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http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2006/02/10/dictator/

The dictator defense
Bush's attorney general won't dare explain the real basis for warrantless
spying on Americans: Pure, unbridled executive power.
By David Cole

Feb. 10, 2006 | The congressional inquiry into President Bush's
authorizing the National Security Agency to wiretap Americans without
warrants has now been locked away behind closed-door briefings. But if the
public Judiciary Committee hearing earlier this week is any guide, the
Senate and House intelligence committees can expect to get no help from
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales. He avoided far more questions than he
answered in Monday's hearing. In one sense, Gonzales did a masterly job of
defending Bush's position, by never acknowledging what he knows that
position to be: an extraordinary claim to unchecked executive power.

When asked about facts, Gonzales declined to answer, saying that he could
not discuss the operational details of the program. (Except, of course,
where selectively disclosing details made the program appear narrow and
reasonable, in which case he disclosed them.) And when asked about the
law, he repeatedly refused to answer any questions about the consequences
of the administration's legal theory by insisting that the questions were
hypothetical and did not concern "this program." It was the perfect
Catch-22: The senators couldn't ask him about the facts or the law. An
exasperated Sen. Patrick Leahy, the committee's ranking Democrat, had it
right when he remarked after yet another Gonzales dodge: "Of course, I'm
sorry, Mr. Attorney General, I forgot you can't answer any question that
might be relevant to this."

Most revealing was the attorney general's persistent refusal to address
recurring questions on one essential point: Given Bush's brazen assertion
of power, how far does his inherent authority as commander in chief
extend? Sen. Dianne Feinstein asked whether this slippery slope would
authorize the president to violate the prohibition on covert illegal
propagandizing within the United States. The attorney general declined to
answer. Sen. Lindsay Graham asked whether the president could override the
ban on cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, which Congress recently
reaffirmed in the McCain Amendment. The attorney general again refused to
answer. Sen. Edward Kennedy asked whether the president could open
domestic first-class mail; Sen. Charles Schumer asked whether Bush could
order warrantless searches of Americans' homes; and several senators asked
about the wiretapping of wholly domestic calls. Each inquiry met with the
same essential response: "It's hard to answer a hypothetical question."

Of course, as every lawyer knows, being a lawyer means always asking --
and answering -- hypothetical questions. The only way to assess whether a
legal theory makes sense is to test how it would govern a variety of
hypothetical scenarios. That is the premise of the Socratic method,
employed in every law school in the country. And that is how legal
arguments in court are conducted every day. Surely the attorney general,
the nation's top lawyer, knows that "It's hypothetical" is not a
sufficient answer to a legal question.

The reason Gonzales spent so much time dodging and weaving is not that he
was unable to answer, but that he knows that a candid answer would have
been politically unacceptable to the senators and to the American people.
His honest answer to all of the foregoing questions would have been the
same: Yes, the president could order warrantless searches of Americans'
homes, the opening of mail, domestic wiretaps and torture -- because there
are no limits on the president's powers as commander in chief to engage
the enemy.

That answer is not hypothetical -- it is found buried in the footnotes of
a detailed 42-paged single-spaced legal memorandum provided to Congress in
January. In that memo, which sought to defend the legality of the NSA
surveillance program, the Justice Department argues that Congress may not
in any way impede the president's executive authority to choose the "means
and methods of engaging the enemy."

That theory knows few if any limits. The Justice Department argues that
since electronic surveillance is a "means and method of engaging the
enemy," Congress cannot restrict it, even when it comes to spying on
Americans without judicial approval, and even though Congress made such
conduct a crime in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).

In an infamous August 2002 memo on torture, the Justice Department
advanced the same theory to argue that the president could order torture
despite the existence of a criminal law and a ratified international
treaty flatly prohibiting torture under all circumstances. The memo was
withdrawn when it became public and jeopardized Gonzales' confirmation as
attorney general, but the new memo that replaced it pointedly did not
reject the presidential power asserted in the August 2002 memo.

And President Bush claimed the same power, albeit in arch legalese, when
he attached a signing statement to the McCain Amendment in December,
stating that he would enforce the law "in a manner consistent with the
constitutional authority of the president ... as Commander in Chief" --
or, in other words, consistent with the president's authority to violate
the law whenever he chooses to do so.

Bush has long sought to cast himself as a disciple of Ronald Reagan -- but
apparently his true guide is Richard Nixon. In defense of the warrantless
surveillance of Americans involved in the antiwar movement of the 1970s,
Nixon infamously claimed, "If the president does it, that means that it is
not illegal." Gonzales surely knows that to directly claim Bush can pick
and choose which laws to follow and which to violate would resonate
disturbingly with the remarks of the impeached former president -- so
Gonzales avoided doing so by repeatedly contending that, in this instance,
the president was acting within existing statutes, not in contravention of
them. That argument not only "defies logic and plain English," as
Republican Sen. Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania concluded Monday, but it
ultimately rests on an assertion of uncheckable executive authority to
violate any law deemed by the commander in chief to be in his way.

The argument that the president's actions are consistent with the law
turns on the theory that Congress authorized the unlimited warrantless
wiretapping of Americans when it authorized the use of military force
against al-Qaida in September 2001. Congress' authorization to use force,
however, says not one word about the wiretapping of Americans, while
another statute, titled "Authorization During Time of War," addresses the
issue specifically. This statute dictates that the president may engage in
warrantless wiretapping "for a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days
following a declaration of war by the Congress." The legislative history
explains that if the president needs more extended authority, he should
come to Congress during that 15-day period to request that the law be
amended. If Congress was willing to grant the president only 15 days of
warrantless wiretapping when it declared war, surely one cannot interpret
a mere authorization to use military force -- which is far less severe
than a declaration of war, and which is entirely silent on the subject of
wiretapping -- to authorize unlimited warrantless wiretapping.

Attorney General Gonzales argued that the Supreme Court's decision in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, involving the detention of an American citizen captured
in Afghanistan as an enemy combatant, supports his reading of Congress'
authorization to use military force. There, the court interpreted the
authorization as providing sufficient statutory authority to detain
American citizens as enemy combatants, even though the authorization did
not specifically address detention. The court reasoned that detention is a
fundamental incident of war, and therefore one could assume that it was
part of the authorization. But the difference is that on wiretapping,
unlike detention, Congress had already specifically addressed the scope of
the authority it would give the president during wartime. Had there been a
statute on the books saying that American citizens could be detained only
for the first 15 days of a war, and that any further detention would
require specific congressional approval, there is no way that in the Hamdi
case the Supreme Court would have interpreted the authorization to use
military force as giving the president unlimited authority to detain.

Every time Gonzales was challenged on the implausibility of his reading of
the authorization to use military force, however, he retreated,
characteristically enough, to the doctrine of "constitutional avoidance."
He said that as long as the administration's interpretation of the statute
was fairly possible, it must be adopted to avoid the serious
constitutional question that would be raised if one read the statutes'
"plain English" as prohibiting the president's action. But that claim
ultimately returns Gonzales to the question he repeatedly sought to duck:
namely, does the president have the authority to violate a criminal
statute barring him from conducting warrantless electronic surveillance on
Americans within the United States?

In the end, Gonzales's argument is circular: You need not reach the
constitutional question of executive authority to violate the law, because
the president acted consistently with the law. But you must find that the
president acted consistently with the law because otherwise the law would
be an unconstitutional infringement on the president's powers. At the
center of this circle is an astounding assertion of presidential power --
the power to choose the "means and methods of engaging the enemy" without
being subject to any legal limits imposed by Congress, whether they be
limits on cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, torture, or spying on
Americans.

What the NSA spying debate is ultimately about is this: Do we want to live
in a country where the president, like the rest of us, is bound by law, or
do we want to live in a country where the president, by invoking the magic
words "commander in chief," can order that criminal laws be violated in
secret? One thing is certain: The Bush administration will never want a
hearing on that question.

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