Author: igor
Date: Fri Jan 3 03:19:24 2014
New Revision: 2813
Log:
libcap uapi headers fix
Added:
trunk/libcap/libcap-2.23-uapi-1.patch
Added: trunk/libcap/libcap-2.23-uapi-1.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ trunk/libcap/libcap-2.23-uapi-1.patch Fri Jan 3 03:19:24 2014
(r2813)
@@ -0,0 +1,639 @@
+diff -Naur libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/linux/capability.h
libcap-2.23/libcap/include/linux/capability.h
+--- libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/linux/capability.h 2013-12-16
05:47:10.000000000 +0100
++++ libcap-2.23/libcap/include/linux/capability.h 1970-01-01
01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+@@ -1,219 +0,0 @@
+-/*
+- * This is <linux/capability.h>
+- *
+- * Andrew G. Morgan <mor...@kernel.org>
+- * Alexander Kjeldaas <as...@guardian.no>
+- * with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
+- *
+- * See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
+- *
+- * ftp://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
+- */
+-#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
+-#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
+-
+-#include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
+-
+-
+-#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
+-#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
+-
+-extern int file_caps_enabled;
+-
+-typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
+- __u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
+-} kernel_cap_t;
+-
+-/* exact same as vfs_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely
*/
+-struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
+- __u32 magic_etc;
+- kernel_cap_t permitted;
+- kernel_cap_t inheritable;
+-};
+-
+-#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
+-#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
+-
+-
+-struct file;
+-struct inode;
+-struct dentry;
+-struct user_namespace;
+-
+-struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void);
+-
+-extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
+-extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
+-
+-/*
+- * Internal kernel functions only
+- */
+-
+-#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) \
+- for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
+-
+-/*
+- * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS:
+- *
+- * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant.
+- * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.
+- *
+- * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs.
+- *
+- * We could also define fsmask as follows:
+- * 1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions
+- * 2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions
+- */
+-
+-# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \
+- | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD) \
+- | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \
+- | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \
+- | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \
+- | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))
+-
+-# define CAP_FS_MASK_B1 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+-
+-#if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
+-# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
+-#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
+-
+-# define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
+-# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})
+-# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
+- | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
+- CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
+-# define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
+- | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
+- CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
+-
+-#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
+-
+-# define cap_clear(c) do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
+-
+-#define cap_raise(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
+-#define cap_lower(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &=
~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
+-#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
+-
+-#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP) \
+-do { \
+- unsigned __capi; \
+- CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
+- c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi]; \
+- } \
+-} while (0)
+-
+-#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP) \
+-do { \
+- unsigned __capi; \
+- CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
+- c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi]; \
+- } \
+-} while (0)
+-
+-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a,
+- const kernel_cap_t b)
+-{
+- kernel_cap_t dest;
+- CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |);
+- return dest;
+-}
+-
+-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a,
+- const kernel_cap_t b)
+-{
+- kernel_cap_t dest;
+- CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &);
+- return dest;
+-}
+-
+-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a,
+- const kernel_cap_t drop)
+-{
+- kernel_cap_t dest;
+- CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~);
+- return dest;
+-}
+-
+-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
+-{
+- kernel_cap_t dest;
+- CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~);
+- return dest;
+-}
+-
+-static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
+-{
+- unsigned __capi;
+- CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
+- if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
+- return 0;
+- }
+- return 1;
+-}
+-
+-/*
+- * Check if "a" is a subset of "set".
+- * return 1 if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
+- * cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return 1
+- * return 0 if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
+- * cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return 0
+- */
+-static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
+-{
+- kernel_cap_t dest;
+- dest = cap_drop(a, set);
+- return cap_isclear(dest);
+-}
+-
+-/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
+-
+-static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap)
+-{
+- const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
+- return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]);
+-}
+-
+-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
+-{
+- const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
+- return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
+-}
+-
+-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
+- const kernel_cap_t permitted)
+-{
+- const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
+- return cap_combine(a,
+- cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set));
+-}
+-
+-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
+-{
+- const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
+- return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
+-}
+-
+-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
+- const kernel_cap_t permitted)
+-{
+- const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
+- return cap_combine(a,
+- cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
+-}
+-
+-extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
+-extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
+- struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+-extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
+-extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
+- struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+-extern bool capable(int cap);
+-extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+-extern bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
+-extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace
*ns, int cap);
+-
+-/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
+-extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct
cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
+-
+-#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
+diff -Naur libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/linux/prctl.h
libcap-2.23/libcap/include/linux/prctl.h
+--- libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/linux/prctl.h 2013-12-16
05:46:28.000000000 +0100
++++ libcap-2.23/libcap/include/linux/prctl.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000
+0100
+@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
+-#ifndef _LINUX_PRCTL_H
+-#define _LINUX_PRCTL_H
+-
+-/* Values to pass as first argument to prctl() */
+-
+-#define PR_SET_PDEATHSIG 1 /* Second arg is a signal */
+-#define PR_GET_PDEATHSIG 2 /* Second arg is a ptr to return the signal */
+-
+-/* Get/set current->mm->dumpable */
+-#define PR_GET_DUMPABLE 3
+-#define PR_SET_DUMPABLE 4
+-
+-/* Get/set unaligned access control bits (if meaningful) */
+-#define PR_GET_UNALIGN 5
+-#define PR_SET_UNALIGN 6
+-# define PR_UNALIGN_NOPRINT 1 /* silently fix up unaligned user
accesses */
+-# define PR_UNALIGN_SIGBUS 2 /* generate SIGBUS on unaligned user
access */
+-
+-/* Get/set whether or not to drop capabilities on setuid() away from
+- * uid 0 (as per security/commoncap.c) */
+-#define PR_GET_KEEPCAPS 7
+-#define PR_SET_KEEPCAPS 8
+-
+-/* Get/set floating-point emulation control bits (if meaningful) */
+-#define PR_GET_FPEMU 9
+-#define PR_SET_FPEMU 10
+-# define PR_FPEMU_NOPRINT 1 /* silently emulate fp operations
accesses */
+-# define PR_FPEMU_SIGFPE 2 /* don't emulate fp operations, send
SIGFPE instead */
+-
+-/* Get/set floating-point exception mode (if meaningful) */
+-#define PR_GET_FPEXC 11
+-#define PR_SET_FPEXC 12
+-# define PR_FP_EXC_SW_ENABLE 0x80 /* Use FPEXC for FP exception enables */
+-# define PR_FP_EXC_DIV 0x010000 /* floating point
divide by zero */
+-# define PR_FP_EXC_OVF 0x020000 /* floating point
overflow */
+-# define PR_FP_EXC_UND 0x040000 /* floating point
underflow */
+-# define PR_FP_EXC_RES 0x080000 /* floating point
inexact result */
+-# define PR_FP_EXC_INV 0x100000 /* floating point
invalid operation */
+-# define PR_FP_EXC_DISABLED 0 /* FP exceptions disabled */
+-# define PR_FP_EXC_NONRECOV 1 /* async non-recoverable exc. mode */
+-# define PR_FP_EXC_ASYNC 2 /* async recoverable exception mode */
+-# define PR_FP_EXC_PRECISE 3 /* precise exception mode */
+-
+-/* Get/set whether we use statistical process timing or accurate timestamp
+- * based process timing */
+-#define PR_GET_TIMING 13
+-#define PR_SET_TIMING 14
+-# define PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL 0 /* Normal, traditional,
+- statistical process timing
*/
+-# define PR_TIMING_TIMESTAMP 1 /* Accurate timestamp based
+- process timing */
+-
+-#define PR_SET_NAME 15 /* Set process name */
+-#define PR_GET_NAME 16 /* Get process name */
+-
+-/* Get/set process endian */
+-#define PR_GET_ENDIAN 19
+-#define PR_SET_ENDIAN 20
+-# define PR_ENDIAN_BIG 0
+-# define PR_ENDIAN_LITTLE 1 /* True little endian mode */
+-# define PR_ENDIAN_PPC_LITTLE 2 /* "PowerPC" pseudo little endian */
+-
+-/* Get/set process seccomp mode */
+-#define PR_GET_SECCOMP 21
+-#define PR_SET_SECCOMP 22
+-
+-/* Get/set the capability bounding set (as per security/commoncap.c) */
+-#define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23
+-#define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24
+-
+-/* Get/set the process' ability to use the timestamp counter instruction */
+-#define PR_GET_TSC 25
+-#define PR_SET_TSC 26
+-# define PR_TSC_ENABLE 1 /* allow the use of the
timestamp counter */
+-# define PR_TSC_SIGSEGV 2 /* throw a SIGSEGV instead of
reading the TSC */
+-
+-/* Get/set securebits (as per security/commoncap.c) */
+-#define PR_GET_SECUREBITS 27
+-#define PR_SET_SECUREBITS 28
+-
+-/*
+- * Get/set the timerslack as used by poll/select/nanosleep
+- * A value of 0 means "use default"
+- */
+-#define PR_SET_TIMERSLACK 29
+-#define PR_GET_TIMERSLACK 30
+-
+-#define PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE 31
+-#define PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE 32
+-
+-/*
+- * Set early/late kill mode for hwpoison memory corruption.
+- * This influences when the process gets killed on a memory corruption.
+- */
+-#define PR_MCE_KILL 33
+-# define PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR 0
+-# define PR_MCE_KILL_SET 1
+-
+-# define PR_MCE_KILL_LATE 0
+-# define PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY 1
+-# define PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT 2
+-
+-#define PR_MCE_KILL_GET 34
+-
+-#endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
+diff -Naur libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/linux/securebits.h
libcap-2.23/libcap/include/linux/securebits.h
+--- libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/linux/securebits.h 2013-12-16
05:46:28.000000000 +0100
++++ libcap-2.23/libcap/include/linux/securebits.h 1970-01-01
01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
+-#ifndef _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
+-#define _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H 1
+-
+-/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies
+- whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the
+- setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be
+- changed from user-level. */
+-#define issecure_mask(X) (1 << (X))
+-#ifdef __KERNEL__
+-#define issecure(X) (issecure_mask(X) &
current_cred_xxx(securebits))
+-#endif
+-
+-#define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000
+-
+-/* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support
+- inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root executable under
+- compatibility mode. We raise the effective and inheritable bitmasks
+- *of the executable file* if the effective uid of the new process is
+- 0. If the real uid is 0, we raise the effective (legacy) bit of the
+- executable file. */
+-#define SECURE_NOROOT 0
+-#define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED 1 /* make bit-0 immutable */
+-
+-#define SECBIT_NOROOT (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT))
+-#define SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED))
+-
+-/* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixup".
+- When unset, to provide compatiblility with old programs relying on
+- set*uid to gain/lose privilege, transitions to/from uid 0 cause
+- capabilities to be gained/lost. */
+-#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP 2
+-#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED 3 /* make bit-2 immutable */
+-
+-#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP))
+-#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED \
+- (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED))
+-
+-/* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even after
+- transitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by
+- bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls exec(); setting both
+- bit 4 and 5 will create a barrier through exec that no exec()'d
+- child can use this feature again. */
+-#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS 4
+-#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED 5 /* make bit-4 immutable */
+-
+-#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
+-#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
+-
+-#define SECURE_ALL_BITS (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \
+- issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \
+- issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
+-#define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS (SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1)
+-
+-#endif /* !_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */
+diff -Naur libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/sys/capability.h
libcap-2.23/libcap/include/sys/capability.h
+--- libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/sys/capability.h 2013-12-16
05:47:10.000000000 +0100
++++ libcap-2.23/libcap/include/sys/capability.h 2014-01-03
11:55:05.356427466 +0100
+@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
+ #ifndef __user
+ #define __user
+ #endif
+-#include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
++#include <linux/capability.h>
+ #include <linux/xattr.h>
+
+ /*
+diff -Naur libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
libcap-2.23/libcap/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
+--- libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h 1970-01-01
01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ libcap-2.23/libcap/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h 2014-01-03
11:55:05.356427466 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
++#ifndef _LINUX_PRCTL_H
++#define _LINUX_PRCTL_H
++
++/* Values to pass as first argument to prctl() */
++
++#define PR_SET_PDEATHSIG 1 /* Second arg is a signal */
++#define PR_GET_PDEATHSIG 2 /* Second arg is a ptr to return the signal */
++
++/* Get/set current->mm->dumpable */
++#define PR_GET_DUMPABLE 3
++#define PR_SET_DUMPABLE 4
++
++/* Get/set unaligned access control bits (if meaningful) */
++#define PR_GET_UNALIGN 5
++#define PR_SET_UNALIGN 6
++# define PR_UNALIGN_NOPRINT 1 /* silently fix up unaligned user
accesses */
++# define PR_UNALIGN_SIGBUS 2 /* generate SIGBUS on unaligned user
access */
++
++/* Get/set whether or not to drop capabilities on setuid() away from
++ * uid 0 (as per security/commoncap.c) */
++#define PR_GET_KEEPCAPS 7
++#define PR_SET_KEEPCAPS 8
++
++/* Get/set floating-point emulation control bits (if meaningful) */
++#define PR_GET_FPEMU 9
++#define PR_SET_FPEMU 10
++# define PR_FPEMU_NOPRINT 1 /* silently emulate fp operations
accesses */
++# define PR_FPEMU_SIGFPE 2 /* don't emulate fp operations, send
SIGFPE instead */
++
++/* Get/set floating-point exception mode (if meaningful) */
++#define PR_GET_FPEXC 11
++#define PR_SET_FPEXC 12
++# define PR_FP_EXC_SW_ENABLE 0x80 /* Use FPEXC for FP exception enables */
++# define PR_FP_EXC_DIV 0x010000 /* floating point
divide by zero */
++# define PR_FP_EXC_OVF 0x020000 /* floating point
overflow */
++# define PR_FP_EXC_UND 0x040000 /* floating point
underflow */
++# define PR_FP_EXC_RES 0x080000 /* floating point
inexact result */
++# define PR_FP_EXC_INV 0x100000 /* floating point
invalid operation */
++# define PR_FP_EXC_DISABLED 0 /* FP exceptions disabled */
++# define PR_FP_EXC_NONRECOV 1 /* async non-recoverable exc. mode */
++# define PR_FP_EXC_ASYNC 2 /* async recoverable exception mode */
++# define PR_FP_EXC_PRECISE 3 /* precise exception mode */
++
++/* Get/set whether we use statistical process timing or accurate timestamp
++ * based process timing */
++#define PR_GET_TIMING 13
++#define PR_SET_TIMING 14
++# define PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL 0 /* Normal, traditional,
++ statistical process timing
*/
++# define PR_TIMING_TIMESTAMP 1 /* Accurate timestamp based
++ process timing */
++
++#define PR_SET_NAME 15 /* Set process name */
++#define PR_GET_NAME 16 /* Get process name */
++
++/* Get/set process endian */
++#define PR_GET_ENDIAN 19
++#define PR_SET_ENDIAN 20
++# define PR_ENDIAN_BIG 0
++# define PR_ENDIAN_LITTLE 1 /* True little endian mode */
++# define PR_ENDIAN_PPC_LITTLE 2 /* "PowerPC" pseudo little endian */
++
++/* Get/set process seccomp mode */
++#define PR_GET_SECCOMP 21
++#define PR_SET_SECCOMP 22
++
++/* Get/set the capability bounding set (as per security/commoncap.c) */
++#define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23
++#define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24
++
++/* Get/set the process' ability to use the timestamp counter instruction */
++#define PR_GET_TSC 25
++#define PR_SET_TSC 26
++# define PR_TSC_ENABLE 1 /* allow the use of the
timestamp counter */
++# define PR_TSC_SIGSEGV 2 /* throw a SIGSEGV instead of
reading the TSC */
++
++/* Get/set securebits (as per security/commoncap.c) */
++#define PR_GET_SECUREBITS 27
++#define PR_SET_SECUREBITS 28
++
++/*
++ * Get/set the timerslack as used by poll/select/nanosleep
++ * A value of 0 means "use default"
++ */
++#define PR_SET_TIMERSLACK 29
++#define PR_GET_TIMERSLACK 30
++
++#define PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE 31
++#define PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE 32
++
++/*
++ * Set early/late kill mode for hwpoison memory corruption.
++ * This influences when the process gets killed on a memory corruption.
++ */
++#define PR_MCE_KILL 33
++# define PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR 0
++# define PR_MCE_KILL_SET 1
++
++# define PR_MCE_KILL_LATE 0
++# define PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY 1
++# define PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT 2
++
++#define PR_MCE_KILL_GET 34
++
++/*
++ * Tune up process memory map specifics.
++ */
++#define PR_SET_MM 35
++# define PR_SET_MM_START_CODE 1
++# define PR_SET_MM_END_CODE 2
++# define PR_SET_MM_START_DATA 3
++# define PR_SET_MM_END_DATA 4
++# define PR_SET_MM_START_STACK 5
++# define PR_SET_MM_START_BRK 6
++# define PR_SET_MM_BRK 7
++# define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8
++# define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9
++# define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10
++# define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11
++# define PR_SET_MM_AUXV 12
++# define PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE 13
++
++/*
++ * Set specific pid that is allowed to ptrace the current task.
++ * A value of 0 mean "no process".
++ */
++#define PR_SET_PTRACER 0x59616d61
++# define PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY ((unsigned long)-1)
++
++#define PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER 36
++#define PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER 37
++
++/*
++ * If no_new_privs is set, then operations that grant new privileges (i.e.
++ * execve) will either fail or not grant them. This affects suid/sgid,
++ * file capabilities, and LSMs.
++ *
++ * Operations that merely manipulate or drop existing privileges (setresuid,
++ * capset, etc.) will still work. Drop those privileges if you want them
gone.
++ *
++ * Changing LSM security domain is considered a new privilege. So, for
example,
++ * asking selinux for a specific new context (e.g. with runcon) will result
++ * in execve returning -EPERM.
++ *
++ * See Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt for more details.
++ */
++#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38
++#define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 39
++
++#define PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS 40
++
++#endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
+diff -Naur libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
libcap-2.23/libcap/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
+--- libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h 1970-01-01
01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ libcap-2.23/libcap/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h 2014-01-03
11:55:05.356427466 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
++#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
++#define _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
++
++/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies
++ whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the
++ setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be
++ changed from user-level. */
++#define issecure_mask(X) (1 << (X))
++
++#define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000
++
++/* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support
++ inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root executable under
++ compatibility mode. We raise the effective and inheritable bitmasks
++ *of the executable file* if the effective uid of the new process is
++ 0. If the real uid is 0, we raise the effective (legacy) bit of the
++ executable file. */
++#define SECURE_NOROOT 0
++#define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED 1 /* make bit-0 immutable */
++
++#define SECBIT_NOROOT (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT))
++#define SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED))
++
++/* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixup".
++ When unset, to provide compatiblility with old programs relying on
++ set*uid to gain/lose privilege, transitions to/from uid 0 cause
++ capabilities to be gained/lost. */
++#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP 2
++#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED 3 /* make bit-2 immutable */
++
++#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP))
++#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED \
++ (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED))
++
++/* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even after
++ transitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by
++ bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls exec(); setting both
++ bit 4 and 5 will create a barrier through exec that no exec()'d
++ child can use this feature again. */
++#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS 4
++#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED 5 /* make bit-4 immutable */
++
++#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
++#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
++
++#define SECURE_ALL_BITS (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \
++ issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \
++ issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
++#define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS (SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1)
++
++#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */
+diff -Naur libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/Makefile libcap-2.23/libcap/Makefile
+--- libcap-2.23.orig/libcap/Makefile 2013-12-24 18:08:53.000000000 +0100
++++ libcap-2.23/libcap/Makefile 2014-01-03 12:13:02.344530878 +0100
+@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
+
+ cap_names.list.h: Makefile $(KERNEL_HEADERS)/linux/capability.h
+ @echo "=> making $@ from $(KERNEL_HEADERS)/linux/capability.h"
+- perl -e 'while ($$l=<>) { if ($$l =~ /^\#define[ \t](CAP[_A-Z]+)[
\t]+([0-9]+)\s+$$/) { $$tok=$$1; $$val=$$2; $$tok =~ tr/A-Z/a-z/; print
"{\"$$tok\",$$val},\n"; } }' $(KERNEL_HEADERS)/uapi/linux/capability.h | fgrep
-v 0x > $@
++ perl -e 'while ($$l=<>) { if ($$l =~ /^\#define[ \t](CAP[_A-Z]+)[
\t]+([0-9]+)\s+$$/) { $$tok=$$1; $$val=$$2; $$tok =~ tr/A-Z/a-z/; print
"{\"$$tok\",$$val},\n"; } }' $(KERNEL_HEADERS)/linux/capability.h | fgrep -v 0x
> $@
+
+ $(STALIBNAME): $(OBJS)
+ $(AR) rcs $@ $^
+diff -Naur libcap-2.23.orig/Make.Rules libcap-2.23/Make.Rules
+--- libcap-2.23.orig/Make.Rules 2013-12-24 20:23:11.000000000 +0100
++++ libcap-2.23/Make.Rules 2014-01-03 11:55:05.355427466 +0100
+@@ -45,8 +45,8 @@
+
+ # Compilation specifics
+
+-KERNEL_HEADERS := $(topdir)/libcap/include
+-IPATH += -fPIC -I$(topdir)/libcap/include -I$(KERNEL_HEADERS)
++KERNEL_HEADERS := $(topdir)/libcap/include/uapi
++IPATH += -fPIC -I$(KERNEL_HEADERS) -I$(topdir)/libcap/include
+
+ CC := gcc
+ CFLAGS := -O2 -D_LARGEFILE64_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64
--
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