<as individual> Lots of implementations of a protocol like, say, SIP, don't "care" to use tls. It gets low on the implementation priority list, many implementations don't have it, and then even the ones that do can't use it because the other side doesn't. We have lousy, very lousy experience with security options like that. We KNOW what happens when we don't make it integral to the operation of the protocol. I don't want to go through that again.
While there is no such thing as protocol police, I think the notion that p2pip ALWAYS uses D/TLS is a very useful, powerful, and important characteristic of the protocol. If you don't need much security, negotiate a null cipher suite. The overhead is low, the benefits are great. Brian On 12/11/09 2:07 PM, "jc" <[email protected]> wrote: > Some individuals may not care to use tls or dtls. These standards > aren't practical in all cases. Encrypted transports a MUST but > mechanism should be optional. This is better than people not using > this draft and resolves conearns about the underlying transports lack > of performance in certain use cases. > > Thinking Chord only as a topology plugin is too narrow from a security > performance perspective. I have bad experience with Kademlia as a > topology plugin. If you understand Kademlia you should understand how > the routing table functions and how the transports reflect that. All > topology plugins will be forced to tune themselves to d/tls which the > result is a less efficient system. > > I don't see where anyone mentioned throw out encryption entirely but I > may be wrong. > > Julian > > Sent from my iPhone > > On Dec 11, 2009, at 1:16 PM, Brian Rosen <[email protected]> wrote: > >> <as individual> >> I disagree. >> >> The problem is that we have a whole lot of history and experience. >> >> The experience is that if we don't insist, and make security >> integral to the >> protocol, it doesn't get implemented and we have a majority of >> insecure >> systems. >> >> If we do insist, the cost of the security is reasonable: the dire >> predictions that it's too costly, too hard, ... don't happen. >> >> No amount of text explaining when the security mechanism is or isn't >> appropriate works. You have to make the mechanism integral to the >> operation >> of the protocol, as we have done here. >> >> I don't see anything in p2psip which would be different then our >> history and >> experience. The costs aren't as bad as you fear. The probability >> of nearly >> every system being implemented insecurely is very high if you make it >> optional. >> >> Don't do that. >> >> Brian >> >> >> On 12/11/09 12:49 PM, "Michael Chen" <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> I too agree with the three of you. D/TLS should be optional. >>> Several of my >>> previous post voice concerns about redundancy and efficiency of the >>> transport >>> layer. >>> >>> --Michael >>>> -------- Original Message -------- >>>> Subject: Re: [P2PSIP] Concerns, questions and nits about base -06 as >>>> part of the WGLC >>>> From: jc <[email protected]> >>>> Date: Fri, December 11, 2009 7:26 am >>>> To: Ari Keranen <[email protected]> >>>> Cc: P2PSIP WG <[email protected]> >>>> >>>> I said this about 7 months ago and I still agree that there should >>>> be >>>> no mandatory transport layer encryption as this should be provided >>>> outside of the scope of this draft. >>>> >>>> Julian >>>> >>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>> >>>> On Dec 11, 2009, at 5:39 AM, Ari Keranen >>>> <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi, >>>>> >>>>> David A. Bryan wrote: >>>>>> Concern 1: Mandatory TLS/DTLS Inappropriate in some Contexts >>>>>> I¹ve raised this issue before, but I¹m hoping that now that >>>>>> people have had a bit more time to think about all the use cases, >>>>>> see what it means in the real world, etc., there might be a bit mo >>>>>> re support for modifying the requirement for TLS/DTLS. TLS/DTLS ma >>>>>> kes sense in some cases, but if we are expecting RELOAD to be reus >>>>>> able, it is clear to me that it does not make sense in all cases. >>>>>> It was familiar >>>>>> to the editors, and well understood, so it made sense as a >>>>>> proposal, >>>>>> but I disagree with it being the mandatory/only solution. >>>>> >>>>> I fully agree with David that making (D)TLS mandatory is not a good >>>>> idea, especially concerning re-usability of the protocol in >>>>> scenarios >>>>> where you already have similar security features provided by the >>>>> underlying system. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Cheers, >>>>> Ari >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> P2PSIP mailing list >>>>> [email protected] >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/p2psip >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> P2PSIP mailing list >>>> [email protected] >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/p2psip >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> P2PSIP mailing list >>> [email protected] >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/p2psip >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> P2PSIP mailing list >> [email protected] >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/p2psip _______________________________________________ P2PSIP mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/p2psip
