At the Vancouver F2F we had extensive discussions on the security model for PAWS. Draft-das proposes to use shared secrets pre-provisioned in the master devices for authentication, while draft-lei proposes to mandate client certificates into master devices.
There seemed to be an understanding that the credential types in use for authentication are a matter of a business model chosen by the provider which deploys white space devices, rather than a protocol decision. Brian mentioned that the iesg may not allow a document to be published which specifies how shared secrets are used, but does not have a provisioning mechanism for the shared secrets defined. In my opinion, a mechanism for distributing shared secrets does not necessarily have to be defined, as a shared secret can be established using current practices to set up shared secrets with financial institutions (using the browser). Thus, my suggestion would be to describe in the document how a shared secret and how a client certificate is used to authenticate a master device. Then, if we run into issues with iesg, in worst case we could remove the shared secret part and keep the other one. I'd like to get additional views on this topic. - Gabor
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