Gary R., List: We seem to be almost entirely on the same page with respect to the previous topic, so I changed the subject line to reflect what you brought up in your last few paragraphs below. I also see this as a continuation of where I left off Thursday in the "Semiosic Ontology" thread and would still welcome any responses to that post ( https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-08/msg00023.html).
I need to acknowledge and clarify something up-front--Peirce himself never *explicitly *says that the universe is a *semiosic *continuum, nor "that every entity is a token of a type," nor "that every interaction is a degenerate form of a continuous triadic semiosis." However, I view these as legitimate *implications *of his relevant writings, and I provide many supporting excerpts from them in my "Semiosic Synechism" paper ( https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHSSA-42.pdf), some of which I have quoted or cited in recent posts (as well as below). That is why my subtitle for that paper is "A *Peircean *Argumentation," not "*Peirce's *Argumentation," as I explain in its introduction. Your most significant misgiving about my hypothesis still seems to be the question of whether and how evolution fits into the resulting picture. I hope that I have made it clear by now that, just like the knowledge of all reality that *would *be possessed by an infinite community after infinite investigation and thus infinite experience, the "one *individual*, or completely determinate, state of things" (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906)--i.e., "the fact that is not abstracted but complete, [which] is the ultimate interpretant of every sign" (EP 2:304, NEM 4:239-40, 1901)--is an asymptotic limit in the infinite future. Likewise, a completely indeterminate state of things--i.e., "nothing, pure zero" (CP 6.217, 1898), "Utter indetermination" (EP 2:322, NEM 4:260, 1901), "utter nothingness ... nility ... tohu bohu" (CP 6.490, 1908)--is an asymptotic limit in the infinite past. In between, at any assignable date, the entire universe is constantly evolving by becoming *more *determinate. This is Peirce's self-described *hyperbolic *or *evolutionist *cosmology (CP 1.409, EP 1:277, 1887-8; CP 6.581, 1890; CP 8.317, 1891), which he contrasts with the alternative *parabolic *or *pessimistic *and *elliptical *or *Epicurean *cosmologies (CP 1.362, EP 1:251, 1887-8; CP 6.582-5, 1890; R 953, c. 1897). In my view, these correspond respectively to genuine, degenerate, and doubly degenerate continua. Because the state of the universe is always proceeding between initial and final states that are *different* from each other, it is isomorphic with time (NEM 2:249-50, 1895; NEM 2:611, 1908) and with the inferential process of reasoning (CP 1.491, c. 1896; NEM 4:127&134, 1897-8), thus suggesting my own conception of it as a *semiosic *continuum. The universe as a *perfect *sign is constantly evolving by becoming *more *determinate (EP 2:545n25, 1906), "working out its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193, 1903), because all the signs within it are constantly determining their interpretants. Simply put, "Symbols grow" (CP 2.302, EP 2:10, 1894). "Reality, therefore, can only be regarded as the limit of the endless series of symbols. A symbol is essentially a purpose, that is to say, is a representation that seeks to make itself definite, or seeks to produce an interpretant more definite than itself" (EP 2:323, NEM 4:261, 1901). "Synechism is founded on the notion that the coalescence, the becoming continuous, the becoming governed by laws, the becoming instinct with general ideas, are but phases of one and the same process of the growth of reasonableness" (CP 5.4, 1902). "Accordingly, the pragmaticist does not make the *summum bonum* to consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those generals which were just now said to be *destined*, which is what we strive to express in calling them *reasonable*" (CP 5.433, EP 2:343, 1905; see also CP 1.615, EP 2:255, 1903). I am not sure what else still needs to be addressed at this point, so I will pause again to see what comments and questions you and others might have. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Aug 8, 2025 at 8:18 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > > Referencing your post yesterday, you and I agree that, as Peirce argues, > Kant's *Ding an sich *is conceptually incoherent, that when we perceive > something that we are *directly perceiving it* even as our conceptual > hold is -- as it must be -- incomplete and imperfect, sometimes confused or > distorted. Further, that "anything that exists can be denoted in a > proposition" and if it can’t be indicated, it can’t be denoted; so, the *Ding > an sich* can’t be indicated; therefore it doesn’t exist. Continuing that > line of argumentation in your post today, I found it helpful for you to > have included multiple *short *Peirce passages demonstrating that Peirce > rejected the incoherent idea of an 'absolutely unknowable reality' which, > again, is incoherent . > I also certainly agree that Peirce’s ideal of *infinite inquiry* (truth > as the eventual hypothetical consensus of all investigation) is not, as was > suggested, subject to falsification, because, as you remarked, it is merely > a r*egulative ideal* which 'plays out' in an asymptotic manner, not at > all a prediction of an actual end state that will ever be reached. Truth is > what an ideal community of investigators would ultimately agree upon if > research could proceed indefinitely under improving conditions of > reasoning, evidence, and freedom from bias. Meanwhile our knowledge remains > fallible and provisional and is always subject to correction and revision. > It follows that progress toward truth is a communal effort, the “community > of inquirers” over many, many generations, pushing knowledge forward. I > thought this had been hashed out in the literature so that there was > consensus on what Peirce meant by infinite inquiry. > > I liked your simple and concise explanation that *experience* is strictly > cognitive while *semiosis* is not, that is as you put it, that while all > cognition is semiosis, not all semiosis is cognition (again, that being > exactly Peirce's 'broader conception') and why Peirce argues that something > like thought appears in natural processes, not just our human brains. I > fail to see why some find that difficult to comprehend; but, of course, > even Peirce despaired of making his broader conception understood as you > noted. But we are in the 21st century after over a century of Peirce > scholarship. . . In my view, any contemporary attempt* to limit semiosis > to human cognition* would be a step backward in semiotic. And as I noted > in an earlier post, even some contemporary professional linguists, like > Michael Shaprio, have embraced Peirce's semeiotic, including his 'broader > conception', into their work. > > As I see it, the matters summarized above are all clearly Peirce's views, > well established principles that, whether they are expressed as direct > quotes or paraphrases, are recognized by many Peirce scholars as expressing > his considered and weighed views on *those *matters (whatever questions > there may be about other aspects of his philosophy). Now whether one agrees > with them or not is another matter. But to suggest that everything I wrote > in the first half of this message is just an individual, personal > 'interpretation' of Peirce is, in my opinion, pure nonsense. Yet it would > appear that, for some, one is damned whether they include direct quotes in > a post *or* paraphrase Peirce. Heavens, there'd be few -- I mean *no* -- > books rooted in what Peirce thought if both weren't included as standard > operating procedure in scientific and philosophical literature. > > But your post today contains ideas that I have expressed reservations > regarding at least some of the implications of Peirce's claim that “the > universe is a vast representamen” (<-> your "single immense sign") and that > all signs are interconnected in a vast continuum. You state that > Peirce argues that every *entity* is a token of a type (so not only the > word 'rose' but any particular actual🌹that one might single out, say point > to in a garden) and, further, that *every interaction is a degenerate > form of a continuous triadic semiosis* (where does Peirce argue that*, *may > I ask?) That would seem to follow from semeiotic principles applicable to > language and through--but to every interaction? > > Of course I'm eager to read you next post, as your argument that semiosis > pervades the "single immense sign" which is the cosmos, that everything and > every event participates in a continuous, unbroken web of semiosis, and I > assume, semiotic meaning (or, perhaps, potential meaning) would *seem* to > sum up the matter. But evidently there is more. . . > > While you've written about it here before, I still don't quite understand > how that 'vast representamen' and much 'within' it (continuous with it?) > evolves so I hope you're planning to discuss that further. (For the nonce I > won't touch the theosemiotic conclusions you've drawn in other posts, > although, as I recall, they are quintessential in your argument concerning > the 'how' of evolution.) > > I very much appreciate the clarity of your last posts. > > Thanks, > > Gary R >
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