Hi all,
I've just finished reading the draft
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-irtf-p2prg-rtc-security-01.txt
It occurs to me that the following attack scenario might be possible:
1. Client A registers its location, storing a tuple of the form <id_a,
location_a, expiredtime> to a peer P in the DHT overlay (P also
represents all replica nodes storing the key id_a)
2. Client B searches for A's location, as a result contacts P.
3. P decides to not give B the latest A's location. It either sends a
out-of-date tuple regarding A's location or says that A is not in the
network. A has no way to know or enforce P to behave properly.
It is a variation of the Denial of Service attack, in which the client A
could be made completely unreachable to the other clients.
Assume the authenticity and integrity of all the tuples, would you say
that this is a probable attack? My main concern is what incentives of P
in doing this, especially in this P2P-SIP setting. I think this attack
depends on the incentives model that encourages clients to act as peers
in the DHT overlay. I would love to hear some reasonable explanation of
why P would (and would not) engage in this attack.
Looking forwards to hear your comments.
Anh.
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