On Mon, Feb 18, 2013 at 11:58 PM, Alex <alex...@gmail.com> wrote: > I never understood how the denyability aspect of OTR actually works. If > you have a conversation with a "friend" who recently became an > informant, how would OTR provide more denyability than an unencrypted, > unsigned conversation?
It doesn't provide _more_ it avoids providing _less_. If you sign your messages then you can't question the reliability of the informant, you'd have to then argue that your computer was compromised. Resulting in own words testifying against you in a very concrete way. It's not much of a practical problem today— people haven't realized what non-repudiation does for them... hopefully it won't ever be one because people will use things like OTR and only use non-reputable systems where they intend to... _______________________________________________ OTR-dev mailing list OTR-dev@lists.cypherpunks.ca http://lists.cypherpunks.ca/mailman/listinfo/otr-dev
