Begin forwarded message: > From: "Pekelharing, Pieter" <[email protected]> > Date: 21 Aug 2015 16:06:45 GMT+2 > To: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> > Subject: [Rethink UvA] on the uberfication of the university > > Dear all > > I thought the article below ( circulating via twitter) was interesting > enough to be sent over het uva-list. It hooks up with discussions on this > list about the value and effects of big data, of MOOC’s, teaching, the rise > of the precariat, privatisation and the possible takeover of public > universities by private enterprises on the basis of new business models > derived from the rise of the sharing-economy and the application of new > information technology. It gives a good impression of the forces those who > want to defend the worth of public universities are up against. > > On the one hand we do not want to come over as luddites fighting a rear-guard > struggle against the ‘unstoppable’ advancement of technology, on the other > hand we don’t want to be ‘uberized’ and fall into the hands of private > monopolists. > > What is it in the idea of education that can explain why universities need to > remain public and why isn’t the creation of a perfect match between supply > and individual demand (the promise of big data) the whole story? Is it only > that we as workers, will - just like many other workers - end up getting the > worst part of the deal? Is it that uberfication leads to monopolies with > much too much private power and discretion? Or should the argument against > uberfication be broader in scope? > As usual we will probably have to come up with a story about education’s > intrinsic worth and the way in which its intrinsic worth will be undermined > when the issue education is reduced to the creation of a perfect match > between supply and demand. > Pieter > > The Uberfication of the University > > Gary Hall (Coventry University) > > Talk about being careful what you wish for. A recent survey of UK > vice-chancellors identifies a number of areas of innovation with the > potential to transform UK higher education. Among them are ‘uses of student > data analytics for personalised services’ (the number 1 innovation priority > for 90% of VCs), ‘uses of technology to transform learning experiences’ > (Moocs, flipped classrooms etc.), and ‘student-driven flexible study modes’, > leading not least to the ‘demise of the traditional academic year’. > Responding to this survey, an editorial in the Times Higher Education laments > that, ‘the UK has world-leading research universities, but what it doesn’t > have is a higher education equivalent of Amazon or Google, with global reach > and an aggressive online strategy.’ Yet one wonders whether any of those > proclaiming the merits of such disruptive innovation have stopped to consider > what a higher education institution emulating the expansionist ambitions of > Amazon and Google would actually mean for those currently employed in UK > universities. > > We can see the impact aggressive, global, for-profit technology companies > have on the organisation of labour by looking at those data analytics > businesses that are associated with the sharing economy. Emerging from the > mid-2000s onwards, the sharing economy is a socio-economic ecosystem that > supplies individuals with information that makes access to things like > ridesharing and sofa surfing possible on a more efficient and expanded basis. > As such, it’s often portrayed as bringing community values back into the ways > in which people consume, and as helping to address environmental issues – by > reducing the carbon footprint of transport, for example. > However, certain aspects of the sharing economy are also helping to enact a > significant societal shift. It is a shift in which state regulated service > intermediaries, like hotels and taxi companies, are replaced by information > and data management intermediaries such as the start-ups Airbnb (a community > marketplace for renting out private lodging and other kinds of accommodation) > and Uber (an app that enables passengers to use their mobile phones to > connect with a taxi, rideshare or private car). > > In this respect, the sharing economy is one of the ways in which > neoliberalism has been able to proceed with its programme of privatisation, > deregulation, and reduction to a minimum of the state, public sector and > welfare, even after the financial crash of 2008-2009. For by avoiding > pre-emptive government regulation, these profit-driven sharing economy > businesses are operating according to what can be understood as a > post-welfare model of capitalism. Here there are few legislative protections > for workers, and hardly any possibilities for establishing trade unions or > other means of generating the kind of solidarity capable of challenging this > state of affairs. It’s a situation that often leaves those providing services > for these companies without a host of workers’ rights. As Mike Bulajewski > notes, the list includes ‘the right to have employers pay social security, > disability and unemployment insurance taxes, the right to family and medical > leave, workers’ compensation protection, sick pay, retirement benefits, > profit sharing plans, protection from discrimination on the basis of race, > color, religion, sex, age or national origin, or wrongful termination for > becoming pregnant, or reporting sexual harassment or other types of employer > wrongdoing.’ > > All of which goes a long way toward explaining why in the March 2015 budget > the government declared it is planning to make the UK a global centre for the > sharing economy. Hence also one of the other names associated with this > aspect of the sharing economy: ‘platform capitalism’. Indeed, the for-profit > sector of this socio-economic ecosystem is almost the neoliberal ideal. It > creates a situation in which the general population not only aspires to own > their own homes – the vision Margaret Thatcher sold to the British > working-classes in the 1980s with the right to buy scheme – they also have > the opportunity to become private capitalist entrepreneurs themselves. And in > the case of Airbnb, one way they can do so is precisely by trading > underutilized space in their now privately owned homes. As Airbnb’s CEO, > Brian Chesky, puts it, previously ‘only businesses could be trusted… Now, > that trust has been democratized – any person can act like a brand…. It > means… people all over a city, in 60 seconds, can become microentrepreneurs’. > > The information and data management intermediaries of the sharing economy may > create jobs, then, but ‘it’s a new kind of job’, as Chesky acknowledges. He > calls it a 21st century job, though really it’s closer to a 19th century > Victorian job. For these for-profit companies, and the microentrepreneurs who > labour for them, are operating in an open market that’s relatively free from > the power of state regulators, the labour movement and trade unions, to not > only put a limit on the maximum hours those employed in these new kinds of > jobs work, but also to specify the minimum wage they receive, the number of > days off they need, and the paid holidays and free weekends they’re entitled > to. > > Production and control, profit and risk, are thus not shared in this sector > of the sharing economy at all. It is the networks of users who help build the > platform and provide the aggregated input, data and attention value that > generates a market. It’s the owners of the information and data management > intermediary who take the profits generated by financializing, corporatizing > and exploiting the ’sharing’ of goods and services between the users and > microentrepreneurs. These owners also control the platform, software and > data, deciding pricing, wage levels, work allocation, and preferred user and > labourer profile. > > Research on the sharing economy by McGregor, Brown and Glöss shows a certain > ‘homophily’ occurs, by which it is often ‘similar “types” of people [who] > provide and use these services (in terms of class, education and race)’, > especially when a rating system is employed. Uber, for example, enables both > customers and drivers to rate one another, and suspends drivers if their > scores are not high enough. Finally, it is the microentrepreneurs (who can > now be potentially ‘any person’ rather than a specific set of employees) who > labour to provide services in the market created by the platform on a > freelance, on demand, and frequently precarious basis; who take the risks > associated with having lost their rights, benefits and protection as > employees; and who, according to this research, often face ‘increased > surveillance, deskilling, casualisation and intensification’ of their labour > too. > > Such concerns are only too easy to push to the back of our minds when we’re > trying to find a cheap place to stay for a weekend break, or call a taxi to > take us home from a friend’s place late at night. It’s perhaps only when we > think about these information and data management intermediaries from the > perspective of a worker rather than a user, and consider their potential to > disrupt our own areas of employment, that the implications of the shift to a > post-welfare form of capitalism they’re helping to enact are really brought > home. So what is the potential affect of this transformation in the > organisation of labour on higher education? > > In April of this year, LinkedIn, the social networking platform for > professionals, spent £1.5 billion purchasing Lynda.com, a supplier of online > consumer-focused courses. Although it doesn’t address the sharing economy > specifically, a report of this deal by Goldie Blumenstyk published shortly > afterwards in the Chronicle of Higher Education under the title of ‘How > LinkedIn’s Latest Move May Matter to Colleges’, was very quick to draw > attention to some of its potential implications for higher education. Of > course, with its University Pages and University Rankings Based on Career > Outcomes, LinkedIn already has enough data to be able to provide the kind of > detailed analysis of which institutions and courses are launching graduates > into which long-term career trajectories, that no traditional university can > match. > > But what the Chronicle piece makes clear is that, with its immanent > transition into being both a social network and an actual provider of > education, such data could now be used to develop an extremely successful > data and information intermediary business model for higher education – if > not by LinkedIn then by some other platform capitalist company. > (Academia.edu, say, which has already signed up over 22 million academics who > between them have added more than 6 million papers.) Such a model would be > based on providing ‘transparent’ information on a fine-grained basis to > employers, students, policy-makers and governments. This information would > indicate which of the courses, classes and even teachers on any such > education ‘sharing economy’ platform are better at enabling students to > obtain a particular degree classification or other educational credential, > make the successful transition to a desirable career, reach the top of a > given profession, and so achieve a high level of job satisfaction and salary. > > But it doesn’t end there. The Chronicle report also tells of how LinkedIn > bought a company called Bright in 2014. Bright has developed algorithms > enabling it to match job positions with applicants according to their > particular achievements, competencies and skill sets. And it wouldn’t be > difficult for a business with the kind of data LinkedIn now has the potential > to gather to do much the same for employers and students – right down to the > level of their salary expectations, extracurricular activities, and ‘likes’. > This business could charge a fee for doing so, just as many dating agencies > make a healthy profit from introducing people with compatible personalities > as deduced by algorithms. They could then charge a further fee for making > this information and data available on a live basis in real time – something > highly desirable in today’s ‘flexible’ economy, where many employers like to > draw from a pool of zero-hours workers available ‘on tap’. > > More ominous still, given that it would be able to control the platform, > software, data analytics and the associated ecosystem, it’s clear that such a > global platform capitalist higher education business would also have the > power to decide who could be most easily seen and found in any such > alternative market for education (much as Google’s does with its page > ranking, the European commission having decided in April 2015 that Google has > a case to answer regarding possible abuse of its dominance of search through > ‘systematically’ awarding greater prominence to its own ads). Understandably, > perhaps – especially following the recent fuss over MOOCs – Blumenstyk’s > analysis of LinkedIn’s acquisition of Lynda.com shies away from arriving at > any overly exaggerated or pessimistic conclusions as to what all this may > mean for higher education and its system of certification and credentialing. > Nevertheless, if a company like LinkedIn took the decision to provide this > level of fine-grained data and information for its own unbundled, relatively > inexpensive online courses, but not for those offered by its more expensive > market competitors in the public sector, it would surely have the potential > to be at least as disruptive as Coursera, Udacity, FutureLearn and co. have > proven to be to date, if not considerably more so. For the kind of > information about degrees and student final destinations and ability to react > to market changes any traditional bricks-and-mortar university is capable of > providing on its own will appear extremely unsophisticated, limited and slow > to compile and deliver by comparison. And, lest the adoption by a for-profit > sharing economy business of such an aggressive stance toward public > universities seems unlikely, it’s worth remembering that Google maintains its > dominance of search in much the same way. In the words of its chief research > guru, Peter Norvig, the reason Google has a 90-95% share of the European > market for search is not because it has better algorithms than Yahoo and > Bing, ‘it just has more data’. Indeed, one of the great myths about > neoliberalism is that it strives to create competition on an open market. As > the venture capitalist Peter Thiel, co-founder of Pay-Pal and early Facebook > investor, emphasizes in his book Zero to One, what neoliberal businesses > actually want is to be a monopoly: to be so dominant in their area of > operation that they in fact escape the competition and become a market of one. > > Of course many of those who work in higher education already have contingent, > precarious positions as a consequence of neoliberalism’s insistence that > universities operate increasingly like businesses. According to Sally Hunt, > secretary of the University and College Union (UCU), ‘more than a third of > the UK’s total academic workforce is now on temporary, fixed-term contracts’, > with a recent UCU survey of 2,500 casualised staff identifying a third of > those in universities experiencing difficulty paying household bills, and as > many as a fifth having problems finding enough money to buy food. > > If an higher education equivalent of Amazon or Google along the lines > sketched above did come into being, it would disrupt the public university > still further – only this time by means of an innovative, profit-driven, > ‘sharing economy’ business operating according to a post-welfare capitalist > model, just as Airbnb is currently disrupting the state regulated hotel > industry, and Uber state regulated taxi companies. Increasing numbers of > university workers would thus find themselves in a situation not dissimilar > to that facing many cab drivers today. Instead of operating in a sector > that’s accountable to state regulators, they would have little choice but to > sell their cheap and easy-to-access courses to whoever’s prepared to pay for > them in the ‘alternative’ education market created by platform capitalism. > They too would become atomised, precarious, freelance microentrepreneurs. As > such, they’d experience all the problems of deprofessionalisation, > intensification and surveillance such a post-welfare capitalist economy > brings. Is that what UK vice-chancellors actually want? > > Van http://discoversociety.org/2015/07/30/the-uberfication-of-the-university/ > > > _______________________________________________ > Rethink UvA mailing list: [email protected] > Guidelines / Working Groups: http://bit.ly/rethink-working-groups > (Un)subscribe / change details: > https://list.uva.nl/mailman/listinfo/rethink-uva > View members: https://list.uva.nl/mailman/roster/rethink-uva > Website: http://rethinkuva.org/ > Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/groups/1409697112666035/ > Twitter: https://twitter.com/rethinkUvA
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