Dear Gary F, Gary R, Robert, List, Thanks to Gary R for intervening and making some of the points that I would have made whilst I was away from email – although Gary R does so more eloquently than I could.
Firstly, we were originally discussing the issue of ‘reality’, but Robert was right to raise the issue of linguistic communication because the whole point of Deely’s work (or one of them) is that humans are not simply to be defined as ‘verbal’. We share with non-human animals a very extensive non-verbal semiosis. Anthroposemiosis is verbal and non-verbal, as Sebeok repeatedly stipulates, and it fosters a particular reality. Secondly, I never suggested that Deely’s sometimes mysterious 2009 book offers an answer. In this business, we don’t trade in answers. That said, I think it’s quite persuasive. Purely objective realities are fictions which carry such weight that they come to feel, through intersubjective interactions, almost as if they are realities in themselves. To address this, though, there needs to be a radical re-thinking of objectivity and subjectivity. As we all know, objectivity, in common parlance, implies a view that is outside all events in question and can take an Olympian, ‘objective’, ‘realistic’ perspective on them. (That’s a fiction in itself, but let’s leave that aside for a moment). Subjectivity, on the other hand, is the realm of, well, a ‘subjective’ view – absolutely tied to the relative positions of the participants of the events. I have been schooled in the Kantian and poststructuralist definition of subjectivity in which humans are subject to their positions. This has a bearing on the matter of reality, of course, but can also be left aside for a moment. For many years, I thought that Deely’s version of the objectivity/subjectivity couplet – certainly in need of revision, as Heidegger insisted in 1946 – as well as Deely’s distinction between thing, object and sign, was, in most ways, an independent formulation. I’m grateful, therefore, to Gary F for providing Peirce’s definition from the Century Dictionary<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/rlb.htm#bjctv>. This is precisely the understanding of ‘objective’ with which Deely was working, referring to an object’ in the sign/representamen, object, interpretant triad. The most convincing part of Deely’s argument on this matter for me, representing a major development of semiotics, I’d argue, concerns the ‘suprasubjective’. As Gary R says, the “suprasubjective provides the foundation for shared meanings, that is for the intersubjectivity”. Put another way, the very possibility of relation (singular), provides the grounds for relations (plural). A typical Deely example (2017) distinguishes between intersubjective and suprasubjective relations: We are supposed to meet for dinner; you show up and I don’t (or vice-versa), and you are annoyed until you find out that I died on the way to the dinner. At my moment of death, at the moment I ceased to have a material subjectivity encounterable in space and time, the relation between us went from being intersubjective as well as suprasubjective to being only suprasubjective; yet under both sets of circumstances I (or you) as the objective terminus of the dinner engagement remained suprasubjective (if not intersubjective!) as a constant influencing the behavior of the one still living in whom the relation retained a subjective foundation as a cognitive state provenating the relation as suprasubjectively terminating at an ‘other’. Thus, the sign – or semiosis – on the one hand, consists not in an ‘objectivist’, determinate entity that is sustained by intersubjectivity, but in a thoroughly malleable relation that is indeterminate in respect of its terminus except insofar as it is understood by agents within the relation. On the other hand, the sign is suprasubjective in that its force – like that of fictions and the law – endures even when one or more of the subjects is removed. Best, Paul Deely, John (2017) ‘Ethics and the semiosis-semiotics distinction’, Special issue of Zeitschrift für Semiotik ed. Morten Tønnessen, Jonathan Beevor and Yogi Hendlin, 37 (3-4): 13-30. From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of Gary Richmond <[email protected]> Date: Tuesday, 14 January 2025 at 06:28 To: [email protected] <[email protected]>, [email protected] <[email protected]> Cc: Robert Junqueira <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Intersubjective Reality Gary F, Paul, Robert, List, As did you, I read Deely's Purely Objective Reality many years ago and had to do some research and reviewing to recall the thrust of the argument for suprasubjectivity. As I understand it, Deely's concept of suprasubjectivity describes a reality that transcends both individual subjectivity and intersubjectivity. That is to say that it refers to a level of reality independent of both, but which yet can be interpreted by individuals and communities, perhaps especially scientific communities. This might make it a rather useful concept for biosemiotics. For example, ecosystems follow natural principles of ecology no matter how we individually or collectively experience, describe, or otherwise think about them (not, of course, that we can't have profound effects upon them, not infrequently, negative effects). While Deely holds that suprasubjectivity is a domain of objective reality, he argues that what many think of as "purely objective reality" is a fiction. In addition, he emphasizes that the creatures of suprasubjectivty are mediated by signs, following Peirce's idea that the entire cosmos is so mediated, perhaps even comprised of signs. He argues that suprasubjective provides the foundation for shared meanings, that is for the intersubjectivity. For example, 'gravity' is a suprasubjective reality because it is a phenomenon which has effects whether there is, say, theoretical agreement now or at any given time as to its nature. Of course that sounds very much like Peirce's definition of 'the real' in the most general sense as that which is independent of what individuals or communities might think it is. As I see it for science, individual scientists can, at best, posit promising hypotheses, while communities of scientists can test these, while for Peirce the principle of fallibilism still holds for whatever the scientific findings, no matter how 'solid' they may appear to be. So the question remains, at least for me, how does suprasubjectivity differ from Peirce's definition of the objectively real which we can only asymptotically approach knowing through the scientific method? Best, Gary R On Mon, Jan 13, 2025 at 8:27 AM <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Robert, list, John Deely defines “anthroposemiosis” as “the species-specifically human use of signs, rooted in language” (Four Ages of Understanding, p. 629). My expression was not a direct quote, or I would have cited the source as I have here. Deely generally followed Thomas Sebeok in making an absolute distinction between human language and the communication faculties of other animals, as he explained in Chapter 9 of Purely Objective Reality. He also called homo sapiens “the semiotic species”, because all animals use signs, but only humans know that there are signs, and therefore only humans do semiotics (i.e. talk about signs, as we are doing here). By the way, Paul Cobley mentioned Deely’s term “suprasubjectivity”, which I didn’t find in Chapter 9 of the book, but it’s in Chapter 2 of Purely Objective Reality. How that concept relates to what Yuval Harari calls “intersubjectivity” is a metasemiotic question that I won’t go into here. Love, gary f. Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg } Ecologically speaking, the trouble with the human race is that it's getting too big for its niches. [gnox] { https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/> From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> On Behalf Of Robert Junqueira Sent: 13-Jan-25 07:42 To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>; [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> Cc: Paul Cobley <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Intersubjective Reality Dear Garry F., Should you please let us know where John Deely defines anthroposemiosis as "human linguistic communication", we would be most appreciative. Yours sincerely, Robert Junqueira <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> escreveu (domingo, 12/01/2025 à(s) 17:15): Paul, list, Thank you for that pointer to Deely’s Purely Objective Reality! Since I read it over a decade ago, I’d forgotten all about it, but I dug up my copy hoping to answer the immediate question on my mind: “intersubjectivity is not enough” for what? Halfway through Deely’s chapter (page 151, specifically) I realized that what he meant was this: Intersubjectivity is not enough to account for anthroposemiosis, or human linguistic communication. Deely’s reason for saying this is that “intersubjectivity,” for him, is a relation between organisms, “something that exists in the world, beyond (over and above) subjectivity, whether or not anybody is aware of its existence; its reality is “hardcore”, not socially constructed” (p. 151). But Harari’s definition and examples of intersubjectively created entities show that for him they are socially constructed (mostly by “stories people tell one another”). What’s behind this discrepancy is that Deely, like Peirce and unlike Harari, generally uses the term “subject” as it was used in the Latin age of philosophy, and avoids the more Kantian sense of “subjectivity.” (See Peirce’s Century Dictionary entry on “objective”, which is reproduced in Turning Signs at https://gnusystems.ca/TS/rlb.htm#bjctv. On Peirce’s usage see Objecting and Realizing (TS ·12)<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/blr.htm#x08>.) So I don’t think Deely’s chapter really answers the question posed by Gary R. I’d like to rephrase it as follows: would Peirce recognize some entities as socially constructed realities? I think I could supply a number of Peirce quotes that show him doing that, but I’d rather hear what others think on the question first. Love, gary f. Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> On Behalf Of Paul Cobley Sent: 12-Jan-25 06:01 To: Gary Richmond <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>; [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> Cc: Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>; Benjamin Udell <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Intersubjective Reality Gary R, list, Thanks for introducing discussion of this very interesting topic. One would expect Harari, bearing in mind his main audience, to rely on a concept such as intersubjectivity. But, in answer to your question ‘Is Harari’s concept of “intersubjective reality” compatible with Peircean realism?’, the most direct and extensive discussion of this issue that I have come across was offered by John Deely nearly 23 years ago. John’s conclusions can be found in Chapter 9 of his 2009 book, Purely Objective Reality (Berlin: de Gruyter). The chapter, aptly, carries the title of the original 2002 lecture: ‘Why intersubjectivity is not enough’. There he outlines the concept of suprasubjectivity to explicate what he sees as compatible with Peircean realism. Best, Paul From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> on behalf of Gary Richmond <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Date: Saturday, 11 January 2025 at 21:22 To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Cc: Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Intersubjective Reality List, Gary Fuhrman, whom I sometimes think of as a philosopher of the Anthropocene, in the course of revising a section of his online book, Turning Signs [https://gnusystems.ca/TS/], forwarded a link to that section to see what I thought of his revision (I've read TS online and in its print version, and have discussed TS often with Fuhrman off List and in his blog). In the section [linked to below] he remarks that Yuval Noah Harari posits, in addition to the objective reality and subjective reality we Peirceans are all fairly familiar with, an intersubjective reality. Fuhrman later sent me a longer quote which, I think, helps clarify exactly what Harari means by "intersubjective reality" (I'll give the shorter quote in the context of Fuhrman's comments on it a bit later) in this post. "The two levels of reality that preceded storytelling are objective reality and subjective reality. Objective reality consists of things like stones, mountains, and asteroids—things that exist whether we are aware of them or not. An asteroid hurtling toward planet Earth, for example, exists even if nobody knows it’s out there. Then there is subjective reality: things like pain, pleasure, and love that aren’t “out there” but rather “in here.” Subjective things exist in our awareness of them. An unfelt ache is an oxymoron. "But some stories are able to create a third level of reality: intersubjective reality. Whereas subjective things like pain exist in a single mind, intersubjective things like laws, gods, nations, corporations, and currencies exist in the nexus between large numbers of minds. More specifically, they exist in the stories people tell one another. The information humans exchange about intersubjective things doesn’t represent anything that had already existed prior to the exchange of information; rather, the exchange of information creates these things."—Harari, Yuval Noah. Nexus (p. 25). McClelland & Stewart. Kindle Edition. I think that Peirce, should he have accepted the concept, might include these intersubjective realities with other symbols inhabiting his Third Universe of Experience. In the quotation below I've put those that might be examples of intersubjective realities in boldface. The third Universe comprises everything whose being consists in active power to establish connections between different objects, especially between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is essentially a Sign -- not the mere body of the Sign, which is not essentially such, but, so to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its Being in its power of serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind. Such, too, is a living consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of a plant. Such is a living constitution -- a daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social "movement." CP 6.455 In Turning Signs Fuhrman puts these in the context of language, communication, information, community, relations and, perhaps especially, dialogue -- but not truth. See: https://gnusystems.ca/TS/dlg.htm#ntrsbj Here, Fuhrman comments, then quotes Harari: Humans are social animals who have used language for millennia to cooperate with others. Without it, and without the information networks which enable communication at ever larger scales, they could not have attained the dominance over life on Earth that we now call the Anthropocene<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropocene>. Some information networks enable humans to learn the truth about what they call “objective” reality, which is what it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it. But every sentient being has to sense its reality on its own, separately and “subjectively.” Consequently, both communication and power relations within the community depend on intersubjective realities<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/gld.htm#ntrsb>, as Yuval Harari calls them in Nexus (2024, 25): ‘they exist in the stories people tell one another.’ Not all these stories reflect “objective” reality, but they can be ‘real powers in the world’ (Peirce<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/sdg.htm#hsabstr>), and some information networks propagate them in order to maintain or modify a social order. The objects referred to by many symbols are among the intersubjective realities which people may naively confuse with “objective” truth. "Contrary to what the naive view of information says, information has no essential link to truth, and its role in history isn’t to represent a preexisting reality. Rather, what information does is to create new realities by tying together disparate things— whether couples or empires. Its defining feature is connection rather than representation, and information is whatever connects different points into a network. Information doesn’t necessarily inform us about things. Rather, it puts things in formation." (Harari 2024, 12) One question immediately comes to mind: Is Harari’s concept of “intersubjective reality” compatible with Peircean realism? I’d be interested in hearing list members' thoughts on this question. Best, Gary R PS My first attempt at sending this email failed as the default address is the old iupui one, so was undeliverable. Ben,, is there any way to make the new iu address the default address? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com<https://cspeirce.com/> and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com<https://www.cspeirce.com/> . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. 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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
