Edit report at https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=74636&edit=1
ID: 74636
User updated by: chanlists at googlemail dot com
Reported by: chanlists at googlemail dot com
Summary: [krb5] negotiate auth broken for vhosts because of
hostname canonicalization
Status: Assigned
Type: Bug
Package: PECL
Operating System: debian 8
PHP Version: 5.6.30
Assigned To: mbechler
Block user comment: N
Private report: N
New Comment:
Great. Works for me just fine whether dns_canonicalize_hostname is set on the
client or not (if I stick all relevant principals in the keytab). Thanks,
Christian
Previous Comments:
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[2017-05-25 14:10:30] mbechler at eenterphace dot org
Just commited another version in which you can pass GSS_C_NO_NAME instead of
the SPN to achieve that. Also includes support for gss_acquire_cred_from
(krb5_import_cred turned out to be unusable for SPNEGO).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[2017-05-25 12:08:04] chanlists at googlemail dot com
OK, what I have tried now is the following patch relative to your latest
version:
248,249d247
< } else if(spn[0] == '@') {
< object->servname = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
The effect of this is that if I set the service name to '@', it will use
GSS_C_NO_NAME... and therefore accept all principals in the keytab.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[2017-05-25 09:56:02] mbechler at eenterphace dot org
Yes, in that case it should be safe. Just saying that there are some
implications to it.
Generally, it would be wise to switch to gss_krb5_import_cred anyhow (if
available) as currently this is a bit of a hack (the keytab set with
register_acceptor_identitity really is process state, if you use multiple
instances or something else fiddles with it you are in trouble). I think that
might just have that behavior (loading all keys from the given keytab) anyways.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[2017-05-24 12:40:58] chanlists at googlemail dot com
Hm... But if I use a separate keytab file for the PHP script, I can control
which principals I stick in there, and so it should not try whatever is in
/etc/krb5.keytab, and only those in my dedicated keytab, say
/etc/apache2/my_httpd_keytab_file.keytab? In that case adding an option should
be safe...
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[2017-05-24 10:51:10] mbechler at eenterphace dot org
Passing GSS_C_NO_NAME or GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to accept_context respecively has
some (possible acceptable) downsides:
a) it invokes implementation dependant behavior (spec essentially says
implementations can choose whichever keys they like) - but the common and more
recent implementations (e.g. mit since 1.7 - which is pretty old) seem have the
desired behavior (trying all keys).
b) this supposedly will also try the default keytab, which means that anyone
with access to one of these other keys (if there are any) can forge tickets for
your service. That might be an subtle security issue in some setups.
If I were using that personally, I would probably rather go for either
redirecting to a canonical host or constructing and passing the proper SPN. But
I think I would be okay with adding an option to enable that behavior.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
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