On Tue, Mar 31, 2026 at 12:43:48AM -0700, John Johansen wrote:
> On 3/28/26 23:18, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Sat, Mar 28, 2026 at 02:41:23PM -0700, John Johansen wrote:
> > > On 3/27/26 22:55, Greg KH wrote:
> > > > On Fri, Mar 27, 2026 at 02:50:42PM +0000, Qualys Security Advisory
> > > > wrote:
> > > > > Hi Greg, John, all,
> > > > >
> > > > > On Fri, Mar 27, 2026 at 07:23:24AM +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> > > > > > On Thu, Mar 26, 2026 at 06:36:17PM +0000, Qualys Security Advisory
> > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > > Since two weeks have passed now (since the fixes were released),
> > > > > > > would
> > > > > > > it be possible to please assign CVEs to the remaining seven
> > > > > > > AppArmor
> > > > > > > vulnerabilities:
> > > > > > We were told that these all required elevated privileges to hit,
> > > > > > and so
> > > > > > were not classified as individual vulnerabilities. If the Apparmor
> > > > > > maintainer tells us that these really all should be assigned a CVE,
> > > > > > we
> > > > > > will be glad to do so, but until then, we're just going to stick
> > > > > > with
> > > > > > the ones that we have assigned already.
> > > > >
> > > > > Thank you very much for your reply! Adding John Johansen then
> > > > > (AppArmor's maintainer), since he will have the authoritative answer.
> > > > >
> > > > > The problem is that containers can be allowed to manage their own
> > > > > AppArmor profiles (via AppArmor namespaces), in which case an attacker
> > > > > inside such a container can directly write to AppArmor's .load,
> > > > > .replace
> > > > > and .remove files and trigger all these vulnerabilities, even without
> > > > > CVE-2026-23268 (the confused-deputy vulnerability).
> > > > >
> > > > > The way we see it:
> > > > >
> > > > > - either CVEs should be assigned to the remaining seven
> > > > > vulnerabilities,
> > > > > in light of the container use case described above;
> > > > >
> > > > > - or CVE-2026-23269 ("validate DFA start states are in bounds") should
> > > > > be rejected, because this vulnerability is no different from the
> > > > > other
> > > > > seven vulnerabilities.
> > > >
> > > > Looks like this one should be rejected, but I will defer to John as to
> > > > what he wishes to have done here, as he is the maintainer of this part
> > > > of the kernel.
> > > >
> > > It is possible to exploit from a user namespace under the correct
> > > circumstances. Specifically
> > >
> > > A privileged process must do the setup, such that it creates a policy
> > > namespace (requires administrative privileges) and ties the "root"
> > > process of the user namespace to the the policy namespace. The "root"
> > > user of the user namespace, then has privilege to load policy to the
> > > policy namespace tied to the container. The root user of the container
> > > could then use the policy load bugs to attack the kernel.
> > >
> > > Incus/LXD can setup a policy namespace for a container, the patch
> > > allowing LXD to do this is what introduced the LPE.
> > >
> > > Without the LPE a regular user, or even root in a user namespace
> > > can not use the other bugs to attack the kernel, except in the
> > > case outlined above where a privileged process setups a policy
> > > namespace and ties it to the container.
> > >
> > > I should also note there is an easy mitigation for the container
> > > case. Sysadmins can set the sysctl unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy
> > > to false. This will stop root within the container from being able
> > > to load policy even when the policy namespace is tied to the user
> > > namespace.
> > >
> >
> > So do you feel the above CVE should be revoked, or that CVEs should be
> > issued for all of the other commits as well?
> >
> As much as I dislike it, with lxd/incus actively allowing use of policy
> namespaces. I think CVEs should probably be issued for the other commits
> as well.
Ok, will go assign them later today, thanks.
greg k-h
