https://bugs.exim.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1749
--- Comment #17 from Petr Pisar <ppi...@redhat.com> --- Despite all this I think your approach still has security benefits since it creates a one-way transition to PROT_EXEC only memory without possibility to modify once compiled code. I appreciate you devoted your time to this issue. I hope (not only) NetBSD people will be happier. I have a parallel discussion with Red Hat security team and it actually looks like the temporary file approach is more a loop-hole in SELinux implementation than a security feature that could provide better security than the mprotect() approach. I will keep you informed. By the way sljit produces position independent code so it could execute the jitted code even from a different mapping, or would the temporary file approach need also changing the jumps it the code if the SLJIT_ENABLE_EXEC() replaced addresses to the second mapping? -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug. -- ## List details at https://lists.exim.org/mailman/listinfo/pcre-dev