Interesting. Wikipedia seemed to consider CSRF and XSRFs the same. Either way, I did wonder if this token changed so I took a look at different Twitter forms to see and whether I submitted information or just went to view other forms, the token remained the same.
On Fri, Nov 20, 2009 at 6:03 PM, John Miller <[email protected]> wrote: > For CSRF, the token just needs to change for each submission. It can only > be used once, so sniffing it is pointless. I didn't take a closer look at > exactly how Twitter handles this, but generally, a cookie will store the > Authentication data while a hidden field stores a per-request token to > prevent CSRF. > > What this is protecting against is a 3rd party site including something > like <img src="http://twitter/doSomthingBad";>. Since they won't have the > single use token, that request can't do anything. > > On Fri, Nov 20, 2009 at 6:38 PM, Soft Reset <[email protected]>wrote: > >> Makes sense if the connection protected the token. According to >> Wikipedia, >> >> "Requiring a secret, user-specific token in all form submissions >> prevents >> CSRF; the attacker's site can't put the right token in its >> submissions.<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery#cite_note-Shiflett-0> >> [1]" >> >> But if the form Twitter returns (containing the token) is returned over >> HTTP (which it is), the token is not secret and does not need to be >> predicted...just eavesdropped. >> >> Does this sound right or am I way off and misunderstanding the whole >> concept of XSRFs? >> >> --sr6 >> >> >> On Fri, Nov 20, 2009 at 3:23 PM, Chris Biettchert < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> The authenticity_token is used for for xsrf protection. It works as >>> intended as long as it can not be predicted for another user. >>> >>> On Fri, Nov 20, 2009 at 10:36 AM, Soft Reset >>> <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> I just noticed it and was wondering if anyone else had. Twitter has >>>> their "authenticity_token" as a 'hidden' input on forms...including >>>> password >>>> changes, resets, etc. Anyone tried hijacking a twitter login to verify >>>> this >>>> is bad form (no pun intended)? Don't want to re-invent the wheel if >>>> someone >>>> already did it. >>>> >>>> If someone has tried it successfully, has it been brought up to the >>>> twitter folks as a push for full SSL sessions? (yeah, I know SSL is also >>>> having issues at the moment, but still...) >>>> >>>> --sr6 >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Pauldotcom mailing list >>>> [email protected] >>>> http://mail.pauldotcom.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/pauldotcom >>>> Main Web Site: http://pauldotcom.com >>>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Pauldotcom mailing list >>> [email protected] >>> http://mail.pauldotcom.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/pauldotcom >>> Main Web Site: http://pauldotcom.com >>> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Pauldotcom mailing list >> [email protected] >> http://mail.pauldotcom.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/pauldotcom >> Main Web Site: http://pauldotcom.com >> > > > _______________________________________________ > Pauldotcom mailing list > [email protected] > http://mail.pauldotcom.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/pauldotcom > Main Web Site: http://pauldotcom.com >
_______________________________________________ Pauldotcom mailing list [email protected] http://mail.pauldotcom.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/pauldotcom Main Web Site: http://pauldotcom.com
