Just my 2 cents... In the real world, trust is earned, not granted. To develop a trusted relationship, you start off offering a small asset which's loss is acceptable and allowing the other person to respond with an asset which's value is slightly higher, so the loss would be acceptable as well and so on.
The nature of the asset (money, social support, valuable goods, etc) is not of primary importance, but assets which can be created at no cost are not valuable in this interaction (and the amount of trust is directly depending on the cost of the asset). Transfer of trust is possible in principle, but you need an "unbroken chain of trust" which has to be created in the conventional way, as it doew not make a difference for the sybil on whom the assets are spend. (On a more sophisticated level, my guess would be that transfer of trust is devaluating the trust slightly, ruling out "economy of scale schemes", that is, creating a relationsship once and exploiting it several times). In order to mimic that behaviour you need two things: tradeable assets which can not be created for free and a memory of transactions. Regards, Matthias > -----Original Message----- > From: [email protected] > [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of > James A. Donald > Sent: Samstag, 21. Juli 2012 23:27 > To: Tony Arcieri > Cc: theory and practice of decentralized computer networks > Subject: Re: [p2p-hackers] The Cryptosphere > > On 2012-07-20 3:43 AM, Tony Arcieri wrote: > > To confuse the algorithm you would either need an extremely > small pool > > of peers (e.g. you're still being bootstrapped into the network and > > you don't know enough to tell good peers from bad), or a > large number > > of lying-but-otherwise-good-faith participants to convince a given > > peer to interact with a Sybil. > > Someone who gives every man his due, which is to say a peer > that supplies bandwidth and storage in return for bandwidth > and storage, is likely to tell the truth about other peers, > though by no means guaranteed. > > Determining truth by consensus, and filtering out those that > deviate from consensus, is apt to go into a positive feedback > loop that winds up dominated by lying sybils. > > This problem can be mitigated by tracing every purported fact > to the original alleged observer, and ensuring that you are > connected to the original observer by a chain of known good > people: You have reason to trust Bob because Bob gave you > your due, and reason to trust Carol, because Bob says that > Carol gave him her due, and reason to trust Dave, because > Carol says Dave gave her his due. Of course as the chain > gets longer, one's confidence in the chain exponentially > approaches zero, but as the chain has more links in parallel, > one's confidence in the chain exponentially approaches unity. > > You have reason to trust Bob and Carol because they both gave > you your due, and reason to trust Dave because both Bob and > Carol say Dave gave them their due. This is almost the same > as the "determine truth by consensus" rule, but unlike the > consensus rule, free from positive feedback loops, provided > one uses Bayesian probability throughout. > > This difference between the quite disastrous consensus rule, > and this rule, is the correct use of Bayesian probability. > > _______________________________________________ > p2p-hackers mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers > _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list [email protected] http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
