ovs_ct_execute() always steals or frees the skb on failure while
ovs_flow_key_update() does not. So, if it fails and we return right
away, the skb ends up leaked.
Fix that by breaking instead and letting the common error handling
code at the bottom of the loop to free the skb properly.
This is a very unlikely scenario as it requires the packet to become
unparseable by applying a set of actions on a previously parseable skb,
but should be fixed nevertheless.
Reported by Sashiko.
Fixes: ec0d043d05e6 ("openvswitch: Ensure flow is valid before executing ct")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <[email protected]>
---
net/openvswitch/actions.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/openvswitch/actions.c b/net/openvswitch/actions.c
index 5653b6642e10..0500939cc8d8 100644
--- a/net/openvswitch/actions.c
+++ b/net/openvswitch/actions.c
@@ -1380,7 +1380,7 @@ static int do_execute_actions(struct datapath *dp, struct
sk_buff *skb,
if (!is_flow_key_valid(key)) {
err = ovs_flow_key_update(skb, key);
if (err)
- return err;
+ break;
}
err = ovs_ct_execute(ovs_dp_get_net(dp), skb, key,
--
2.55.0
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