Post mortem from Cybersource (and likely other payment gateways) on what 
happened on Tuesday...

"This was due to a network routing issue introduced by a third-party regional 
telecommunications service provider."



*Incident Title*
Transaction Failures via Multiple CyberSource Services

*Status*
Resolved

*Incident Date/Duration*
Start:     2018/07/17 16:48 (23:48 GMT)
End:       2018/07/17 18:52 (01:52 GMT)
Duration:  2 hours, 4 minutes.

*Summary*
CyberSource merchants experienced transaction failures utilizing multiple 
CyberSource service offerings dependent upon external gateways/processors. This 
was due to a network routing issue introduced by a third-party regional 
telecommunications service provider. CyberSource teams attempted to utilize the 
alternate datacenter and redundant network routes; however, this action failed 
to mitigate the issue.

*Impact*
During the incident period, merchants processing transactions via CyberSource 
datacenters received ESYSTEM and/or 150 error messages. Any transaction(s) that 
received these error messages failed processing.

*Root Cause*
A regional third-party telecommunications service provider introduced routing 
changes that affected communications between CyberSource and third-party 
gateways/processors. As this new routing information was more specific than the 
routing information advertised by       CyberSource, reply information for 
requests initiated by CyberSource were not routed back as expected. As a 
result, CyberSource was unable to process these requests that were dependent on 
external processors/gateways.

*Related and Contributing Factors*
CyberSource monitoring systems immediately identified the issue at the 
application layer. As the impact emanated from an uncommunicated change 
instituted by the third-party telecommunications service, an increased amount 
of time was needed for determination of root cause and subsequent mitigation 
actions.
This situation (lost return traffic) did not trigger alarms on the network 
components as they were functioning as designed. As no alerts are in place to 
monitor improper routing, there were no observed error conditions in any 
network device to pinpoint the issue for prompt remediation.

*Resolution*
CyberSource mitigated the incident by installing filters on CyberSource 
datacenter routers to ignore the third-party telecommunications route 
announcements. Once CyberSource installed the filters, expected transaction 
routing and processing resumed.



*Action Taken for Remediation/Improvement*
The following action(s) by CyberSource were taken and/or are planned to quickly 
identify and prevent an incident recurrence-
CyberSource has implemented a change to ensure this particular third-party 
network is not able to cause this kind of issue in the future.
CyberSource to include additional filtering on all existing and future traffic 
routes to prevent the inadvertent introduction of incorrect routing information.
CyberSource is working with the third-party telecommunications network 
responsible for this impact to understand reasons behind this change, and 
identify process improvements to prevent a recurrence.

***Timeline and Actions Taken***
List of symptoms encountered and major actions taken by CyberSource during the 
incident.
All times reported in Pacific Time (PST/PDT) and Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) in 
parenthesis.

* Jun 17 16:48 (23:48) - Issue seen on outbound processor connection via 
CyberSource datacenters. Teams observe an application issue with respect to 
outbound traffic communication.
Note: No network impact observed at this time.

* 16:48 - 16:52
(23:48 - 23:52) - CyberSource fails transaction processing to alternate 
datacenter. Issue continues.

* 17:06 (00:06) - CyberSource opens bridge for additional troubleshooting.

* 17:49 (00:49) - CyberSource incorporates a routing filter to a single 
datacenter router. CyberSource observed stability processing through that 
device.

* 18:52 (01:52)- Additional filters are installed on all edge devices. Errors 
on all processing platforms cease.

Mike Castoro | Director of IT
Adrianna Papell Group | 646-723-3885

From: Mike Castoro
Sent: Tuesday, July 17, 2018 10:24 PM
To: Phillip Lewis <phill...@joinvip.com>
Cc: outages@outages.org
Subject: Re: [outages] Cybersource Payment Gateway

Thanks Phillip. Processing is back to normal for me as of 9:36pm ET.
Mike Castoro
Director of IT
Adrianna Papell
(646) 723-3885
mcast...@adriannapapell.com<mailto:mcast...@adriannapapell.com>

________________________________
From: Phillip Lewis <phill...@joinvip.com<mailto:phill...@joinvip.com>>
Sent: Tuesday, July 17, 2018 9:05:41 PM
To: Mike Castoro
Cc: outages@outages.org<mailto:outages@outages.org>
Subject: Re: [outages] Cybersource Payment Gateway

Confirmed.
I got through to support. Major Processor outage affecting the card processors 
(not Cybersource directly). First Data and others involved.



On Tue, Jul 17, 2018 at 9:02 PM Mike Castoro via Outages 
<outages@outages.org<mailto:outages@outages.org>> wrote:
Anyone use Cybersource (a VISA Company) for credit card payment gateway and 
having issues?  Been getting failed authorizations since 7:55PM EST. Been on 
hold with Support for a while.  No alerts or notifications sent by Cybersource 
yet.  Even tried to enter authorize directly in the virtual terminal.

Reason Code 150 - General system failure
The payment processor returned an unexpected result: Connection reset: gpn

Apologies if this isn't the place for this type of issues (I saw a similar 
issue last week).

Mike Castoro | Director of IT
Adrianna Papell Group | New York, NY 10018
(646) 723-3885 | mcast...@adriannapapell.com<mailto:mcast...@adriannapapell.com>
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--
Phillip Lewis
Director of Operations
VIP Communications Inc
Office | (+1) 703-708-1515 Ext 3028
Email | phill...@joinvip.com<mailto:phill...@joinvip.com>
Website | www.joinvip.com<http://www.joinvip.com/>
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