Gary, List: GR: For example, you are quite right to emphasize the idea of “conceivable” effects in Peirce's PM rather than merely practical ones.
As I observe in the analysis portion of my paper about the maxim ( https://philpapers.org/go.pl?aid=SCHPMO-8), Peirce himself calls attention to his deliberate repetition of words derived from "conceive" in its original formulation. CSP: This employment five times over of derivates of *concipere *must then have had a purpose. In point of fact it had two. One was to show that I was speaking of meaning in no other sense than that of *intellectual purport*. The other was to avoid all danger of being understood as attempting to explain a concept by percepts, images, schemata, or by anything but concepts. I did not, therefore, mean to say that acts, which are more strictly singular than anything, could constitute the purport, or adequate proper interpretation, of any symbol. (CP 5.402n3, 1905) The *ultimate *meaning of an intellectual concept is not any *single *action, nor even a *series *of individual actions, but a general *habit* of conduct. The description of such a habit is a *conditional *proposition whose consequent is "the *kind *of action to which it gives rise" (emphasis mine), and whose antecedent is "the specification of the conditions and of the motive." Accordingly, I suggest near the end of my paper that its logical form is, "If result *R* is intended under conditions *C*, perform act *A*." As I go on to add ... JAS: It is important to recognize again that for Peirce, rather than stipulating particular actions in particular situations, these propositions signify general tendencies to act in certain general ways under certain general circumstances; not a collection of discrete actualities, but a continuum of real possibilities. ... It is presumably along these lines that Peirce's long-sought proof of pragmatism "would essentially involve the establishment of the truth of synechism" (CP 5.415, EP 2:335, 1905), which is "that tendency of philosophical thought which insists upon the idea of continuity as of prime importance" (CP 6.169, 1902). As for the "proof [of pragmatism] from Peirce's theory of signs," it is not the only one that Houser identifies and loosely reconstructs in his introduction to EP 2 (pp. xxxiii-xxxviii); the others are based on Peirce's theory of belief (1877-8), theory of perception (1903), and Existential Graphs (never finished). I have previously posted my own speculative sketch of the last one, as follows. 1. Intellectual concepts are symbols and thus indeterminate, so their only mode of composition is mutual determination by means of propositions--"Some stones possess the character of hardness." 2. The logical meaning of an intellectual concept (second grade of clearness) is the continuum of all possible propositions that would truthfully affirm or deny it of something--"Any diamond possesses the character of hardness." 3. Belief in an intellectual concept corresponds to *individual *habits of expectation described by indicative judgments--"If *this *stone possesses the character of hardness, then when I rub it with a knife, it *will *resist scratching." 4. The pragmatistic meaning of an intellectual concept (third grade of clearness) is a *general *mental habit described by a subjunctive conditional--"If I *were *to rub any diamond with a knife, then it *would *resist scratching." 5. Beliefs are subject to revision with further experiences, especially surprising observations that call for explanatory hypotheses--"When I rub *this *stone with a knife, it resists scratching, and if it *were *a diamond, then that would be a matter of course." 6. A general mental habit *manifests *in self-controlled conduct described by a practical syllogism with #4 as the major premiss and a relevant intention as the minor premiss--"I *desire *a stone that possesses the character of hardness, so I *shall *obtain a diamond." Many scholars make the mistake of stopping at #4 (verification) or #5 (abduction/retroduction) instead of going on to #6 (prescription). I now suspect that what Peirce needed for #4-5 was "a *Delta *part [of Existential Graphs] in order to deal with modals" (RL 376, R 500:2-3, 1911)--perhaps his 1909 Logic Notebook version using heavy lines to denote possible states of things, which I develop much farther than he did in two recent papers (https://doi.org/10.23925/2316-5278.2025v26i1:e60449 and https://doi.org/10.2979/csp.00026). #6 would then require a way to represent intentions and imperatives--which is presumably why Peirce proposed tinctures in 1906, but he abandoned them along with cuts in favor of simple shading for negation in 1911. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 3, 2025 at 4:20 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > > I fully concur with your response to Surteerth, Jon, which clarifies > several matters which, strangely, continue to confound some students of > Peirce's philosophy. > > For example, you are quite right to emphasize the idea of “conceivable” > effects in Peirce's PM rather than merely practical ones. For Peirce > meaning derives from the *conception* of *conceivable* effects and not > from the total sum of practical effects. That several prominent > pragmatists, including William James, seem to have continued to do so was > his principal motivation in renaming his philosophy 'pragmaticism'. > > Similarly, that qualities, relations, and representations continue to be > seen by some as three different things rather than *three modes of being* > (viz.,1ns, 2ns, and 3ns) that structure both experience and thought is > still a surprisingly common misconception. > > And, as you noted, holding that there is a distinction between internal > ideas and an external real world is shown to be false in Peirce’s argument > that thought is not confined to the mind but extends into external tools > and media (the inkwell and pen example). Peirce's justifiably famous remark > on this, which you quoted, is worth repeating: "Accordingly, just as we > say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a body we ought to > say that we are in thought and not that thoughts are in us." I suppose > only a Cartesian dualist would disagree. > > Finally, your rejection of the framing of a choice between pragmatism as a > criterion of meaning or as a methodological postulate is countered by > Peirce's pragmatism integrating both through his framework of abduction > (1ns), deduction (3ns), and induction (2ns) in what Peirce called "a > complete inquiry" when taken in that order (1ns -> 3ns -> ) following the > vector of process. > > In a sense, all of the above merely -- but importantly! -- emphasizes > Peirce’s original terminology, certain important distinctions he makes, and > the structure of his broader logical system. > > What especially interested me was your opinion that of the various > attempts to outline Peirce's 1907 "proof of Pragmatism" that you found > Nathan Houser's the most impressive. Of those I know, I would strongly > agree. Houser precedes his overview of this "proof" by remarking that > Peirce expressed his thesis in a very simple form then; Houser then goes on > to outline it: > > "The whole meaning of an intellectual predicate is that certain kinds of > events would happen, once in so often, in the course of experience, under > certain kinds of existential circumstances." > > This is what Peirce set out to prove in 1907. > > Peirce's proof, much abbreviated, ran something like this: > 1. "Every concept and every thought beyond immediate perception is a > sign." 2. The object of a sign is necessarily unexpressed in the sign. > 3. The interpretant is the "total proper effect of the sign" and this > effect may be emotional, energetic, or logical, but it is the logical > interpretant alone that constitutes "the intellectual apprehension of the > meaning of a sign." > 4. "A sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates > between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the > object relatively to the interpretanty and determines the interpretant in > reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be > determined by the object through the mediation of this 'sign.'" > 5. The logical interpretant does not correspond to any kind of object, but > is essentially in a relatively future tense, what Peirce calls a > "would-be." Thus the logical interpretant must be "general in its > possibilities of reference." > 6. Therefore, the logical interpretant is of the nature of habit. > 7. A concept, proposition, or argument may be a logical interpretant, but > not a final logical interpretant. The habit alone, though it may be a sign > in some other way, does not call for further interpretation. It calls for > action. Introduction I xxxv > 8. "The deliberately formed, self-analyzing habit... is the living > definition, the veritable and final logical interpretant." > 9. "Consequently, the most perfect account of a concept that words can > convey will consist in a description of that habit which that concept is > calculated to produce. But how otherwise can a habit be described than by a > description of the kind of action to which it gives rise, with the > specification of the conditions and of the motive?" > > This conclusion is virtually a paraphrase of Peirce's thesis, the "kernel > of pragmatism," so it completes his proof. We might think of this as the > proof from Peirce's theory of signs. > > > I'd be most interested in discussing this, shall we say, semeiotic proof > of pragmatism. > > Best, > > Gary R >
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