Hi, I'm disclosing a vulnerability in kubernetes/cloud-provider-gcp that I reported to Google Cloud VRP on 2026-06-14 (Issue #523808414). The 90-day disclosure deadline I communicated to the vendor (2026-10-06) has passed with no substantive response beyond automated queue acknowledgments and a priority reassignment to P2. I've independently reconfirmed the issue remains present in master as of 2026-10-11.
A CVE ID has been requested from MITRE's CNA-LR (CAN-2026-2039459, pending). I'll follow up with the CVE ID once assigned. Affected component: pkg/gcpcredential/gcpcredential.go, line 314 Project: https://github.com/kubernetes/cloud-provider-gcp Description: auth-provider-gcp is a kubelet credential provider plugin deployed on every GKE node, invoked by kubelet on every image pull from GCR/Artifact Registry. ContainerRegistryProvider.Provide() unconditionally logs the raw GCE metadata server response body via klog.Errorf when JSON parsing of the token response fails: if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(tokenJSONBlob), &parsedBlob); err != nil { klog.Errorf("while parsing json blob %s: %v", tokenJSONBlob, err) return cfg } tokenJSONBlob is the raw HTTP response from the GCE metadata server ( http://metadata.google.internal./computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token), which contains a valid GCP OAuth2 access token. klog.Errorf logs at ERROR level regardless of kubelet's -v verbosity flag, guaranteeing the token reaches system/kubelet logs whenever a malformed or truncated JSON response is received (e.g. due to network issues, proxy truncation, or transient metadata service problems). This is a regression of CVE-2020-8563. The same binary explicitly guards against this exact pattern elsewhere (cmd/auth-provider-gcp/app/getcredentials.go:130): // The error from json.Marshal is intentionally not included so as to not leak credentials into the logs return fmt.Errorf("error marshaling credentials") Attack preconditions: - GKE Standard cluster without Pod Security Standards enforcement (common default; GKE Autopilot is unaffected - hostPath blocked by policy) - Malformed/truncated JSON response from the metadata server (realistic via network timeout, proxy truncation, or transient metadata service issues) - Attacker controls a pod on the same node, with either a hostPath mount to the kubelet log location, or Cloud Logging read access for the node Impact: An attacker who controls a pod on a GKE Standard node can exfiltrate the node's GCE service account access token from system logs when a metadata server parse failure occurs, then authenticate to GCP APIs with that service account's privileges. Impact scales with the node SA's OAuth scope: - devstorage.read_only (minimum): unauthorized read access to GCR/Artifact Registry images across the project - cloud-platform (GKE default for non-hardened clusters): read/write access across all GCP services in the project - storage, compute, secrets, KMS PoC and full reproduction steps (standalone Go harness + kind cluster integration test) were included in the original Cloud VRP report; happy to share on request. Nebojša Jaćović
