Jack, Gary F., List: JRKC: I do not consider Peirce’s system to be a literal description of the world as it is, but rather a model for understanding consciousness.
As I see it, the Peircean response to this is not rejecting it outright, which would be blocking the way of inquiry; it is recognizing it, as Peirce himself did, to be "a sop to Cerberus"--a necessary and very useful step toward understanding his "broader conception," with plenty of work still to be done. However, it would be equally inappropriate to *limit *the applicability of semiotic principles to consciousness, or even human thought and communication more generally; in his own words ... CSP: Although the definition does not require the logical interpretant (or, for that matter, either of the other two interpretants) to be a modification of consciousness, yet our lack of experience of any semiosis in which this is not the case, leaves us no alternative to beginning our inquiry into its general nature with a provisional assumption that the interpretant is, at least, in all cases, a sufficiently close analogue of a modification of consciousness to keep our conclusion pretty near to the general truth. We can only hope that, once that conclusion is reached, it may be susceptible of such a generalization as will eliminate any possible error due to the falsity of that assumption. (CP 5.485, EP 2:411, 1907) An example of such generalization is what I say at the very end of my paper on "Peirce's Evolving Interpretants" ( https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHPEI-12.pdf, p. 222)--"The emotional, energetic, and logical interpretants are the familiar effects of signs that humans routinely experience as 'modifications of consciousness.' The immediate, dynamical, and final interpretants are the corresponding effects of signs in general." JRKC: In Peirce’s semiosis, the sign is not static: it unfolds through a process of interpretation, where the Interpretant alters and extends the meaning of a given sign. In this way, the sign is not an object, but a relational function across time. In my view, this is a confusion of *continuous semiosis* as an unfolding process vs. any *discrete sign* that we prescind from that process as the first correlate of a genuine triadic relation. The latter *is* static as an *entia rationis*--effectively, a hypothetical instantaneous snapshot--but the former *is not* static, and I maintain that it is also not strictly dynamic because Peirce often associates that term with *dyadic* reactions. In fact, here is what he states right before the quotation above. CSP: It is important to understand what I mean by *semiosis*. All dynamical action, or action of brute force, physical or psychical, either takes place between two subjects,--whether they react equally upon each other, or one is agent and the other patient, entirely or partially,--or at any rate is a resultant of such actions between pairs. But by "semiosis" I mean, on the contrary, an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of *three *subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs. (CP 5.484, EP 2:411) The prescinded individual sign, object, and interpretant are the three *subjects* of the triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating, which is not reducible to the dyadic relations that it involves. On the other hand, an *event* of semiosis *is *dynamic, with an *actual* sign token being determined by its dynamical object to determine a *dynamical* interpretant. Even so, the process is *governed *by the genuine *triadic* relation of the sign *in itself*--not its general types, nor their individual instances--with its dynamical object and *final* interpretant. The latter is not "final" as the *last *member of a series, but as the *ideal *end at which semiosis is aiming--the *final cause* of all the sign's dynamical interpretants, whose *efficient causes* are the sign's instances/tokens. JRKC: This is why, for example, a sign that emerges twenty years later may retroactively restructure the significance of a prior event. The past is made newly legible through present interpretation. ... As such, what we call "the past" is not determined once and for all, because it remains open to revision by future interpretants. If the past were fully determinate, then the most basic acts of reinterpretation, revision, or understanding would be impossible. The first two sentences here are true, but the second two sentences are false. Future signs and interpretants can change the *significance*, *interpretation*, or *understanding* of a past event; but that event *itself *is still exactly what it always was, "determined once and for all." As I said yesterday, the aim of inquiry is eliminating (or at least minimizing) the deviations of our dynamical interpretants from the same sign's immediate and (especially) final interpretants, which is what makes logic as semeiotic a *normative *science. The absolute truth is what an *infinite* community *would *believe after *infinite *inquiry, the final interpretant of every sign whose dynamical object is reality. In the meantime, any of our beliefs that would *not *be included in that final opinion are subject to revision whenever they are confounded by our ongoing experience. GF: In a given extended moment, the past part is remembered and the future part is anticipated (and there are no real boundaries between these “parts); what we recall as *previous* to the moment is only a *representation* of experience, while the more or less distant future is *imagined*. Both are signs rather than dynamic objects of direct experience. They are not real things or collections of things; what we call “the past” is a *recollection*, mediated in one way or another. Along the same lines, I agree that memories are *representations *of past experiences; but as such, those past experiences are their dynamical objects. Put another way, recollections are *signs *of the past, not the past *itself*, which is not only *real *but also *external*--it is as it is, not only regardless of what anyone thinks about *it*, but regardless of what anyone thinks about *anything* (cf. CP 8.191, c. 1904-5). In fact, as I said yesterday, I agree with Peirce that the past *exists*--it "really acts upon us ... precisely as an Existent object acts," and it is "absolutely determinate," permanent and unchanging. GF: Those of us who care about Peirce’s exact terminology at least look at the actual text before we cite it as Peirce’s. I am indeed one such person, and a good online source for accurate quotations is the Commens dictionary (http://www.commens.org/dictionary). Unfortunately, that website itself is no longer reliably maintained, but an archived version is available, thanks to the Wayback Machine ( https://web.archive.org/web/20240703023004/http://www.commens.org/dictionary ). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Jul 27, 2025 at 12:25 PM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jack, I’m not sure what to make of your “quantum method,” but I agree with > most of you post, including this: “What we take to be “the past” is, > surely, that which may be called upon within the present at any given > moment (or otherwise we cannot even cite said "past").” In a given > extended moment, the past part is remembered and the future part is > anticipated (and there are no real boundaries between these “parts); what > we recall as *previous* to the moment is only a *representation* of > experience, while the more or less distant future is *imagined*. Both are > signs rather than dynamic objects of direct experience. They are not real > things or collections of things; what we call “the past” is a > *recollection*, mediated in one way or another. > > However I must take issue with your use of *AI-Source.* What it cites as > coming from CP 2.303, for instance, is *not* a direct quote from Peirce’s > text. Those of us who care about Peirce’s exact terminology at least look > at the actual text before we cite it as Peirce’s. Those who include a lot > of such quotations in our posts (such as Jon Alan Schmidt and I) can do so > because we have *searchable* databases of Peirce texts which may come > from e-books, PDFs, transcriptions from manuscript, etc. My own primary > database consists of three large HTML files where I’ve copied texts that > seemed important to me in my reading of Peirce over the past 20 years or > so, and arranged them in chronological order. Personally I don’t trust an > AI even to *summarize* Peirce (or anything) accurately, let alone supply > exact quotes. Better not to use quotation marks at all! > > Now I’ll go back to have a closer look at your “quantum method” … > > > > Love, gary > > Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg > > } By their fruits ye shall know them. [*Matthew* 7:20] { > > substack.com/@gnox }{ Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/> > > > > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> *On > Behalf Of *Jack Cody > *Sent:* 27-Jul-25 09:57 > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]>; Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Time and Semiosis (was Semiosic Ontology) > > > > Speaking of the past—and here I may depart from orthodoxy among Peirce > scholars—I do not consider Peirce’s system to be a literal description of > the world as it is, but rather a model for understanding consciousness. I > realize this may be rejected outright, but I cannot help but interpret it > in this way. > > > > When it comes to time—past, present, future—I read Peirce’s categories not > as fixed ontological boundaries, but as phenomenological modalities of > temporal consciousness. That is, I see time in Peirce much like I see it in > quantum theory: not as a clean succession of fixed states, but as an > ongoing process of semiotic determination. Peirce’s account of the > categories—Firstness (quality of feeling), Secondness (reaction or brute > fact), and Thirdness (law or mediation)—already admits a model of > continuity that resists closure: > > > > “Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, > positively and without reference to anything else. It is the realm of > possibility, quality, feeling.” > > — CP 1.337 (1885 - *by AI-Source*). > > > > In Peirce’s semiosis, the sign is not static: it unfolds through a process > of interpretation, where the Interpretant alters and extends the meaning of > a given sign. In this way, the sign is not an object, but a relational > function across time. Similarly, in quantum terms, the act of > measurement—or interpretation—collapses a possibility space into a > particular state, but never exhausts it. This is why, for example, a sign > that emerges twenty years later may retroactively restructure the > significance of a prior event. The past is made newly legible through > present interpretation. > > > > This is consistent with Peirce’s claim that semiosis is infinite and that > interpretants are themselves signs, capable of being interpreted again: > > > > “The sign depends upon its interpretant for its interpretation, and > this interpretant again is a sign, which has an interpretant of its own; so > that the process of semiosis is unlimited.” > > — CP 2.303 (1903 - *by AI-Source*) > > > > As such, what we call "the past" is not determined once and for all, > because it remains open to revision by future interpretants. If the past > were fully determinate, then the most basic acts of reinterpretation, > revision, or understanding would be impossible. > > > > This same structure is evident in the quantum method I use. In my > deductive framework, I describe recursive systems (S₁, S₂, …) as semiotic > phases: each invocation of S₁ alters it, such that S₁ becomes S₁′, and then > S₁″, and so on. It is never the same state again. This is not merely > metaphorical—each call alters the relational state space, just as each > interpretive act in semiosis transforms the “meaning” of the sign. > > > > Only when S₁/S₁′ (S₁″… S₁ⁿ) is no longer invoked at all can we say that > the past configuration has truly ceased to be—no longer semeiotically > active. In network or systems theory, that point can be modeled through > thresholds of signal collapse or feedback saturation. But in consciousness > or human reality, it is far less clear: the "end" of a sign’s activity is > not determined ontologically, but functionally—whether or not it continues > to be invoked. > > > > This is in line with Peirce’s theory that semiosis is never complete. > There is no final interpretant “in this life”—and perhaps not even “in the > next”: > > > > “There is no final, or absolute, interpretant. The process of > interpretation never ceases. The semiosis is infinite.” > > — CP 2.92 (1903 - *by AI-Source*) > > > > A sign, like a quantum state, may lie dormant, but not concluded. > > > > In that light, semiosis is akin to the quantum structure I devised (states > and call-backs) in that each is recursive, reinterpreting, historically > contingent, and indeterminate *until it isn’t*. What we take to be “the > past” is, surely, that which may be called upon within the present at any > given moment (or otherwise we cannot even cite said "past"). > > > > I must add, here, that owing to my relative "novice" status within this > list I have had to program an AI to grab Peirce quotations where I think > they may or may not fit but the message: I think it important to clarfy > such things these days. As many of you may or may not know, my own work is > moving in divergent areas so I am trying much more, these days, to find > some common ground within the Peircean corpus. It's something that must be > addresssed, by me, personally, at any rate, for me to advance my other work > and thus this community is very helpful (in its agreements and > disagreements). > > > > (I add, think Marcel Proust and the cake — for those literary inclined > among us). > > > > Best, > > > > Jack >
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