(Since my main mail and MS365 being the mail provider is, apparently, Not Okay here, I have to send from my alternate address... which ends up here anyways.)

Kevin,

The Ubuntu CVE website and tracker is a little fubar. This said, the CVE data is actually available in a separate git repository which has all the CVEs.

The CVE is listed as an Active CVE and there are no releases yet with the fix.

This does not mean that Ubuntu is ignoring it, but there are a very LARGE number of kernel variations across the current supported releases, each which needs patched, tested, etc.

A copy of the CVE tracker's behind-the-scenes data is available at https://paste.debian.net/hidden/2649d264 currently, copied to there by me.  So this is in the Tracker, but the website part is broken.

This CVE was only made publicly available on 7/27 as well.  The current test cycles are likely to take more than 4 days to get a release available because of testing all the variant kernel packages.


Thomas



On 2026-07-31 19:16, Kevin Riggle wrote:
Does anybody have any color as to why Ubuntu hasn't picked this up
yet?  Usually they're good about picking up the CVE even if they don't
have a fix in place yet.  If as is claimed in the report both 22.04
and 24.04 are vulnerable in default configuration out of the box, I
would expect the CVE to be listed onhttps://ubuntu.com/security/ but
it doesn't show up in search results and
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-64531 returns a 504 Gateway
Timeout.  Is there some disagreement as to the severity or
exploitability of the vulnerability or are they just overloaded?

(Unrelatedly, the Ubuntu security site has been very flaky for me
lately and even CVE pages that I know exist have been timing out on
me.  What's going on over there?  Everybody who uses Ubuntu relies
heavily on the Ubuntu security team, and I'm very worried about folks
if we can't keep infrastructure up and we're likely burning people
out.)

- Kevin


On Tue, Jul 28, 2026 at 6:06 AM manizada<[email protected]> wrote:
Hi folks,

Emailing here now that the embargo agreed upon with linux-distros@ has
expired.

Flagging a local root vulnerability in the Linux kernel's Open vSwitch
datapath (originally reported [email protected] and OVS maintainers on
Jun 19). The fix is now public and has shipped in the relevant stable
trees:

3f1f75536668 ("net: openvswitch: reject oversized nested action attrs")

The first fixed upstream stable releases are 5.15.212, 6.1.178, 6.6.145,
6.12.97, 6.18.40, and 7.1.5.

Impact: Unprivileged user -> root code exec on affected systems where:
   - OVS kernel datapath and conntrack/FTP-helper support are present, and
   - unprivileged user/network namespaces are enabled, or the attacker
     otherwise has CAP_NET_ADMIN over an attacker-controlled network
     namespace.

This affects many distros in stock config via unprivileged user namespaces.
AppArmor/SELinux do not block the exploit once the attacker has the
required CAP_NET_ADMIN. Note that the nature of the bug makes it reachable
from a container with an appropriate CAP_NET_ADMIN, but I have not
validated the container escape possibility.

Bug:
   Open vSwitch validates a userspace action list, then rewrites some
   actions into a larger internal sw_flow_actions stream. The generated
   actions are stored as Netlink attributes, whose nla_len field is only 16
   bits wide.

   A March 2025 change removed the old 32 KiB cap on the total generated
   action stream, allowing the total stream to validly exceed 64 KiB, but
   exposing a pre-existing missing check on individual nested attributes.

   An attacker can submit a valid action -- e.g., a CLONE -- containing
   hundreds of small conntrack actions. The kernel expands them until the
   generated CLONE exceeds 65,535 bytes, then stores that length in the
   16-bit nla_len, causing it to wrap to a small value. Later dump/free
   consumers trust the wrapped length and resume parsing from inside the
   generated conntrack data.

   Conntrack labels and timeout names are attacker-controlled, so fake
   OUTPUT and SET actions can be planted exactly where parsing resumes. The
   PoC turns those fake actions into a kernel pointer leak, a kernel-memory
   read, and a targeted decrement primitive, then corrupts a host process's
   credentials and writes a sudoers rule for root code execution.

Affected distros:
   Below is a summary of the tested distros. The full table, including cases
   where available vendor kernels are unaffected or stock policy blocks
   exploitation, is in the attachment (and in an easier-to-read format in
   the writeup linked below).

   Stock-default exploitable distros
     (an affected regular-track kernel is installed + OVS/conntrack support
     is present + unprivileged namespaces are permitted by default):

     - AlmaLinux 9.7 Workstation/Azure cloud, 9.8, 10.1 Workstation/Azure
       cloud, and 10.2 x86-64/x86-64-v2
     - Alpine Linux 3.22.4/3.23.4/3.24.1 Cloud and
       3.22.5/3.23.5/3.24.1 LTS/virt
     - Amazon Linux 2023 KVM (6.1/6.12/6.18 kernel tracks)
     - Arch Linux monthly (linux/linux-lts/linux-zen)
     - CentOS Stream 9 Cinnamon/GNOME/KDE/MATE/XFCE and 10 GNOME/KDE
     - Debian 12/13
     - Fedora 40 Workstation/Server after an ordinary same-track update
       (the stock ISO kernel is unaffected)
     - Fedora 41 Workstation/Server after an ordinary same-track update
       (the stock ISO kernel is unaffected)
     - Fedora 42/43/44 Workstation/Server
     - Gentoo amd64 cloud image and stable gentoo-kernel-bin
       6.1/6.6/6.12/6.18 branches
     - Kali Linux 2026.1
     - Linux Mint 22.3 Cinnamon
     - NixOS 24.11/25.05/25.11/26.05
     - openSUSE Tumbleweed GNOME/KDE
     - Pop!_OS 22.04 Intel/24.04 Generic
     - Rocky Linux 9/10 KDE/Workstation/Workstation Lite
     - Ubuntu 22.04 Desktop minimal/full and Server
     - Ubuntu 24.04 Desktop minimal/full and Server

   Exploitable after the listed non-default change, with no other default
   config changes:
     - Arch Linux monthly linux-hardened
       (set kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=1, disabling the hardening)
     - Linux Mint 21.3 Cinnamon
       (install the optional linux-generic-hwe-22.04 kernel track)
     - Oracle Linux 8/9/10 KVM
       (install and load the missing OVS/conntrack module packages)
     - Ubuntu 26.04 Desktop minimal/full, Server, and
       generic/AWS/Azure/GCP/GKE/Oracle cloud kernel tracks
       (set kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=0)

Immediate-term mitigations (aside from backporting the kernel fix):
   - Unloading the openvswitch module and blocking it from loading if OVS is
     not required (assuming it is not built into the kernel)
   - Disabling unprivileged user namespaces (though this does not block the
     potential container-escape path described above)
   - Using the emergency BPF mitigation included with the PoC if OVS and
     unprivileged namespaces must remain available.

The issue is tracked under CVE-2026-64531.

Full writeup:
   https://heyitsas.im/posts/ovswrap

PoC for validation; BPF mitigation:
   https://github.com/manizada/OVSwrap


Thanks,
-Asim Manizada


Reply via email to