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>From Rommel to Qaddafi: Petrol Supplies Still the Key to Military Success in
Libya


Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 21

May 27, 2011 03:07 PM Age: 2 hrs

Category: Terrorism Monitor, Global Terrorism Analysis, Home Page, Featured,
Military/Security, Africa, Hot Issue 

By: Andrew McGregor
<http://www.jamestown.org/articles-by-author/?no_cache=1&tx_cablanttnewsstaf
frelation_pi1%5Bauthor%5D=153> 

 
<http://www.jamestown.org/index.php?eID=tx_cms_showpic&file=uploads%2Fpics%2
FDamaged_Oil_Pipeline.jpg&md5=00a84823dd17fc5c9730d45a8919fb9bfa4577fa&param
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DpjbG9zZSgpOyI%2B&parameters%5B3%5D=IHwgPC9hPiI7fQ%3D%3D>
http://www.jamestown.org/typo3temp/pics/122578611e.jpg

Libyan oil pipeline damaged in the fighting

“The bravest men can do nothing without guns, the guns can do nothing
without plenty of ammunition, and neither guns nor ammunition are of much
use in mobile warfare unless there are vehicles with sufficient petrol to
haul them around.” General Erwin Rommel, 1942 [1] 

In mid-November, 1942, General Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps ran out of fuel
in the midst of the battle for eastern Libya. An Italian naval convoy
carrying fuel to Benghazi turned back rather than risk entry into the
harbor. Though sporadic fuel supplies continued to arrive by air and sea, it
was not enough, and the once feared but now isolated Afrika Korps entered a
swift decline, eventually surrendering to Allied forces in May 1943.

Unlike Rommel, however, Libyan leader Mu’ammar Qaddafi does not need to
seize and hold territory in the desert, thus eliminating worries about
extended supply lines. Occasional raids by small mobile groups are
sufficient to prevent the rebels of Benghazi from making new shipments of
oil that will fund their revolt. If the Libyan revolution must be funded
entirely out of the pockets of Western taxpayers, it will become
increasingly hard to sell in countries such as the UK where substantial cuts
are being made in all sectors of government, including the military. Such
raids may also dry up fuel supplies for the lone rebel-held refinery, which
in turn will be unable to supply the gasoline-powered turbines that run
Benghazi’s energy plant. So long as the regime can operate with a free hand
in the desert, time is clearly on Qaddafi’s side in this conflict. 

Perhaps conscious of this, the NATO bombing campaign seems to have taken on
a new tone of urgency, with strikes on Qaddafi’s Bab al-Zawiya compound in
Tripoli designed to eliminate the leadership in hopes of bringing a swift
end to the conflict. The arrival, off the Libyan coast, of the French
amphibious assault vessel Le Tonnerre with 16 military helicopters may also
mark a new phase in NATO efforts to bring the war to an end (Le Figaro, May
22). 

Of course, this still leaves the vast majority of Libyans who, even if they
oppose Qaddafi, have no wish to be ruled by the Benghazi–based clique that a
coupleWestern countries have already recognized as the legitimate government
of Libya. 

Changing Tactics and Strategies

In one way, the imposition of a no-fly zone actually helped the Libyan
regime by forcing it to abandon fuel-consuming armor and aircraft in favor
of lighter and highly mobile vehicles that use far less fuel and are
difficult to identify from the air. Though Qaddafi began the war as a modern
“Rommel,” reliant on conventional armor-based forces, he has been forced to
adopt the methods of the long-range desert raiders of World War II, a proven
formula in desert warfare. In this, his commanders may be able to apply the
bitterly-learned lessons of the 1987 “Toyota War” in Chad, where, like the
Italians before him, Qaddafi’s heavy forces were rolled up by highly mobile
and lightly armed fighters striking out of the desert on light trucks. 

The defeat of Rommel took place at sea as well as on land, with Allied ships
and aircraft intercepting an increasingly larger proportion of the fuel
tankers sent to resupply his petrol-thirsty army. As Rommel noted: “In
attacking our petrol transport, the British were able to hit us in a part of
our machine on whose proper functioning the whole of the rest depended.” [2]
Qaddafi continues to receive fuel from Italy and elsewhere, shipped through
third parties in Tunisia (Guardian, May 5; The Peninsula, May 21). Unless
this flow can be cut off, it will continue to be difficult to bring the
regime’s mobile forces to a standstill.

The Evolution of Motorized Warfare in the Libyan Desert

The idea of creating small, mobile attack and reconnaissance groups using
specially modified vehicles was devised by Major Ralph Bagnold, one of a
number of British officers stationed in prewar Egypt and Sudan, who used
their off-duty time to explore the vast Libyan Desert in stripped-down
civilian vehicles. [3] Bagnold and his colleagues trained a small but
disparate group of volunteers from New Zealand, Rhodesia and various British
Guards and Yeomanry regiments in the techniques of desert driving,
navigation and warfare as part of the newly formed Long Range Desert Group
(LRDG). [4] Besides providing invaluable intelligence, the LRDG mounted
raids designed to destroy enemy airfields and petrol dumps, occasionally
fighting battles with their Italian counterparts in La Compania Sahariana de
Cufra. 

In 1941, the LRDG joined Free French forces, including Senegalese and
Chadian (Tubu and Sarra) colonial troops under General Leclerc, in a daring
850 km raid from the Chadian oasis of Faya Largeauon, the strategically
located Kufra Oasis in southwest Libya. The Italians had thought such a raid
impossible, and the loss of Kufra and its airfield was at once both a
crippling blow to Italian communications with its East African empire and a
resounding demonstration of the abilities of motorized attack forces in
desert warfare. Lessons learned here were later applied in the “Toyota War”
of 1987, in which largely Tubu forces under Hissène Habré (with French
logistical support and the covert assistance of French Foreign Legion units)
drove the Libyan army out of northern Chad, seizing the Libyan’s main base
at Faya Largeau, despite being outnumbered and outgunned. 

Since that time, Kufra’s strategic importance has actually grown as it
provides a controlling position over the vast oilfields of eastern Libya,
and is a vital point on the Libyan-built desert road system connecting Libya
to Chad and Darfur. In late April, a column of roughly 250 Libyan loyalist
fighters crossed nearly 1,000 km of desert from Sabha to Kufra, taking the
oasis after a brief firefight with rebel forces there. [5] So long as Kufra
remains in loyalist hands, there is little chance of the rebels restarting
oil operations in eastern Libya. 

Desert Raids May Cripple the Rebel Cause

Desert raids have enabled Qaddafi to cripple the long-term prospects of the
rebellion quickly, decisively and at little expense. Operating out of the
Waha oil field or the military base at Sabha Oasis (home of loyalist Megarha
tribesmen), Qaddafi’s raiders carried out a series of long-range operations
in early April that struck the Misla and Sarir oil fields, targeting storage
tanks and pipeline pumps. [6] The targeting appears to have been carefully
calculated; the damage could be easily repaired under normal conditions, but
the skilled workers in the oil fields have been evacuated leaving no-one to
make repairs. The rebels do not have the manpower to defend infrastructure
and pipelines stretched over hundreds of miles of desert, so in this way
Qaddafi has brought rebel oil production to a halt without causing permanent
damage to facilities he would like to retain and return to production in the
event of a victory or negotiated settlement. Should these prospects dim in
the coming months (or years), more permanent damage can be easily inflicted.
Aware of their inability to protect the oil fields, the rebel leadership has
demanded that NATO do it for them, a task not easily done from the air. With
the sanctions in force against government oil sales, Qaddafi’s greatest
advantage is that he does not need to hold the oil fields or even conduct
regular raids—the mere threat of such operations is enough to keep the oil
fields inoperative.

The raids have prompted an announcement by the rebel-operated Arab Gulf Oil
Co. (AGOCO) that oil production will not resume until the war is over.
According to AGOCO information director Abdeljalil Muhammad Mayuf:
“Everything depends on security. We can produce tomorrow, but our fields
would be attacked. We cannot put an army around each field. We are not a
military company and the forces of Qaddafi are everywhere” (AP, May 15). 

For now, the lone rebel-held refinery in Tobruk is receiving only the oil
that was already in the pipeline before the attacks as it slowly trickles
through by gravity, the booster system that normally pumps oil through the
pipeline having been badly damaged in an April 21 raid by loyalist forces.
The oil inside Tobruk’s storage tanks is not available for export, being
needed to power desalinization plants and Benghazi’s diesel-fuelled
hydro-electric plant, which is now running at three-quarters capacity to
save fuel. This supply is expected to last only a few months before, in true
“coal to Newcastle” fashion, the rebels will need to start importing oil as
well as the gasoline imports it already relies on (Reuters, April 23; NPR,
May 15). Benghazi’s energy plant used to be run by natural gas from
Marsaal-Burayqah (a.k.a. Brega), but this city is now in loyalist hands.
Keeping the desalinization plants running is crucial in case Qaddafi cuts
fresh water supplies from the “Great Man-Made River” project, which taps
extensive reserves deep under the Libyan Desert. If that were to happen and
the desalinization plants fail, rebel-held territory would also depend on
foreign shipments of fresh-water to survive.

Both Sides Face Petrol Shortages

The rebels’ lone sale of oil was expected to bring in $129 million, but $75
million of this total was needed immediately to pay for a single shipment of
gasoline (Reuters, April 23). Yet, instead of rationing precious gasoline
supplies, the rebel administration has actually lowered the already low
subsidized price, encouraging young men to use the scarce fuel to race their
vehicles in pointless displays of bravado better saved for the frontlines
(NPR, May 15). The Tripoli government, by comparison, is being far more
careful in its distribution of gasoline, even at the risk of inflaming the
public. Supplies available to civilians are short, as are tempers at fuel
stations that can have waits of several days. Libya’s own refining capacity
has always been limited, though efforts are underway to increase capacity at
government-held refineries at RasLanuf and Zawiya (Guardian, May 5). 

Residents of Tripoli recently attacked a bus carrying foreign journalists
with knives and guns—such buses are given priority at petrol stations
(Reuters, May 22). Fuel purchases are being further complicated by a growing
shortage of currency on both sides of the conflict as consumers hoard cash
and banks limit withdrawals—a major shipment of new British-made bills is
being held up by sanctions, though its military use is disputable. In terms
of real funds, however, Qaddafi is well supplied with foreign reserves
(estimated at $100 billion, much of it beyond the reach of sanctions) and a
large store of gold that continues to appreciate, in part, due to the
instability in Libya. 

NATO has begun interdicting fuel shipments to government-held ports in Libya
under the “all necessary measures” clause of UN Security Council Resolution
1973, designed to prevent the killing of civilians by the Libyan regime. On
May 19, NATO forces boarded the Jupiter, a tanker carrying 12,750 tonnes of
gasoline from Italy in Libyan waters, ordering it to anchor off Malta.
Another vessel, the Cartagena, was reported to be on its way to Zawiyah with
a load of 42,000 tons of fuel from Turkey (Petroleum Economist, May 19). The
rebel Transitional National Council (TNC) has asked NATO to prevent all fuel
shipments from reaching government ports, but stopping tankers in Libyan or
international waters is of questionable legality under international law. 

Conclusion

Of course, there is no guarantee that the mercurial Libyan leader will take
advantage of the opportunities now presented to him. Yet, those supporting
the Benghazi rebels should be aware that the initiative still lies with
Qaddafi should he choose to shift his efforts from the now static coastal
campaign and exploit the desert option. While the rebels consist largely of
urbanized Arabs from towns and cities along the Mediterranean coast, Qaddafi
can call on experienced desert fighters from the nomadic Arabs of the
interior as well as fighters from the Tuareg and Tubu groups, long
recognized as established masters of the desert. [7] NATO currently faces a
shortage of refueling and long-range surveillance aircraft in the Libyan
deployment that would help secure the vast Libyan interior. Rebel planning
to deal with difficulties in the south is complicated by internal divisions
within the rebel leadership, a lack of trained men and the general
reluctance of defecting troops to participate in frontline operations. In
this environment, Rommel’s observations on the importance of petrol as a
decisive factor in campaigning in the Libyan Desert are as relevant today as
they were in 1942. 

Notes:

1. Erwin Rommel (ed. by Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart): The Rommel Papers,
15th ed., New York, 1953, p.359.
2. Ibid, p. 328.
3. See Andrew McGregor, Jamestown Foundation Special Commentary on Libya:
“It Didn’t Start This Way, but it’s a War for Oil Now,” April 20, 2011.
4. An excellent account of the Guards units in the LRDG can be found in
Michael Crichton-Stuart, G Patrol, London, 1958.
5. See Andrew McGregor, “Qaddafi Loyalists Retake Strategic Oasis of Kufra,”
Terrorism Monitor Brief, May 5, 2011. 
6. See Ralph A. Bagnold, Libyan Sands: Travel in a Dead World, London, 1935.
7. The Tubu of southeastern Libya and northern Chad have a fearsome
reputation as desert warriors. According to Bagnold: “For many years,
perhaps for centuries, raids had been made by the black Tubuhillmen of the
western highlands into nearly every region bordering on the South Libyan
Desert. Their movements were unknown. They operated in places as far apart
as the Nile Valley and French Equatoria, Darfur and the oases on the Arba’in
Road. How they operated across such vast distances of desert no one could
tell. The raiding parties were small and extraordinarily mobile; their
seeming indifference to water supplies undoubtedly stimulated the general
belief in the existence of undiscovered wells away out in the desert.”
Libyan Sands, pp. 238-239.

 



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