Author: ken
Date: Fri Nov 20 22:39:45 2020
New Revision: 4228
Log:
Rename the patches for libxml2 and libexif as security fixes.
Added:
trunk/libexif/libexif-0.6.22-security_fixes-1.patch
- copied unchanged from r4227,
trunk/libexif/libexif-0.6.22-upstream_fixes-1.patch
trunk/libxml2/libxml2-2.9.10-security_fixes.patch
- copied unchanged from r4227,
trunk/libxml2/libxml2-2.9.10-upstream_fixes.patch
Deleted:
trunk/libexif/libexif-0.6.22-upstream_fixes-1.patch
trunk/libxml2/libxml2-2.9.10-upstream_fixes.patch
Copied: trunk/libexif/libexif-0.6.22-security_fixes-1.patch (from r4227,
trunk/libexif/libexif-0.6.22-upstream_fixes-1.patch)
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ trunk/libexif/libexif-0.6.22-security_fixes-1.patch Fri Nov 20 22:39:45
2020 (r4228, copy of r4227,
trunk/libexif/libexif-0.6.22-upstream_fixes-1.patch)
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+Submitted By: Ken Moffat <ken at linuxfromscratch dot org>
+Date: 2020-11-21
+Initial Package Version: 0.6.22
+Upstream Status: Applied
+Origin: Found at fedora
+Description: Fixes CVE-2020-0181, -0198, -0452. The first two are merely
+DOS, the last is an oob write on integer oveflow which could possibly
+be exploited for remote code execution or disclosure of sensitive
+information.
+
+From ce03ad7ef4e8aeefce79192bf5b6f69fae396f0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marcus Meissner <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2020 17:27:06 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] fixed another unsigned integer overflow
+
+first fixed by google in android fork,
+https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libexif/+/1e187b62682ffab5003c702657d6d725b4278f16%5E%21/#F0
+
+(use a more generic overflow check method, also check second overflow
instance.)
+
+https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2020-0198
+---
+ libexif/exif-data.c | 10 ++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c
+index 8b280d3..b495726 100644
+--- a/libexif/exif-data.c
++++ b/libexif/exif-data.c
+@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@
+ #undef JPEG_MARKER_APP1
+ #define JPEG_MARKER_APP1 0xe1
+
++#define CHECKOVERFLOW(offset,datasize,structsize) (( offset >= datasize) ||
(structsize > datasize) || (offset > datasize - structsize ))
++
+ static const unsigned char ExifHeader[] = {0x45, 0x78, 0x69, 0x66, 0x00,
0x00};
+
+ struct _ExifDataPrivate
+@@ -327,7 +329,7 @@ exif_data_load_data_thumbnail (ExifData *data, const
unsigned char *d,
+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
"Bogus thumbnail offset (%u).", o);
+ return;
+ }
+- if (s > ds - o) {
++ if (CHECKOVERFLOW(o,ds,s)) {
+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
"Bogus thumbnail size (%u), max would be %u.", s, ds-o);
+ return;
+ }
+@@ -420,9 +422,9 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
+ }
+
+ /* Read the number of entries */
+- if ((offset + 2 < offset) || (offset + 2 < 2) || (offset + 2 > ds)) {
++ if (CHECKOVERFLOW(offset, ds, 2)) {
+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA,
"ExifData",
+- "Tag data past end of buffer (%u > %u)", offset+2,
ds);
++ "Tag data past end of buffer (%u+2 > %u)", offset,
ds);
+ return;
+ }
+ n = exif_get_short (d + offset, data->priv->order);
+@@ -431,7 +433,7 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
+ offset += 2;
+
+ /* Check if we have enough data. */
+- if (offset + 12 * n > ds) {
++ if (CHECKOVERFLOW(offset, ds, 12*n)) {
+ n = (ds - offset) / 12;
+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
+ "Short data; only loading %hu entries...", n);
+From 9266d14b5ca4e29b970fa03272318e5f99386e06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marcus Meissner <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2020 09:50:08 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] fixed a incorrect overflow check that could be optimized
+ away.
+
+inspired by:
+https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libexif/+/8e7345f3bc0bad06ac369d6cbc1124c8ceaf7d4b
+
+https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2020-11-01
+
+CVE-2020-0452
+---
+ NEWS | 3 ++-
+ libexif/exif-entry.c | 4 ++--
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libexif/exif-entry.c b/libexif/exif-entry.c
+index 3fc0ff9..4b866ce 100644
+--- a/libexif/exif-entry.c
++++ b/libexif/exif-entry.c
+@@ -1371,8 +1371,8 @@ exif_entry_get_value (ExifEntry *e, char *val, unsigned
int maxlen)
+ {
+ unsigned char *utf16;
+
+- /* Sanity check the size to prevent overflow */
+- if (e->size+sizeof(uint16_t)+1 < e->size) break;
++ /* Sanity check the size to prevent overflow. Note EXIF files
are 64kb at most. */
++ if (e->size >= 65536 - sizeof(uint16_t)*2) break;
+
+ /* The tag may not be U+0000-terminated , so make a local
+ U+0000-terminated copy before converting it */
Copied: trunk/libxml2/libxml2-2.9.10-security_fixes.patch (from r4227,
trunk/libxml2/libxml2-2.9.10-upstream_fixes.patch)
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ trunk/libxml2/libxml2-2.9.10-security_fixes.patch Fri Nov 20 22:39:45
2020 (r4228, copy of r4227,
trunk/libxml2/libxml2-2.9.10-upstream_fixes.patch)
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+Submitted By: Ken Moffat <ken at linuxfromscratch dot org>
+Date: 2020-11-21
+Initial Package Version: 2.9.10
+Upstream Status: Applied
+Origin: Found at fedora.
+Description: Various fixes, including CVE-2019-20388, CVE-2020-7595,
+CVE-2020-24977. I think that worst case these are DOS vulnerabilities.
+
+From 0815302dee2b78139832c2080348086a0564836b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Wellnhofer <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2019 12:27:29 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix freeing of nested documents
+
+Apparently, some libxslt RVTs can contain nested document nodes, see
+issue #132. I'm not sure how this happens exactly but it can cause a
+segfault in xmlFreeNodeList after the changes in commit 0762c9b6.
+
+Make sure not to touch the (nonexistent) `content` member of xmlDocs.
+---
+ tree.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/tree.c b/tree.c
+index 070670f1..0d7fc98c 100644
+--- a/tree.c
++++ b/tree.c
+@@ -3708,6 +3708,11 @@ xmlFreeNodeList(xmlNodePtr cur) {
+ (cur->type != XML_XINCLUDE_START) &&
+ (cur->type != XML_XINCLUDE_END) &&
+ (cur->type != XML_ENTITY_REF_NODE) &&
++ (cur->type != XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) &&
++#ifdef LIBXML_DOCB_ENABLED
++ (cur->type != XML_DOCB_DOCUMENT_NODE) &&
++#endif
++ (cur->type != XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE) &&
+ (cur->content != (xmlChar *) &(cur->properties))) {
+ DICT_FREE(cur->content)
+ }
+--
+2.22.0
+
+From 6088a74bcf7d0c42e24cff4594d804e1d3c9fbca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2019 16:33:06 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix memory leak in xmlSchemaValidateStream
+
+When ctxt->schema is NULL, xmlSchemaSAXPlug->xmlSchemaPreRun
+alloc a new schema for ctxt->schema and set vctxt->xsiAssemble
+to 1. Then xmlSchemaVStart->xmlSchemaPreRun initialize
+vctxt->xsiAssemble to 0 again which cause the alloced schema
+can not be freed anymore.
+
+Found with libFuzzer.
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
+---
+ xmlschemas.c | 1 -
+ 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/xmlschemas.c b/xmlschemas.c
+index 301c8449..39d92182 100644
+--- a/xmlschemas.c
++++ b/xmlschemas.c
+@@ -28090,7 +28090,6 @@ xmlSchemaPreRun(xmlSchemaValidCtxtPtr vctxt) {
+ vctxt->nberrors = 0;
+ vctxt->depth = -1;
+ vctxt->skipDepth = -1;
+- vctxt->xsiAssemble = 0;
+ vctxt->hasKeyrefs = 0;
+ #ifdef ENABLE_IDC_NODE_TABLES_TEST
+ vctxt->createIDCNodeTables = 1;
+--
+2.24.1
+
+From 0e1a49c8907645d2e155f0d89d4d9895ac5112b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2019 17:30:55 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix infinite loop in xmlStringLenDecodeEntities
+
+When ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF,xmlParseStringEntityRef
+return NULL which cause a infinite loop in xmlStringLenDecodeEntities
+
+Found with libFuzzer.
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
+---
+ parser.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c
+index d1c31963..a34bb6cd 100644
+--- a/parser.c
++++ b/parser.c
+@@ -2646,7 +2646,8 @@ xmlStringLenDecodeEntities(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const
xmlChar *str, int len,
+ else
+ c = 0;
+ while ((c != 0) && (c != end) && /* non input consuming loop */
+- (c != end2) && (c != end3)) {
++ (c != end2) && (c != end3) &&
++ (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF)) {
+
+ if (c == 0) break;
+ if ((c == '&') && (str[1] == '#')) {
+--
+2.24.1
+
+From 8e7c20a1af8776677d7890f30b7a180567701a49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Wellnhofer <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2020 17:30:41 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix integer overflow when comparing schema dates
+
+Found by OSS-Fuzz.
+---
+ xmlschemastypes.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/xmlschemastypes.c b/xmlschemastypes.c
+index 4249d700..d6b9f924 100644
+--- a/xmlschemastypes.c
++++ b/xmlschemastypes.c
+@@ -3691,6 +3691,8 @@ xmlSchemaCompareDurations(xmlSchemaValPtr x,
xmlSchemaValPtr y)
+ minday = 0;
+ maxday = 0;
+ } else {
++ if (myear > LONG_MAX / 366)
++ return -2;
+ /* FIXME: This doesn't take leap year exceptions every 100/400 years
+ into account. */
+ maxday = 365 * myear + (myear + 3) / 4;
+@@ -4079,6 +4081,14 @@ xmlSchemaCompareDates (xmlSchemaValPtr x,
xmlSchemaValPtr y)
+ if ((x == NULL) || (y == NULL))
+ return -2;
+
++ if ((x->value.date.year > LONG_MAX / 366) ||
++ (x->value.date.year < LONG_MIN / 366) ||
++ (y->value.date.year > LONG_MAX / 366) ||
++ (y->value.date.year < LONG_MIN / 366)) {
++ /* Possible overflow when converting to days. */
++ return -2;
++ }
++
+ if (x->value.date.tz_flag) {
+
+ if (!y->value.date.tz_flag) {
+--
+2.28.0.rc2
+
+From 50f06b3efb638efb0abd95dc62dca05ae67882c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Wellnhofer <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2020 21:54:27 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix out-of-bounds read with 'xmllint --htmlout'
+
+Make sure that truncated UTF-8 sequences don't cause an out-of-bounds
+array access.
+
+Thanks to @SuhwanSong and the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) for
+the report.
+
+Fixes #178.
+---
+ xmllint.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/xmllint.c b/xmllint.c
+index f6a8e463..c647486f 100644
+--- a/xmllint.c
++++ b/xmllint.c
+@@ -528,6 +528,12 @@ static void
+ xmlHTMLEncodeSend(void) {
+ char *result;
+
++ /*
++ * xmlEncodeEntitiesReentrant assumes valid UTF-8, but the buffer might
++ * end with a truncated UTF-8 sequence. This is a hack to at least avoid
++ * an out-of-bounds read.
++ */
++ memset(&buffer[sizeof(buffer)-4], 0, 4);
+ result = (char *) xmlEncodeEntitiesReentrant(NULL, BAD_CAST buffer);
+ if (result) {
+ xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, "%s", result);
+--
+2.28.0.rc2
+
--
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