I honor moving the conversation to another place, and thank all those who have shared so much with us all in this place. As the conversation moves, I offer the following written by a friend for a local newspaper, following the teachings of Sun Tzu.
Terrorism's Trojan Horse. As the American expeditionary force sails away on its opening campaign in the War Against Terrorism, do they know the enemy? Seeing it clearly is vital to victory and to the safety of the West. Yet there is a gnawing sense that something has slipped under the radar and could be very close to home indeed. In the aftermath of the blood-curdling events of last week a terrible resolve stalks the U.S. Politicians and journalists alike have deafened us with their war-cries, while a recent poll reported that 58% of Americans wanted military action -- even if it meant the death of many thousands of innocent civilians. With the harsh logic of war, it seems that American popular reasoning has become indistinguishable from the terrorist's. If ever there was a time for political and military leaders to ignore the voice of the people, this is it. It has been known for millennia that rage in war leads to defeat and if Bin Laden or other shadowy figures are taken to be the opposing generals (and both sides now see this as war) they must be seen skilled, ice-cold, strategists indeed. They have turned the enemy's power against himself, and they have perfected a decisive skill, what Sun Tzu in The Art of War calls forming the enemy while remaining formless oneself. Their forces stay invisible, emerging to strike, while the opponent lunges into thin air. They have achieved remarkable victories, mobilizing history's mightiest military against them and, like Giap of Vietnam, hooking the U.S. on the horns of an agonizing dilemma -- it may have little option but to act offensively, yet almost any aggression will stir up a terrorist cauldron. Bin Laden hopes the U.S. will respond to his bloody provocation and fall into this trap. Yet, although the West seeks to hunt down Bin Laden, they have set their sights much higher, and plan on a 10-year campaign to flush out terrorists across the globe. This mission will require far different and far subtler techniques than the ones normally needed for manhunts or warfaring. Here the ghosts of the past rise up. The medieval Crusaders' chief tactic was the all-out charge -- but Muslim armies quickly learned to give way before it, opening their ranks and allowing it to expend its force in space, while attacking the Crusaders' flanks or rear. Later, Lawrence of Arabia, was to see his Arab forces as like "... an influence ... an idea, a thing invulnerable, intangible, drifting about like a gas ... a vapour ... Our kingdoms lay in each man's mind ... " Conventional warfare fails against guerilla warfare or terrorism. It seeks to deliver a knock-down blow to the enemy's strongpoint or centre of gravity. There is no such centre. Special forces may hunt down personalities or bases, but in the face of the assault commanders, camps and trainees will likely dissolve into the terrain only to reform like vapour when the dust has settled. Intelligence on terrorists and their movements becomes a main, potent, weapon. Technology has -- calamitously -- failed to provide this sort of intelligence. What is needed is earthy, human, intelligence, and this must be gained primarily from friendly governments, accessible informers, and ordinary people. This is where the enemy comes into focus, if Western commanders but widen their gaze to see it. Its dispositions are strong and, as a superb recruiter and motivator, it inspires ruthless attacks. This opponent, hatred, has for years been gaining power in the Mideast. Its power will be boosted by the presence of large, aggressive, U.S. forces and -- should they charge in and kill innocent people or otherwise act with ruthlessness -- it will ignite. If hatred explodes, the campaign will likely go up in flames, and Bin Laden's trap will have done its work. Sun Tzu talks of taking whole, of avoiding destruction in favour of a strategy which respects the human context and the world in which we will live once the conflict is past: "Subduing the other's military without battle is the most skilful." In this fraught region, campaigns will have to be undertaken with great caution and -- whatever the impulse for revenge -- with minimal aggression. For Sun Tzu, knowing self and other is the key to generalship: "Not knowing the other and not knowing oneself, in every battle certain danger." If Western, perhaps especially U.S., leaders fail to identify hatred and its close ally, revenge, as the enemy, their campaign will collapse and in the ruins they will have sown dragon's teeth of retribution. This skilled general will know, and have mastered, this opponent. He will understand that under the bombs and missiles there will be people -- men, women, and children who experience suffering in the same way we do. This understanding does not come from moral, ethical or religious scruples. It is just good strategy. So the main enemy force may lie close to home, maybe even within the gates. This enemy must be engaged. And as the conflict unfolds, we might ask ourselves: who are the aggressors, who the aggrieved? Who are the victims, who the victors? Grant MacLean, a freelance writer living in St. Margaret's Bay, Nova Scotia, is co- author/translator of Sun Tzu's The Art of War: A New Translation (Shambhala Publications, 2001). Terrorism's Trojan Horse. As the American expeditionary force sails away on its opening campaign in the War Against Terrorism, do they know the enemy? Seeing it clearly is vital to victory and to the safety of the West. Yet there is a gnawing sense that something has slipped under the radar and could be very close to home indeed. In the aftermath of the blood-curdling events of last week a terrible resolve stalks the U.S. Politicians and journalists alike have deafened us with their war-cries, while a recent poll reported that 58% of Americans wanted military action -- even if it meant the death of many thousands of innocent civilians. With the harsh logic of war, it seems that American popular reasoning has become indistinguishable from the terrorist's. If ever there was a time for political and military leaders to ignore the voice of the people, this is it. It has been known for millennia that rage in war leads to defeat and if Bin Laden or other shadowy figures are taken to be the opposing generals (and both sides now see this as war) they must be seen skilled, ice-cold, strategists indeed. They have turned the enemy's power against himself, and they have perfected a decisive skill, what Sun Tzu in The Art of War calls forming the enemy while remaining formless oneself. Their forces stay invisible, emerging to strike, while the opponent lunges into thin air. They have achieved remarkable victories, mobilizing history's mightiest military against them and, like Giap of Vietnam, hooking the U.S. on the horns of an agonizing dilemma -- it may have little option but to act offensively, yet almost any aggression will stir up a terrorist cauldron. Bin Laden hopes the U.S. will respond to his bloody provocation and fall into this trap. Yet, although the West seeks to hunt down Bin Laden, they have set their sights much higher, and plan on a 10-year campaign to flush out terrorists across the globe. This mission will require far different and far subtler techniques than the ones normally needed for manhunts or warfaring. Here the ghosts of the past rise up. The medieval Crusaders' chief tactic was the all-out charge -- but Muslim armies quickly learned to give way before it, opening their ranks and allowing it to expend its force in space, while attacking the Crusaders' flanks or rear. Later, Lawrence of Arabia, was to see his Arab forces as like "... an influence ... an idea, a thing invulnerable, intangible, drifting about like a gas ... a vapour ... Our kingdoms lay in each man's mind ... " Conventional warfare fails against guerilla warfare or terrorism. It seeks to deliver a knock-down blow to the enemy's strongpoint or centre of gravity. There is no such centre. Special forces may hunt down personalities or bases, but in the face of the assault commanders, camps and trainees will likely dissolve into the terrain only to reform like vapour when the dust has settled. Intelligence on terrorists and their movements becomes a main, potent, weapon. Technology has -- calamitously -- failed to provide this sort of intelligence. What is needed is earthy, human, intelligence, and this must be gained primarily from friendly governments, accessible informers, and ordinary people. This is where the enemy comes into focus, if Western commanders but widen their gaze to see it. Its dispositions are strong and, as a superb recruiter and motivator, it inspires ruthless attacks. This opponent, hatred, has for years been gaining power in the Mideast. Its power will be boosted by the presence of large, aggressive, U.S. forces and -- should they charge in and kill innocent people or otherwise act with ruthlessness -- it will ignite. If hatred explodes, the campaign will likely go up in flames, and Bin Laden's trap will have done its work. Sun Tzu talks of taking whole, of avoiding destruction in favour of a strategy which respects the human context and the world in which we will live once the conflict is past: "Subduing the other's military without battle is the most skilful." In this fraught region, campaigns will have to be undertaken with great caution and -- whatever the impulse for revenge -- with minimal aggression. For Sun Tzu, knowing self and other is the key to generalship: "Not knowing the other and not knowing oneself, in every battle certain danger." If Western, perhaps especially U.S., leaders fail to identify hatred and its close ally, revenge, as the enemy, their campaign will collapse and in the ruins they will have sown dragon's teeth of retribution. This skilled general will know, and have mastered, this opponent. He will understand that under the bombs and missiles there will be people -- men, women, and children who experience suffering in the same way we do. This understanding does not come from moral, ethical or religious scruples. It is just good strategy. So the main enemy force may lie close to home, maybe even within the gates. This enemy must be engaged. And as the conflict unfolds, we might ask ourselves: who are the aggressors, who the aggrieved? Who are the victims, who the victors? Grant MacLean, a freelance writer living in St. Margaret's Bay, Nova Scotia, is co- author/translator of Sun Tzu's The Art of War: A New Translation (Shambhala Publications, 2001). * * ========================================================== [email protected] ------------------------------ To subscribe, unsubscribe, change your options, view the archives of [email protected], Visit: http://listserv.boisestate.edu/archives/oslist.html
