This would break all the current deployments and implementation and not just in 
a way where some new software would need to be pushed out - all new 
certificates would need to be issues. From my point of view, this is too late 
for this change and instead it could be addressed with an extension.

On Jul 1, 2011, at 5:47 AM, Gonzalo Camarillo wrote:

> Hi,
> 
> please, let me know whether or not these modifications will be included
> in the base draft at this point.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Gonzalo
> 
> On 21/06/2011 10:58 PM, Marc Petit-Huguenin wrote:
>> I read the paper and this modification makes sense to me (for example without
>> this modification a peer that is purely used for routing and storage purpose,
>> like a bootstrap peer, had to invent a valid, unique, and useless username 
>> just
>> to acquire a certificate).
>> 
>> So I support its inclusion in draft-ietf-p2psip-base.
>> 
>> On 06/09/2011 10:47 AM, Diego Suarez wrote:
>>> I think it would require a (slight) modification in the base document.
>>> Current P2PSIP certification model is based on a single PKC (including
>>> both usernames and nodeIDs) that uniquely identifies a user and her
>>> devices. On the other hand, our model is base on a split certification.
>>> Devices and users are independent. Each device has its own PKC including
>>> a nodeID and a PK. Similarly, each user has her own PKC including her
>>> username and a PK. This approach do not prevent a centralized entity
>>> (such as an offline CA) to have information related to the devices each
>>> user (or company, etc.) has registered, but permits, among other
>>> improvements, a user to be connected to the system through devices she
>>> has not registered herself such as a phone issued by a telco or a fixed
>>> phone in a laboratory shared by all the members of a research group.
>> 
>> 
>>> On Thu, 2011-06-09 at 10:05 -0700, Marc Petit-Huguenin wrote:
>>> Does this model really required modifications in the base document, or can 
>>> it be
>>> designed as an extension?  (Unfortunately the paper is not freely 
>>> available, so
>>> it is difficult to know really what is needed for this).
>> 
>>> On 06/09/2011 07:31 AM, Diego Suarez wrote:
>>>>>> Hi, 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I had in mind writing a draft about this, but since I'm running out of
>>>>>> time, I would like to summarize a new certification model for P2PSIP I
>>>>>> have been working on, in case it is of interest for the group.
>>>>>> Further details can be found in paper:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> D. Touceda, J. Camara, L. Villalba, and J. Marquez, Advantages of
>>>>>> identity certificate segregation in P2PSIP systems, Communications,
>>>>>> IET, vol. 5, pp. 879889, Apr. 2011.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> The idea is to split the certification of users and devices. Devices are
>>>>>> identified by PKCs including a nodeID and the PK of the device, while
>>>>>> users are identified by PKCs including a username and the PK of the
>>>>>> user. Similar models have been used before in other communications
>>>>>> systems, such as GSM where devices and users are separately represented
>>>>>> by the international mobile equipment identity (IMEI) stored in the
>>>>>> phones and the international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) stored in
>>>>>> the user subscriber identity module (SIM), respectively.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Motivations of this model are:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> - Users and devices are different entities performing different
>>>>>> roles within a P2PSIP system. Devices are nodes of the P2P
>>>>>> overlay network (represented by a nodeID) that offer services
>>>>>> (to route messages, to store data, . . .) to the system, while
>>>>>> users (represented by an username) utilize these services,
>>>>>> usually to establish media communications using SIP.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> - Support for mobility scenarios where a user may be logged at different
>>>>>> devices at the same time using the same PKC.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> - Support several users to be logged in the same device (like a fixed
>>>>>> phone) at the same time.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> - Support for user independent hard-coded devices.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> - Interoperability with SIP. SIP certificates are not valid in actual
>>>>>> P2PSIP since they don't include a nodeID.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> cheers
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Diego Suárez
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Wed, 2011-06-08 at 09:48 -0700, David A. Bryan wrote:
>>>>>>> Unless something major comes up, we plan to request the newest version
>>>>>>> of the base draft, draft-ietf-p2psip-base-15, be published. I'll put
>>>>>>> in the request in a week (June 16th or 17th). If there are any further
>>>>>>> comments from the last call a while ago (or further comments on the
>>>>>>> comments since then), please send them to the list ASAP.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> David (as chair)
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> P2PSIP mailing list
>>>>>>> [email protected]
>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/p2psip
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> P2PSIP mailing list
>>>>>> [email protected]
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/p2psip
>> 
>> 
>> 
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