On 26/03/11 13:40, Ray Kohler wrote:
So, after a couple of days of messing around (and fixing random things
here and there), I was able to go end-to-end, verifying a signed repo
DB, and then installing a signed package from that repo. Very nice!
I ended up testing out the failure case on verifying signatures a bit
more than I wanted, though, as I something surprised me: When
importing keys with pacman-key, they keys themselves are imported
fine, but they are not marked as sufficiently trusted that the
signatures are worth anything.
I just imported my "real" GPG pubring (which has nothing in it but my
own key) with "pacman-key -a ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg", and used that same
key to sign a package and add that package to a signed repo. GPGme
returns "unknown key" when asked to verify these sigs, so pacman
flunks them as "invalid signature". After editing the trustdb to mark
this key as "ultimate" (hey, it's my own key after all), everything
worked.
So, my question is, where does the fault lie? Did I make some wrong
assumption? Should pacman-key set high levels of trust on keys it
imports? Should alpm configure GPGme with trust-level=always?
I posted on the gpgme list trying to clarify what was needed for a
signature to be validated. Essentially one key with ultimate trust is
needed in a gpg keyring. So, the options are:
1) the user creates their own key in the pacman keyring and uses that to
sign keys for the repos they want to add
2) the users imports the master key for any repo they use with ultimate
trust
I personally prefer option #1, but it really makes no difference given
the keyring is probably only used for pacman.
For Arch, I guess we will have one (or more) master keys that will sign
all the developer keys. The user will have to manually import the
master key and then install a pacman-keyring package (signed by that
key) which contains all the developers keys.
Allan
