Airport Security: A Flawed Premise
By Captain Matt Sheehy
Captain Matt Sheehy is a retired airline pilot with 37 years experience and
has over 20,000 hours in his log book. He also has extensive experience and
expertise in the field of aviation security. Matt is former OPP Auxiliary
Constable and continues to lend his security expertise to the aviation and
transportation industry.
Doctrine Trumps All
"If the doctrine is right, the tactics and technology will evolve
accordingly, but if the doctrine is flawed then everything that follows will
be flawed"
Captain Liddell Hart, Military Historian
Within our entire national security landscape, our airport security is
perhaps the most visible and high profile manifestation of our collective
will to defend ourselves against terrorism and a component part of our
over-all matrix of National Security. Notwithstanding the efforts society
has taken to defend itself, we have every reason to be deeply concerned at
what happened on a Northwest flight 253 in-bound to Detroit on Christmas Day
2009. This was a very close call. It was only by luck and the quick actions
of in-flight crew and passengers that another tragedy was averted. If the
attempted detonation had worked we would be having an entirely different
national debate today. I propose that for purposes of our collective
discussion on aviation security, we should think as if the attack had
succeeded because nothing in our normal security screening process detected
this bomber or prevented him from boarding flight 253. In short, the system
failed completely once again.
We can't afford to depend on the ineptitude of the terrorists themselves and
their bomb makers or, alternatively, the alertness of overworked in-flight
crews and long suffering passengers, to protect us in the air. It is high
time for the public and the airline industry to push aside the bureaucrats
and jump into this debate with both feet before another tragedy occurs. The
hard truth is that the present approach to airline and transportation
security has not worked and sooner or later it will have to change. The only
question is whether this change happens before or after the next tragedy?
It is in the best interests of our appointed security mavens and the
enormous security complex that has developed since 9/11, to pretend the
present system is working. After all, they have a huge vested interest in
its continuance. The frightening truth is that the present system, despite
being awash in public and private funding, is utterly ineffective. It
provides only the illusion of security. Innocent people are forced to line
up, x-rayed, micro waved, patted down, take off their shoes; and hand over
tweezers,
nail files, and dangerous looking shampoos and to what end? Do we really
feel safer when an 85 year old WWII veteran and his wife are pulled aside
for a random or secondary search? I don't know about you but such a
spectacle offends both my intelligence and my sense of dignity. If we keep
focusing all our energies on innocent people, sooner or later the bad guys
are bound to get through. Meanwhile, helpless passengers are daily
inconvenienced, flights are missed and the public increasingly views air
travel with fear and loathing. The courts are on record that strip searches
are only legal when there are reasonable and probable grounds that a crime
has been committed and is in clear breech of the Fourth Amendment of the US
Constitution.
The Maginot Line Mentality
The French built the Maginot line in the 1930's to prevent another invasion
of France by Germany and to reassure the public they were safe. In large
measure they built the Maginot line to re-fight the last war rather prepare
for the next. The parallels with 9/11 and post 9/11 security precautions are
eerily similar. The Maginot line did indeed make the French public feel
safer but this feeling of security was nothing more than an anodyne, masking
their growing exposure in the face of German rearmament. The presence of
this impregnable line caused the French to under-invest in new armored
doctrines and equipment which they would badly need in 1940. In short, the
Maginot Line, with all of its showy strength, induced a deadly hubris. The
other venal public mantra is "As long as I'm safe I don't care" a new take
on the old Stockholm syndrome.
Trusted Traveler Doctrine
So what is to be done? First of we must stop throwing 99 % of our security
resources at 99.9% of the traveling public that is innocent and indeed on
our side up to the point where they come to the logical conclusion that they
have had enough and just stop flying. Instead of a No Fly List how about a
"Can Fly List?" This sort of trusted passenger system is already in place
and working today as part the United States and Canada's joint TTS system
called Nexus .Biometric supported identification through palm prints and
iris scans are quick and certainly beat virtual strip searches at the
airport. Such a transition in focus and mindset would take time and
resources but is certainly doable.
Instead of the politically correct approach of one size fits all, we need to
change to a threat and trust based system of security. As we begin to
identify and remove the trusted members of our flight crews and our
traveling public and begin to unburden and streamline our system, two things
will begin to happen: First the entire system will become more efficient and
second it will become more cost effective. This new strategy will not only
make aviation safer and more secure it will add a long awaited financial
advantage that this industry desperately needs to survive and move forward.
Israeli Model
Israel is recognized as the world's leader in all aspects of aviation
security and it is insightful to note the simple but effective security
matrix and philosophy they use and have successfully employed since 1972.
They use the model of the ever increasing concentric circles emanating out
from the center. This Israeli model focuses as many resources and attention
on the outer perimeter as it does on the inner core of the circle. If there
is to be trouble, they want it to occur as far away, in time and space, from
the center of security as possible. Better to ID a problem passenger in the
parking lot based on behaviors than at the terminal checkpoint. Better
still, identify him or her days before the flight takes place based on
knowledge of the person and their background. Our system in contrast focuses
almost all of its resources protecting the center point only. This is not
only dangerous but ineffective as it results in huge traffic jams and
line-ups which themselves impeded security by the very chaos they create.
It is time to push our thinking about security out beyond the screening
point.
In Conclusion
Last year the TSA reported it had confiscated almost over 7 million items
from mostly honest and descent passengers and crew and captured not one
terrorist. The knee jerk over-reaction by our security apparatus
precipitated by the botched terrorist attack on Christmas day 2009 should be
a big wakeup call that new thinking is required. Technology is useful but it
is not a silver bullet. And like the Maginot line, technology can lull us
into a false sense of security. It is unclear whether even the latest
technologies could have prevented the "underwear bomber" last December 2009.
What could have interdicted this terrorist was better coordination of
intelligence and better inter-government communications. One way tickets
bought with cash and no checked luggage plus let's not forget his father
begging authorities to do something to stop his son from committing a
terrorist attack. Now that's what I call a profile. We need to stop looking
for bad things and start looking for bad people. We need to develop a
holistic approach to our transportation security requirements it needs to be
intelligence driven supported by an effective (trust but verify)
technologies with the focus on behavior and malicious intent and we need to
do this now.
The reality is that no system can be 100% secure and there are limited and
finite resources to support it. We cannot continue to add more and more
barriers and ever more intrusive and demeaning screening at check points. At
some point the burden will become unsustainable both for the public and the
airline industry.
The essential question is this: do you believe the existing system is
working? If you do, then keep on doing the same things and let's see what
happens? But if you do not, then it's time for some new thinking and new
approaches.
"Men fight for freedom; then they begin to accumulate laws to take it away
from themselves"
Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826)
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
------------------------------------
--------------------------
Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list,
[email protected].
--------------------------
Brooks Isoldi, editor
[email protected]
http://www.intellnet.org
Post message: [email protected]
Subscribe: [email protected]
Unsubscribe: [email protected]
*** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has
not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. OSINT, as a part of
The Intelligence Network, is making it available without profit to OSINT
YahooGroups members who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the
included information in their efforts to advance the understanding of
intelligence and law enforcement organizations, their activities, methods,
techniques, human rights, civil liberties, social justice and other
intelligence related issues, for non-profit research and educational purposes
only. We believe that this constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material
as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use
this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,'
you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
For more information go to:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtmlYahoo! Groups Links
<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/
<*> Your email settings:
Individual Email | Traditional
<*> To change settings online go to:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/join
(Yahoo! ID required)
<*> To change settings via email:
[email protected]
[email protected]
<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
[email protected]
<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
