebuild the church, dismiss the district's governor,
and establish a law that insures equal religious protections for Muslims and
Copts. Within a day the protest had grown to some 10,000 people, including
Muslims who had come out in solidarity. Colored blankets and plywood covered
the pavement, and Christian crosses were on display everywhere, as was the
symbol of an Egypt for all: the cross within a crescent. "We don't feel safe
in our own country," one protester told me. He and others I spoke to said
they would not go home until their demands were met. "We want to be treated
as equals," Tamer Wagdy, a 25-year-old Copt who decided to act as my
guardian, told me. "This is our revolution, the Coptic one."

Soldiers from the armed forces, with their tanks, guns, and concrete and
barbed-wired barricades, had entirely surrounded the hundred-square meters
of street where the protesters had gathered. Unlike during the Tahrir
uprising, they were doing little to search people entering the area or
prevent thugs from infiltrating the crowd. One afternoon, I watched a man
rush in, grab a gold chain with a cross on it from the neck of a young
protester, pull it off, then push the protester over the corniche fence and
into the river and try to run away. He was swiftly shoved to the ground by
two teenage boys with crosses tattooed on their wrists and dragged toward a
soldier. I then watched as the soldier held the thief's arm, twisted it,
playfully pulled his ear, and then laughed and let him go, back into the
crowds. "It's because we're Copts," Tamer had told me. "They are doing
nothing to protect us."

Despite several attempts by the army to disperse them, the Coptic protesters
would not budge. Finally, on March 14—the tenth day of their sit-in—the
military council promised to meet their key demands. (The army did later
rebuild the church, though it has not brought charges against the March 4
attackers.) A priest subsequently urged them to leave and many went home.
But ninety or so protestors remained, and the army began a brutal crackdown
against them at 4:30 AM that night, sending in several hundred soldiers with
wooden sticks, metal batons, and Taser guns. Tamer called me in a panic when
the attack began. I couldn't get to him until 7 AM, when the curfew was
lifted. By then, many of his friends had been badly beaten; many had also
been detained. Thirty-two people were hospitalized with injuries, and a
twenty-two-year old man was missing.

While Christians have long played a significant part in Egypt's economic and
political life—Mubarak's long-standing minister of finance was a Copt—they
have also been subject to recurring waves of persecution. In the 1970s,
President Anwar El Sadat attempted to quell the threat of leftist groups by
releasing from jail the radical Islamists (or Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya), who
ultimately assassinated him in 1981, and brutal attacks on both foreigners
and Copts became more frequent. In the spate of terrorist attacks they
orchestrated in the 1990s, Al-Gamaa radicals killed scores of tourists, but
also targeted Coptic churches, monasteries, villages, homes, and shops,
particularly in Upper Egypt, leaving several hundred dead.

Mubarak, to his credit, clamped down: his security apparatus threw Al-Gamaa
members in jail and the situation for Copts improved. Permits to build
churches became somewhat easier to obtain, and broadcasts of church services
and programs became more frequent. But it was also widely known that the
regime was allowing a degree of room for Salafis and more radical Islamists
to keep society somewhat fragmented and provide a counterweight to the far
larger Muslim Brotherhood, whose social services and broad support made it a
more direct threat to the government. Among the diplomatic cables disclosed
by Wikileaks, for example, one from 2009 points to the "striking increase"
in Salafism in recent years, and reports: "One of the most potent factors in
facilitating the spread of Salafism has been the [Government of Egypt's]
largely passive approach to it… the GOE is happy to allow the unfettered
spread of Salafi ideology, viewing it as drawing popular support away from
the MB [Muslim Brotherhood]." The cable further noted: "Salafism is a bridge
to extremism."

Last year, amid growing grievances against the government and animosity
towards the president's son, Gamal Mubarak—who was being groomed to succeed
his father in the 2011 presidential elections—the state security apparatus
increasingly resorted to violence. Days before the parliamentary elections
in November 2010, clashes broke out in a district near the Pyramids between
anti-riot police and Copts, who were protesting a government moratorium on
construction of a Christian community center. At least two people were
killed, dozens injured, and 133 arrested. The government's NDP spokesman Ali
ElDin Hilal blamed the Copts for inciting the conflict; 156 people faced
charges with possible maximum sentences of life in jail.

Then, during the November elections, the Coptic candidates were all but
suppressed. The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) fielded just 10 Copts
among its 780 nominees vying for the 508 available seats. Of a total 5,725
candidates running for election, just 81—less than 2 percent—were Christian.
It was widely believed that this was another one of the regime's tactics to
silence the opposition and maintain the status quo. (In the end, carefully
orchestrated violence, vote rigging and corruption at the hands of the NDP
gave it an unprecedented sweeping majority win—the opposition at large was
eliminated.)

Weeks later, when a bomb ripped through a church in Alexandria, killing 23
and injuring 81, people were outraged by the regime's feeble reaction and
its changing story about the suspected perpetrators. The rumor fast spread
that the Minster of Interior, Habib El Adly—a close Mubarak ally who is now
in jail—had planned the attack in collusion with Islamists. "He wanted to
keep people distracted so that Gamal could be pushed into power," prominent
politicians and retired army generals told me.

Much of this speculation was confirmed when protesters stormed the State
Security headquarters on March 5, retrieving classified files and documents
from the former regime—some of them directly implicating the interior
minister in the Alexandria attack. Other cables and leaked documents
unearthed since the uprising point to close collaboration between the State
Security, or Amn Al Dawla, and particular Sheikhs, who were given public
offices and positions. Among them was Mohamed Hassan, the prominent Sheikh
who had been dispatched by the military to calm tensions after the March 4
attack and who, during the revolution, had called the Tahrir Square
protesters "sinners."

Now that the Mubarak regime has fallen and the military has shown clemency
toward Islamists, radical Salafis have been further emboldened, sometimes to
the point of taking the law into their own hands. In late March, a group of
Salafis in the Upper Egyptian governorate of Qena cut off a teacher's ear
after accusing him of renting an apartment to prostitutes. They have also
called for monuments and shrines to be destroyed, alcohol to be banned, and
all women to cover their hair or risk being beaten and sprayed with acid.
When one such threat circulated by SMS last month, many women chose to stay
home the next day.

These incidents have led some in the Egyptian media to say that the Salafis
have supplanted the Muslim Brotherhood as the fiend that threatens to turn
Egypt into an Islamic state. This is hardly plausible—the military has
promised that "Egypt will not become Iran," and the Muslim Brotherhood,
which hosted a joint conference with the Salafis last week, has denounced
the violence and the radical interpretations of Islam that in part seem to
be driving it. It also isn't clear whether Salafis are principally
responsible for the violence: despite perceptions to the contrary, only 23
of the more than 200 people detained for taking part in the Imbaba attack
have been identified by the armed forces as Salafis (others who have been
identified appear to be mainly thugs, plus some associates of the former
regime).

I emailed my friend Stephane Lacroix, a scholar and expert on Wahabism and
Egypt's Salafi movements, asking for his insight on the recent Salafi
resurgence. He confirmed the State Security's support of certain Sheikhs,
and said that some of the Egyptian Islamists appear to be backed by wealthy
patrons in Saudi Arabia. About the threat to the Coptic community, he said:
"Salafis do have a sectarian rhetoric, but at the same time they are capable
of pragmatism… The biggest threat, I believe, is from mutasallifin (those
influenced by certain hardline Salafi ideas) who are out of everyone's
control. It is those on the fringes of the movement who are causing the
recent troubles."

Although the news of the church attacks and clashes stunned much of the
nation, the Coptic community had already anticipated such an attack. "We
leave the house in the morning and are not sure we will return at night.
Every day we pray for our lives," one man told me last Friday at a Coptic
rally at the Coptic Orthodox Cathedral in Cairo, the seat of the Coptic
Pope, during which Copts called for equal rights and better protection from
the state.

On Sunday, May 8, a few hours after a midday mass had been held at an Imbaba
church for those killed in the local clashes, about two thousand Copts
marched from the Supreme Court in downtown Cairo to the State TV and Radio
Building. The march had already been planned before the Imbaba attacks, but
now, in their aftermath, it had taken on new meaning. One of the protesters'
loudest chants accused Field Marshall Tantawi—the top army commander—of
failing to hold anyone accountable for the attacks: `Field Marshal Tantawi
why are you silent? Is it because you are a Salafi too?'

In one of Mubarak's final speeches, he warned that in his absence, there
would be "chaos." Since his resignation, the military council, led by former
Mubarak insider Tantawi, has at times appeared to be pushing things
precisely in that direction. The police remain largely passive, and soldiers
often just stand by, watching crimes unfold. Meanwhile, the military has
released long-held Islamist prisoners and lifted restrictions on
approximately 3,000 wanted radical Islamists who had been in exile and
blacklisted from entering the country. Among those recently released is
Abboud El Zomor, a member of the Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya who was involved in
the assassination of Sadat and is calling for an Islamic State. He said—live
on Egyptian State TV—that he had no regrets about his involvement in the
killing of Sadat. "If he were alive I would do it again."

El Zomor, who was kept in jail for almost 30 years despite completing the
15-year sentence he was handed down, is one of the radical Islamists
mentioned in a diplomatic cable dated November 2008. The cable (08CAIRO2187)
details the counter-radicalization efforts and pressures Egyptian State
Security has been applying on the Al-Gamaa [GI], saying that if pressure is
lifted, "it is likely that some members of GI would return to violent
extremism." It also cited a government source saying that members of the
group who have been released from prison "are prone to re-radicalization,
and that left to themselves, it is likely that they would do so."

In the end, there does not seem to be any single explanation for the church
attack and the other recent incidents of violence. What is clear is that a
confluence of forces—an army seeking the opportunity to consolidate power,
remnants of a regime stirring havoc, a cabinet with little authority of its
own, radical Islamists aspiring to an Islamic State, and deep-rooted
currents of social intolerance that Egypt has long failed to confront—have
created a situation in which the Copts, among other groups, have become
particularly vulnerable. As the economy plummets, financial woes may lead to
more instability—prices have already risen, and on the streets people are
complaining they have no work. Reports indicate that many are already
resorting to theft to feed their families.

As I write this, there are several hundred Copts camped outside the State TV
and Radio building once again. In their tenth day of protest their
encampment—which attracts several thousand in the evening hours as the
workday ends and the air cools—looks much like it did back in March.
Although the interim Interior Minister has said he will work with an "iron
fist," and the Prime Minister announced measures to prevent religious
sloganeering, to give permits to build churches and mosques on an equal
basis, and to refer those implicated in previous attacks to military courts,
the protesters remain fearful.

A Coptic family is right now mourning the death of their 27-year-old son,
who was shot over the weekend of May 15 on his way to work. Two other people
were killed last weekend in violence at the hands of armed thugs; 60 others
were injured. The army has announced it will extend the emergency law until
after a President is elected, and already there is speculation that it may
postpone the parliamentary elections, citing security concerns. "Whatever
way things go, we'll be under military rule for at least a few years," a
prominent businessman told me yesterday. As another friend put it, "Egypt
today: horror movie, Bollywood production."

Yasmine El Rashidi's eyewitness account of the 2011 Egyptian revolution, The
Battle for Egypt, has just been published by New York Review Books.





[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



------------------------------------

--------------------------
Want to discuss this topic?  Head on over to our discussion list, 
[email protected].
--------------------------
Brooks Isoldi, editor
[email protected]

http://www.intellnet.org

  Post message: [email protected]
  Subscribe:    [email protected]
  Unsubscribe:  [email protected]


*** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has 
not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. OSINT, as a part of 
The Intelligence Network, is making it available without profit to OSINT 
YahooGroups members who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the 
included information in their efforts to advance the understanding of 
intelligence and law enforcement organizations, their activities, methods, 
techniques, human rights, civil liberties, social justice and other 
intelligence related issues, for non-profit research and educational purposes 
only. We believe that this constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material 
as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use 
this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,' 
you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
For more information go to:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtmlYahoo! Groups Links

<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/

<*> Your email settings:
    Individual Email | Traditional

<*> To change settings online go to:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/join
    (Yahoo! ID required)

<*> To change settings via email:
    [email protected] 
    [email protected]

<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
    [email protected]

<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
    http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

Reply via email to