Phil Cowburn wrote:
I strongly agree with Manav here and an implementation must be able to
demultiplex using the Key ID in the incoming packet. It is afterall
for this very reason that we put the Key ID in the packet.
Erblichs point, as i read it is, that most implementations (if not
all) currently take type 2 to mean MD5. This may break once this draft
becomes a standard, which it would, in some time.
My take on this is that even if the WG agrees to Erblichs solution and
introduces a new type, say 3 for HMAC-SHA-1 authentication, then
somebody else could repeat the same argument and clamour for a new
type when we're introducing newer authentication algorithms in the
future.
Hi Phil,
I think RFC 2328 is clear that authentication type 2 applies to all
cryptographic authentication types.
Thanks,
Acee
Lets move on from this issue.
Phil
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