On Jan 30, 2011, at 12:55 PM, Jack Kohn wrote: > Acee: > >> I've finally read this draft and I'm less enamored with it than Michael. I >> think the > >> requirement to protect the source address is valid. However, I think the >> assumptions > > Yes, i agree and there has been a discussion that this should be done. > >> regarding sequence number management which are used to justify the >> challenge/nouce >> are flawed. > > And why do you think this is flawed? > >> If you tie the sequence number to the clock (which I'd guess most rational >> implementations already do), then there is no reason for this nouncense :^). >> Even with a > > You should not tie anything to the clock since the time can go back. > This is also one reason why we dont use the clock to give us the > sequence numbers for regular OSPF and IS-IS.
I wasn't suggesting using the time of day clock but the system clock (which will never go backwards and is required for other reasons). However, I can see that a patient enough attacker could simply wait for a cold start using the same manual key. Given how much extra signaling and complexity is required in this solution, it may better to wait for a solution to the manual keying problem. Acee > > Jack _______________________________________________ OSPF mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ospf
