On Mon, Dec 12, 2016 at 01:58:51PM +0100, Arnold Nipper wrote:
> What does it help when everyone is able to set the flag and you can't
> trust that this really is a route server net?
It helps on the configuration generation side:
If "route server" == true:
no bgp enforce-first-as
no bgp next-hop peer-address
no as_path_filter "^$peer_asn_"
else:
bgp enforce-first-as
bgp next-hop peer-address
as_path_filter XYZ
The above pseudo code is assuming people generate config straight from
PDB, in addition to the above, a PDB user can programmatically enforce
their:
"we peer with every route server"-policy
or "we dont peer with any route servers"-policy
or "we only peer with route servers operated by the IXP themselves"-policy
So one could argue there is a wide varierty of decisions that can be
assisted if your peers self-report whether they are perform a Route
Server function or not.
All data retrieved from PDB must be validated against an operators own
policy and procedures. I always consider PDB data to be a raw resources,
this does not have to do with (lack of) trust, but rather with making
assisted choices.
Hope this clarifies the use case.
Kind regards,
Job
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