Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-p2psip-share-09: No Objection
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-p2psip-share/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- - General: this feels more like an experimental spec. If the authors didn't object I think that'd be more appropriate. - General: can these ACLs be resources to which access is controlled via another of these ACLs? If so, then it seems like there may be some nasty corner-cases where things get lost (so nobody can change 'em in future) and I don't see how one might recover from that. (Apologies if I'm just mixed up here, I read this fairly quickly and didn't reload RELOAD into my little head first;-) - 3.1: 24 bits of collision resistance isn't many. I'm not clear why that's ok - 3.1, last para: SHA-1 isn't a good example really, SHA-256 would be better today. - 5.3: Is the mapping to USER and DOMAIN from certificates well-defined? It may be in RELOAD, I forget, sorry;-) It doesn't seem to be well-defined here anyway. _______________________________________________ P2PSIP mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/p2psip
