Hi Acee,
We currently provided the following description of this attack in the draft:
"The paper refers to the attack as "Disguised LSA" and is of
persistent nature. This attack is launched from a compromised router
inside a routing domain. In this attack, the compromised router
alters the LSA of an uncompromised router (victim). Normally, such
an attempt does not have persistence because the victim generates a
new LSA when it sees such self-originated LSAs (referred to as
"fight-back" mechanism in the paper). But the paper makes disguised
LSA persistent because all the fields { LS sequence number, checksum}
are predictable. It alters the existing LSA of victim to suit its
needs but sets the sequence number to +1 of the existing LSA and
alters the LSA so that checksum matches with checksum that would be
generated by the victim when it generates the new LSA. When this
disguised LSA reaches the victim, it does not fight back because it
compares only the fields { LS sequence number, checksum, age} to
check for duplicates and not the actual content of LSA.
This attack enables an insider attacker to fully control the entire
content of an LSA. We think this attack is powerful."
These details are currently present in Section 4, which is titled
"Implementation advice".
We can probably move it to a different section (e.g., "Introduction") to make
it clear.
If you think even more additional details about the attack are useful to the
working group,
please let us know. We will add.
Thank you.
Regards,
Ramakrishna DTV.
________________________________________
From: Acee Lindem (acee) <[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2016 8:49 PM
To: Manjul Khandelwal; [email protected]
Cc: Ramakrishna DTV
Subject: Re: [OSPF] Fw: New Version Notification for
draft-manjuldtv-ospf-sequence-number-00.txt
Hi Manjul,
Would it be possible to succinctly describe these “certain security
attacks” in the draft rather than expecting everyone to read the
referenced paper?
Thanks,
Acee
On 5/11/16, 10:19 AM, "OSPF on behalf of Manjul Khandelwal"
<[email protected] on behalf of [email protected]> wrote:
>Hi,
>
>We have recently submitted a draft which deals with OSPF LS sequence
>number
>generation mechanism.
>
>Abstract of the draft:
> The mechanism for LS sequence number generation as specified in RFC
> 2328 and RFC 5340 is completely predictable. This makes it prone to
> certain security attacks which exploit the predictable nature of LS
> sequence numbers. This draft updates the RFC 2328 to make LS
> sequence number generation an implementation choice rather than a
> fixed increment by 1 for successive LSAs.
>
>https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-manjuldtv-ospf-sequence-number/
>
>We solicit feedback/comments on the draft and request for adoption by the
>OSPF working group.
>
>Regards,
>Manjul Khandelwal
>DTV Ramakrishna Rao
>________________________________________
>From: [email protected] <[email protected]>
>Sent: Monday, May 9, 2016 7:22 PM
>To: Manjul Khandelwal; Ramakrishna DTV
>Subject: New Version Notification for
>draft-manjuldtv-ospf-sequence-number-00.txt
>
>A new version of I-D, draft-manjuldtv-ospf-sequence-number-00.txt
>has been successfully submitted by Manjul Khandelwal and posted to the
>IETF repository.
>
>Name: draft-manjuldtv-ospf-sequence-number
>Revision: 00
>Title: OSPF LSA sequence number generation
>Document date: 2016-05-09
>Group: Individual Submission
>Pages: 10
>URL:
>https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-manjuldtv-ospf-sequence-number-
>00.txt
>Status:
>https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-manjuldtv-ospf-sequence-number/
>Htmlized:
>https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-manjuldtv-ospf-sequence-number-00
>
>
>Abstract:
> The mechanism for LS sequence number generation as specified in RFC
> 2328 and RFC 5340 is completely predictable. This makes it prone to
> certain security attacks which exploit the predictable nature of LS
> sequence numbers. This draft updates the RFC 2328 to make LS
> sequence number generation an implementation choice rather than a
> fixed increment by 1 for successive LSAs.
>
>
>
>
>Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
>submission
>until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
>The IETF Secretariat
>
>_______________________________________________
>OSPF mailing list
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>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ospf
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