Jon, List, JAS: In accordance with my label of the first cosmological "layer" as the constitution of *being*, you are correct that it would apply to *any possible* universe. However, as I see it, there is no reason to suspect that any other universes *exist* except our own; in fact, since such a conception has no practical bearings, it is "meaningless gibberish" (CP 5.423, EP 2:338, 1905). GR: From a strictly Peircean pragmatic sense that may be so. But 'practical bearings' sometimes occur following a leap into what earlier seemed like "meaningless gibberish." There are myriad examples of 'crazy ideas' (wild hypotheses) which once realized (e.g. quantum mechanics) proved to have considerable "practical bearings." That is to say that in the 21st century I don't believe that we need to cling so closely to 19th and early 20th century cosmologies since missions like the James Webb Space Telescope Program has shown our cosmos to be truly incomprehensibly large, complex, and sometimes 'weird'. Just consider the size of it! There are an estimated 2 to 20 trillion galaxies in the observable universe, and a total of approximately 200 sextillion stars (200 billion trillion stars) in the observable universe
In any event, there are conjectures offered by modern cosmologists suggesting that there may be other universes than our own, or there may have been in the past, or there may be in the future. For one random example, the theory of eternal inflation (to which I don't necessarily subscribe) suggests that while inflation ended locally (that is, created our observable universe), it continues elsewhere, generating countless “bubble” universes, each potentially with different physical laws (a different selection of Platonic ideas?) JAS: Put another way, the inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities (1ns) indeed *transcends *our universe, but those possibilities that have been actualized (2ns) *constitute *our universe. After all, Peirce posits multiple "Platonic worlds" but only one "actual universe of existence," which is the one "in which we happen to be" (CP 6.208, 1898). GR: Yet as just suggested above, other possibilities, other 'Platonic worlds', may have given birth to any number of other universes. God only knows. If these exist can we ever know them? That seems even more unlikely than our knowing in any significant detail any of the trillions of galaxies in our universe. How pragmatically 'real' are they for us? JAS: My use of "complete chaos" to describe the initial state of things also comes directly from Peirce. "The original chaos, therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really happened" (CP 1.411, EP 1:278, 1887-8). "The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the nothingness of which consists in the total absence of regularity" (CP 8.317, 1891). "So, that primeval chaos in which there was no regularity was mere nothing, from a physical aspect" (CP 6.265, EP 1:348, 1892). "In the original chaos, where there was no regularity, there was no existence. ... This we may suppose was in the infinitely distant past" (CP 1.175, c. 1897). GR: All these examples cited are dated before the 1898 lecture series. I would maintain that they principally apply to the first, earlier phase of Peirce's cosmological thinking. I do not see 'chaos' as mentioned in the 'blackboard' lecture. Rather, as I see it, the selection of those "Platonic ideas" which would become our own universe had a sort of primal logic -- not chaotic at all. As I see it, in the 1898 lectures Peirce replaces the imagery of chaos with exactly that of an indeterminate continuum of generality, the *blank blackboard* on which marks can be drawn and erased, redrawn, stabilized, etc. Here, the proto-cosmos originates not from “chaos” (unstructured randomness) but from generality or continuity (3ns) that can *generate* particularity and reaction (1ns and 2ns). JAS: To clarify, Peirce explicitly describes the universe as "a vast representamen," but he does not directly connect his remarks about a "perfect sign" to the universe, and I am not aware of any writings where he refers to a "semiosic continuum." That is why the subtitle of my "Semiosic Synechism" paper is "A *Peircean *Argumentation," not "*Peirce's *Argumentation"; I believe that my synthesis is faithful to his insights, but I recognize that he never spelled it out that way himself. GR: Thanks for the clarification on this point: I must have incorporated your synthesis into my thinking; and for your clarifying two other related points in the conclusion of your post. Best, Gary R On Sun, Oct 5, 2025 at 8:56 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., List: > > In accordance with my label of the first cosmological "layer" as the > constitution of *being*, you are correct that it would apply to *any > possible* universe. However, as I see it, there is no reason to suspect > that any other universes *exist* except our own; in fact, since such a > conception has no practical bearings, it is "meaningless gibberish" (CP > 5.423, EP 2:338, 1905). Put another way, the inexhaustible continuum (3ns) > of indefinite possibilities (1ns) indeed *transcends *our universe, but > those possibilities that have been actualized (2ns) *constitute *our > universe. After all, Peirce posits multiple "Platonic worlds" but only one > "actual universe of existence," which is the one "in which we happen to be" > (CP 6.208, 1898). > > My use of "complete chaos" to describe the initial state of things also > comes directly from Peirce. "The original chaos, therefore, where there was > no regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy, in which > nothing existed or really happened" (CP 1.411, EP 1:278, 1887-8). "The > state of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the nothingness > of which consists in the total absence of regularity" (CP 8.317, 1891). > "So, that primeval chaos in which there was no regularity was mere nothing, > from a physical aspect" (CP 6.265, EP 1:348, 1892). "In the original chaos, > where there was no regularity, there was no existence. ... This we may > suppose was in the infinitely distant past" (CP 1.175, c. 1897). > > I agree that the entire universe cannot possibly be a complex *adaptive > *system > without existing within an environment to which it is *adapting *itself, > and that 1ns encompasses not only qualities but also "Freedom, or Chance, > or Spontaneity" (CP 6.200, 1898). > > GR: Peirce’s grand semeiotic vision in which the universe itself is > conceived as a vast sign, a perfect sign, and a semiosic continuum from > which facts (and events?) are prescinded > > > To clarify, Peirce explicitly describes the universe as "a vast > representamen," but he does not directly connect his remarks about a > "perfect sign" to the universe, and I am not aware of any writings where he > refers to a "semiosic continuum." That is why the subtitle of my "Semiosic > Synechism" paper is "A *Peircean *Argumentation," not "*Peirce's > *Argumentation"; > I believe that my synthesis is faithful to his insights, but I recognize > that he never spelled it out that way himself. > > As for your reference to "facts (and events?)," Peirce seems to maintain > that we *only *prescind facts, because he *defines *an event as "an > existential junction of incompossible facts ... The event is the > existential junction of *states *(that is, of that which in existence > corresponds to a *statement *about a given subject in representation) > whose combination in one subject would violate the logical law of > contradiction" (CP 1.492&494, c. 1896). This is consistent with his remark > a decade later, "A *fact *is so highly a prescissively abstract state of > things, that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition" (CP > 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906). > > Peirce also takes exception with "the idea that a cause is an event of > such a kind as to be necessarily followed by another event which is the > effect" (CP 6.66, 1898). On the contrary, "So far as the conception of > cause has any validity ... the cause and its effect are two *facts*" (CP > 6.67). "Now it is the ineluctable blunder of a nominalist ... to talk of > the cause of an event. But it is not an existential event that has a cause. > It is the *fact*, which is the reference of the event to a general > relation, that has a *cause*" (CP 6.93, 1903). We prescind two *different > *facts and recognize that the earlier one is a cause, the later one is > its effect, and the *change *from one state of things to the other is an > event. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sat, Oct 4, 2025 at 11:00 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, List, >> >> We are clearly in agreement on one matter: that while Peirce initially >> conceived the universe as beginning with 1ns (possibility, “boundless >> freedom”), he later came to see 3ns (generality, continuity, habit-taking) >> as primordial. Categorial involution—that is, that 3ns involves 2ns & 1ns, >> and 2ns involves only 1ns—adds logical support to that later view. >> Additional support comes from your arguing the cosmological integration of >> these three as a continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities (1ns), only >> some of which become actualized (2ns), with the sequence of events >> unfolding as spontaneity (1ns), reaction (2ns), and habit (3ns). As you >> argue, this reinforces an underlying evolutionary trajectory from chaos, >> through process, toward regularity (ultimately, complete regularity in >> Peirce’s view). >> >> JAS: My own attempt at integrating these two accounts or phases was to >> suggest that the *constitution (or hierarchy) of being* is an >> inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities (1ns), some of >> which are actualized (2ns); while the *sequence of events* in each case >> when this happens consists of spontaneity (1ns) followed by reaction (2ns) >> and then habit-taking (3ns). The resulting overall *evolution of states *is >> from complete chaos (1ns) in the infinite past, through this ongoing >> process (3ns) at any assignable date, toward complete regularity (2ns) in >> the infinite future. These three "layers" conform respectively to your >> categorial vectors of representation, order, and process. (Emphasis added, >> GR) >> >> >> You seem to be arguing that* your* three layers (italicized above)*: the >> constitution of being*,* the sequence of events*, and *the overall >> evolution of states* all apply to our existing universe. I don't agree. >> As I've been arguing, the blackboard metaphor suggests to me that your >> first layer, the constitution of being, does not apply only to our >> universe, but to* any possible universe* that might come into existence. >> Indeed, in my view 'being' is not 'constituted' in the proto-universe >> represented by the blackboard at all -- that's why I refer to it as a >> * proto*-universe. There is, no doubt, a *reality moving towards >> existence*; but in my reading of the lecture in which the blackboard >> analogy appears, out of the infinite number of 'Platonic ideas' any number >> of different ones *migh*t have been 'selected' so that some other >> universe different from ours might have come into existence (who knows? >> *has* come into existence). >> >> I would also not call the proto-world foreshadowing our existent cosmos >> "complete chaos". The ur-continuity of the blackboard already suggests that >> there is something in the cosmic schema that has the capacity and >> intelligence to select just those Platonic ideas which *can be* and *will >> be realized *in an actual, existential, evolutionary cosmos such as >> ours. What seems at all 'chaotic' to me is that infinite number of Platonic >> 'ideas' (characters, qualities, dimensions, categories, etc.) But do those >> possibilities actually represent chaos? >> >> But to return for a moment to a different cosmological disagreement, it >> has been pointed out before by several on the List including both of us, >> that the universe as a whole cannot qualify as a complex adaptive system >> because it does not exist within a larger environment to which it must >> constantly adapt. For example, in Peirce's cosmology 1ns corresponds not >> essentially to qualities but to pure possibility and “boundless freedom.” >> In his 1898 blackboard analogy Peirce explicitly *does not confine these >> categories to the spatiotemporal universe*; instead, he refers to >> “Platonic worlds” of infinite possibilities, some of which become the >> characters of a universe which *will come into being*. He is clear that >> this particular universe in which we live and breathe and have our being >> came out of one such Platonic world, which may even suggest, as I and >> others have noted, an early multi-universe model. >> >> The two later developments in Peirce’s thought which you say shaped your >> own synthesis, Jon: (1) the topical conception of continuity which sees a >> continuum as an undivided whole of indefinite parts, and (2) Peirce’s grand >> semeiotic vision in which the universe itself is conceived as a vast sign, >> a perfect sign, and a semiosic continuum from which facts (and events?) are >> prescinded—further explicates and extends Peirce’s cosmology. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . 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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
