Jeff, List: I changed the subject line (again) since your specific questions do not seem to be about ontology, but maybe I am missing something.
JBD: If we take the premisses of an argument to be the sign and the conclusion to be the interpretant ... I would instead take the *entire *argument to be the sign--or rather, the entire *argumentation *consisting of "definitely formulated premisses" (cf. CP6.456, EP 2:435, 1908) and an explicit conclusion, which can only be formulated retrospectively to *represent *a real and continuous process of inference that has already taken place. In other words, we *prescind *the argumentation as an individual sign with its object and interpretant as artifacts of analysis, along with its constituent individual propositions with their objects and interpretants, as well as their constituent individual terms/names with their objects and interpretants. The following quotations are admittedly lengthy, but they are excerpts from even longer paragraphs that I recommend reading and considering in their entirety. CSP: Practically, when a man endeavors to state what the process of his thought has been, after the process has come to an end, he first asks himself to what conclusion he has come. That result he formulates in an assertion, which, we will assume, has some sort of likeness--I am inclined to think only a conventionalized one--with the attitude of his thought at the cessation of the motion. That having been ascertained, he next asks himself how he is justified in being so confident of it; and he proceeds to cast about for a sentence expressed in words which shall strike him as resembling some previous attitude of his thought, and which at the same time shall be logically related to the sentence representing his conclusion, in such a way that if the premiss-proposition be true, the conclusion-proposition necessarily or naturally would be true. ... For there is no fact in our possession to forbid our supposing that the thinking-process was one continuous (though undoubtedly varied) process. At any rate, it is only the self-defence of the process that is clearly broken up into arguments. It is more than doubtful whether what we can state as an argument or inference represents any part of the thinking except in the logical relation of the truth of the premiss to the truth of the conclusion. And, moreover, the argument so considered consists in the statements in words. How nearly they represent anything really in the thought is very doubtful, and is quite immaterial. (CP 2.27, 1902) CSP: [A]n Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a motion is built up of positions. So to regard it is to neglect the very essence of it. … Just as it is strictly correct to say that nobody is ever in an exact Position (except instantaneously, and an Instant is a fiction, or ens rationis), but Positions are either vaguely described states of motion of small range, or else (what is the better view), are entia rationis (i.e. fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions) invented for the purposes of closer descriptions of states of motion; so likewise, Thought (I am not talking Psychology, but Logic, or the essence of Semeiotics) cannot, from the nature of it, be at rest, or be anything but inferential process; and propositions are either roughly described states of Thought-motion, or are artificial creations intended to render the description of Thought-motion possible; and Names are creations of a second order serving to render the representation of propositions possible. (LF 3/1:234-235, 1906) The interpretant of an argumentation is indeed its conclusion--"An Argument is a sign which distinctly represents the Interpretant, called its Conclusion, which it is intended to determine" (CP 2.95, 1902); "The argument is a representamen which ... separately represents what is the interpreting representation that it is intended to determine. This interpreting representation is, of course, the conclusion" (CP 5.76, EP 2:164, 1903)--and it can indeed serve as a premiss in a subsequent argumentation. However, so can any of the premisses from which it purportedly follows, or even the entire previous argumentation as a whole. Again, the first step in any semiotic analysis is prescinding the *individual* sign of interest, whose "boundaries" are arbitrary to some degree, followed by identifying the other correlates. Since the conclusion is *internal *to the argumentation, it must be the *immediate *interpretant, "the Interpretant represented or signified in the Sign" (CP 8.343, EP 2:482, 1908 Dec 24-28). Moreover, "So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant" (R 339:276r, 1906 Apr 2). As I see it, the *dynamical *interpretant is the argumentation's *actual *effect on an interpreter, such as being rationally persuaded of the truth of the conclusion as plausible (abductive), probable (inductive), or necessary (deductive); and its *final* interpretant is its *ideal* effect on an interpreter, such as whether it *would be* rationally persuasive to an infinite community after infinite inquiry. Likewise, the dynamical interpretant of the conclusion itself--as a proposition--is the exertion of *actually *affirming (or denying) it, and its final interpretant is its *would-be* affirmation (or denial) by an infinite community after infinite inquiry. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Jul 20, 2025 at 11:34 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Jon S, Gary R, List, > > > I'd like to ask a couple of questions about the two positions you describe > with respect to the nature of a sign: > > > GR: Some argue, with considerable textual support from Peirce, that sign > (representamen), object, and interpretant are but correlates within a > triadic semiotic relation, others that the triadic relation itself is the > Sign: that is, that one could argue that the Sign is not simply the > representamen or the representamen plus its object, that the Sign is the > whole triadic relation of representamen, object, and interpretant ensemble. > > > JAS: As you and other List members are well aware, I am in the former camp > and quite vociferously reject the latter position. As I see it, it is an > even bigger terminological mistake than using "instant" colloquially > instead of carefully distinguishing it from "moment," because it is even > more conducive of conceptual confusion. The triadic relation is > "representing" or (more generally) "mediating," while "sign" designates its > first corollate--that which represents the object for the interpretant, or > (more generally) that which mediates between the object and the > interpretant. > > > Let's consider a pattern of inquiry involving abductive, deductive and > inductive arguments. If we take the premisses of an argument to be the sign > and the conclusion to be the interpretant, what is the sign as the cycle > continues from initial hypotheses to the deduction of possible tests and > predicted consequences to induction from actual experiments that help to > confirm or disconfirm the competing hypotheses? At each stage, don't the > conclusions of a given argument carry forward and serve as premisses in the > next stage of inquiry? > > > First, given the fact that, at each stage, the interpretant has three > parts: an immediate, a dynamical and a final interpretant. Don't the three > parts of the interpretant serve as a sign at the next stage? > > > Second, do you think that only the conclusion is carried forward to serve > as a premiss in the next argument in the inquiry. Or, is the entirety of > the previous argument--conclusion and premisses--carried forward? > > Note that I am not advocating for one position or the other in this > debate. I am open to the competing interpretative hypotheses and want to > understand the pros and cons of different approaches w/r/t reading Peirce. > > --Jeff >
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