List JAS: I am not going to get into a detailed examination of JAS’s comments on Rose’s paper on emergent evolution, and his claims that Rose ‘fails, misunderstands’ etc, as, in my view, JAS makes a number of questionable assumptions and also is working from within an analytic framework that is quite different from that of Rose.
JAS writes: “(1ns) from a continuous range of possibilities or spectrum of qualities (3ns); it is the latter, not the former, that Peirce ultimately posits as the initial state of things”. I reject this assertion of 3ns as primary – for Peirce’s own outline of the emergence [1.412 and 6.219--].. has all three categories as primary – what Peirce is writing about is the operation of these categories in the first phase of the universe. Ie ..that flash [1ns]; those ‘discrete bits [ 2ns] and then, the development of habits [3ns]. Obviously, as I interpret this, all three categories are primary and the emergence takes place within, what I consider a vital aspect; that of their energy content;, ie, 1ns as made up of the least energy is first, as a brief flash; then, the more complex 2ns, and then. the most energy complex, 3ns. I reject the assertion by JAS that "objective idealism," is “the doctrine that mind is primordial and becomes matter by developing inveterate habits”.. That would be pure idealism, which Peirce rejects. I understand the term to mean that both matter and mind are primordial. Indeed, Peirce’s account of the origin of the universe, 1.412. is quite clear that habits [Mind] develop from and with the emergence of matter I also understand the analogy of the blackboard [6.203] to refer not to the emergence of the universe but to the ‘beginnings of creation’ of specific instantiations of matter which is AFTER the emergence of the spatiotemporal universe!. Furthermore Peirce continues to maintain that tychism and chance are basic and vital elements of the universe. Indeed, in 6.202, he objects to having his ‘metaphysical system as a whole called Tychism’ - because he insists that “Firstness or chance, and Secondness or Brute reaction, are other elements, without the independence of which Thirdness would not have anything upon which to operate’…and he writes that “I would not object to Tritism’ ;ie, to calling his metaphysical system as ‘Tritism’ because ALL three categories are vital components of its operation. I also reject that assumption which is prevalent on this list, that there is an ‘early and late’ cosmogeny – and that the later one denies the outline of the first one - with the first one claiming that all three categories are primal elements and that matter and mind arose from Nothing within the operations of 1ns, then 2ns, then 3ns. ..and the later one moving to Mind as primordial and God as somehow an aspect of this. And I consider that Rose [ a well-established Peircean scholar ] is right about Peirce’s cosmology and evolution…seeing it as an emergent and bottom up process rather than top down process. Indeed I think that this contrast between two views of Peircean cosmology has not been acknowledged enough on this list. I am not going to declare that either one is right; I will instead point out that there are two views. There are two views; one which sees the universe as emerging from within “nothing’ via the three categories, as a self-organized system – which is why I refer to it as a CAS. See his ‘evolution of the Laws of Nature 7.512..where ‘the laws of nature are still in process of evolution from a state of things in the infinitely distant past in which there were no laws, it must be that events are not even now absolutely regulated by law”..7.5l4. and ‘if the laws of nature are results of evolution, this evolution must proceed according to some principle; and this principle will itself be of the nature of a law. But it must be such a law that it can evolve or develop itself”… The other view, as held by JAS [and others], is a top down evolution, with 3ns as the primary and with 3ns akin to, as he writes, God as Ens necessarium These are two very different interpretations of not merely Peirce’s cosmogeny but also, of the nature of evolution. I leave it to the many scholars now and in the future - to analyze these differences. Edwina > On Oct 10, 2025, at 6:27 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Atila, List: > > I changed the subject line this time because I am shifting back to a focus on > Peirce's expressed views instead of applying his ideas to modern scientific > theories. Specifically, I would like to respond to these brief remarks. > > AB: Now my point (for another time) is that lecture 2 left me unsatisfied > about 1ns. It seemed the most defective and inadequate of the categories, > dangling apart from 3ns ... > > Peirce recognizes that of his three categories, 1ns is the most difficult to > grasp conceptually and explain accurately. "It cannot be articulately thought > ... Stop to think of it, and it has flown! ... every description of it must > be false to it" (CP 1.357, EP 1:248, 1887-8). Personally, I have found it > helpful to distinguish an individual possibility or quality in itself (1ns) > from a continuous range of possibilities or spectrum of qualities (3ns); it > is the latter, not the former, that Peirce ultimately posits as the initial > state of things. An example of someone failing to recognize this distinction, > and thus misunderstanding his categories and cosmology, is Philip Rose's 2016 > paper, "C.S. Peirce's Cosmogonic Philosophy of Emergent Evolution: Deriving > Something from Nothing" (https://www.unav.es/gep/RoseScio2016.pdf). Here is > the last paragraph of its introduction. > > PR: Peirce rejects the mechanistic metaphysics against which emergentism > develops and proposes a radically new ontological system whose base condition > is not mechanism per se but tychasm or chance. Focusing on the work produced > during Peirce’s so-called 'Monist' period, we will see that Peirce’s attempt > to explain the origins of the laws of nature is in fact the groundwork for > what amounts to a theory of emergent evolution. Much of the discussion will > revolve around the cosmogonic hypothesis outlined in Peirce’s unpublished > work, "A Guess at the Riddle," for it is here that the kernel of his > cosmogonic philosophy is most clearly articulated and laid out. Once Peirce’s > cosmogonic hypothesis has been made clear I will end by outlining my own > speculative metaphysical account of how the Categories themselves might have > come about, with 3ns and 2ns standing in an emergent relation to 1ns. (p. 125) > > I see at least three problematic issues here. First, Rose seems to think that > tychasm--"evolution by fortuitous variation" (CP 6.302, EP 1:362, 1893), > i.e., in accordance with tychism as "the doctrine that absolute chance is a > factor of the universe" (CP 6.201, 1898)--is the central tenet of Peirce's > metaphysics. However, already in 1892 (CP 6.163, EP 1:333), he refers to his > overall system as "the synechistic philosophy" and says that "it carries > along with it" not only "tychism, with its consequent thorough-going > evolutionism," but also "a logical realism of the most pronounced type," the > doctrine that some generals are real; and "objective idealism," the doctrine > that mind is primordial and becomes matter by developing inveterate habits. > In the blackboard lecture, he states even more directly, "I object to having > my metaphysical system as a whole called Tychism. For although tychism does > enter into it, it only enters as subsidiary to that which is really, as I > regard it, the characteristic of my doctrine, namely, that I chiefly insist > upon continuity, or 3ns ... Accordingly, I like to call my theory Synechism" > (CP 6.202). > > Second, Rose relies exclusively on Peirce's early (1887-93) cosmological > writings, especially "A Guess at the Riddle," instead of also taking into > account his later texts. In fact, he makes an especially egregious > interpretive error when commenting on the one and only late quotation that he > includes, from "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (1908), when he > mentions "Peirce's later claim that at least two of the three Universes 'have > a creator independent of them' (CP 6.483, EP 2:449), with 1ns as presented > here standing as the ground or 'creator' of the other two" (p. 140). Anyone > acquainted with that famous article knows that the "creator" being referenced > is not any of the three categories, but God as Ens necessarium; and it is > unambiguous in Peirce's still-unpublished manuscript drafts for it that the > one universe of which he suspects that God might not be completely > independent is the third one, because "He is so much like a mind [3ns], and > so little like a singular Existent [2ns] ... and so opposed in His Nature to > an ideal possibility [1ns]" (R 843). > > Third, Rose's account claims that 3ns and 2ns somehow emerged from 1ns as "a > state of absolute possibility, a state where there was nothing actual or > potential, no limit or limiting power whatsoever, just a state of absolute, > indeterminate possibility" (p. 139). By contrast, Peirce's starting point in > the blackboard lecture is "vague potentiality ... a continuum of forms ... > potentiality of everything in general, but of nothing in particular" (CP > 6.196); "general indefinite potentiality" (CP 6.199); "the original vague > potentiality, or at any rate of some early stage of its determination ... for > after all continuity is generality" (CP 6.203); "the original generality ... > the original continuity which is inherent in potentiality. Continuity, as > generality, is inherent in potentiality, which is essentially general" (CP > 6.204). Again, he repeatedly maintains that 2ns and 3ns cannot come from 1ns; > on the contrary, 1ns and 2ns cannot be without 3ns. "Not only does 3ns > suppose and involve the ideas of 2ns and 1ns, but never will it be possible > to find any 2ns or 1ns in the phenomenon that is not accompanied by 3ns" (CP > 5.90, EP 2:177, 1903). > > To be clear, I am not suggesting that Rose is wrong because Peirce is right; > I am only pointing out that Rose disagrees with Peirce about these matters, > apparently without recognizing it. Varying interpretations of his writings > are to be expected, especially since many of them from the last two decades > of his life--including some that shed valuable light on both earlier and > better-known texts, on cosmology as well as many other subjects--remain > unpublished except as online manuscript images. Wherever there are such > differences, readers must decide for themselves which scholars have made the > most persuasive cases for their positions, but some claims about Peirce's own > views are objectively falsified by their inconsistency with what his words > plainly state. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Tue, Oct 7, 2025 at 10:42 AM Atila Bayat <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> List, +Robert Marty >> >> I must concur that this is a serious analysis of cosmology. Yet what are we >> talking about when we talk cosmology for Peirce? It’s a normative science >> and metaphysical discourse, a physical metaphysics, a bridge between general >> metaphysics and psychical metaphysics, and in the 1898 lecture 8 (p. 267), >> “mathematical metaphysics.” >> >> His cosmology is construed as an “evolutionary” metaphysics; Peirce will >> invoke the categories to render that bridge explicit. Cf. Lectures 2-3 in >> Turrisi’s Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, which I often consider my leading >> resource of explication. See her initial commentary, Peirce’s 3 drafts of >> Lecture 2 published there, and 1 full complete Lecture 3. Turrisi well >> observes that there were 5 extant manuscripts for Lecture 2, and 3 printed >> in her book. Let me drop this a moment. Lecture 3, which I call the Kempe >> lecture, for me is mostly about mathematical form. Peirce writes, in the >> course of examining Kempe’s system; >> >> “…I found the three Categories copiously illustrated in the system. But what >> was still more interesting, a certain fault in the system, by no means of >> the fatal kind but still a vexatious inelegance which I had often remarked >> but could see no way of remedying, now when looked upon from the point of >> view of the categories, appeared in a new and stronger light than ever >> before, showing me not only how to remedy the defect that I had seen, but >> opening my eyes to new possibilities of perfectionment that I had never >> dreamed of. I wish I could present all this to you, for it is very beautiful >> and interesting as well as very instructive, but it would require several >> lectures and lead me quite away from Pragmatism.” (Pragmatism as a Principle >> and Method of Right Thinking, 1997, SUNY, p.186). >> >> Now we are left on our heels by Peirce, “it would require several lectures >> and lead me quite a way from Pragmatism.” Thus no explication from Peirce >> that I know of since. It thwarted me, perhaps as if one were in that lecture >> room with Peirce, how would we react? >> >> Now my point (for another time) is that lecture 2 left me unsatisfied about >> 1ns. It seemed the most defective and inadequate of the categories, dangling >> apart from 3ns; perhaps a kind of quantum logic might render it more >> intelligible. Notice that Hartshorne and Weiss themselves, back to the >> 1940s-50s, noted that Peirce didn’t have the advantage of quantum mechanics >> (which Edwina hints as well). Particularly, Hartshorne found there were some >> matters of inconsistency in Peirce on continuity, and others have perhaps >> noted. Not sure we want to go there yet. I just want to raise consciousness >> at this stage, something rather imperfect here, yet fascinating. >> >> I will pick this up further in a reply to Robert Marty’s earlier and >> noteworthy post, which is overdue, in which I take up quantum logic and >> lattices. >> >> Atila >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> > . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, > then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
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