Gary R., List: To be fair, I did say that both the sign's antecedent object and its subsequent interpretant are likewise of the *nature* of a sign. This is well-known in the case of the interpretant; in fact, Peirce often refers to it as another sign, although he eventually recognizes that it can also be a feeling or an exertion (CP 4.536, 1906). As for the object, "Whatever is capable of being represented is itself of a representative nature" (CP 8.268, 1903). "Thus, it is said to be a necessary result of the analysis that the object represented by the sign, and whose characters are independent of such representation, should itself be of the nature of a sign, so that its characters are not independent of *all *representation" (EP 2:328, 1904). This is consistent with my own hypothesis that the entire universe is a vast semiosic continuum.
With that clarification, I decided to go ahead and spell out in this new thread what I now consider to be the sequential steps for analyzing a sign, *its *object, and *its *interpretant. 1. Prescind an *individual *sign token from the real and continuous process of semiosis. 2. Identify the immediate object of that token, which is the *general *sign type of which it is an instance. 3. Identify the immediate interpretant of that type, which is also the immediate interpretant of the token as an instance of it. 4. Identify the dynamical object of the type, which is likewise a *general *object. 5. Identify the dynamical object of the token, which is either that same general object or an individual instantiation of it. 6. Identify the dynamical interpretant of the token, which is its *actual *effect. 7. Identify the final interpretant of the sign, which is the *ideal *effect of *any *instance of that sign. The following is my current understanding of all the correlates for *linguistic symbols*, keeping in mind that arguments *involve *propositions, which *involve *words. - The immediate interpretant is the verbal definition of an ordinary word, the literal meaning of a proposition, or the conclusion of an argument. - The dynamical object of the type is an inexhaustible continuum of potential individuals--whatever *possibly could* satisfy the verbal definitions of the words. - The dynamical objects of a token that is an instance of the type are either those same general objects or individual objects that are instantiations of them--existent things that *actually do* satisfy the verbal definitions of the words. - The dynamical interpretant of a token is how it *actually is* understood by an interpreter in an event of semiosis. - The final interpretant of a sign is how any instance of it *ideally would be* understood, e.g., by an infinite community after infinite investigation. As an example, consider an asserted token of the sentence, "The cat is on the mat." The immediate interpretant is that something satisfying the verbal definition of "cat" stands in a relation satisfying the verbal definition of "on" to something satisfying the verbal definition of "mat." The dynamical objects are one individual cat, one individual instantiation of the relation of being-on at the present moment, and one individual mat; however, *which *individual cat, relation, and mat can only be established by collateral observation. The dynamical interpretant is each reader's individual understanding of the uttered sentence, which might be incorrect--someone could be *mis*understanding it. The final interpretant is that under ideal circumstances, the utterer would be telling the truth, so there really was one particular cat located on top of one particular mat at one particular time, namely, when the sentence was uttered. As a non-linguistic example, consider an individual weathercock, which Peirce considers to be a paradigmatic case of an indexical token and likewise an instance of a type (see my post <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00047.html> yesterday). The immediate interpretant is its alignment with the direction of the wind. The dynamical object of the type is air movement in general, while the dynamical object of the token is the wind blowing at that particular place and time. The dynamical interpretant is the perceptual judgment by someone observing the weathercock that the wind is blowing from the direction in which it is pointing, which might be incorrect--it could be stuck pointing in a different direction. The final interpretant is that under ideal circumstances, the weathercock would indicate the direction of the wind at any specified place and time. For what it is worth, I am sincerely interested in getting feedback on all this, including the two examples--"since in scientific inquiry, as in other enterprises, the maxim holds, *Nothing hazard, nothing gain*" (EP 2:410, 1907). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Nov 10, 2025 at 10:37 AM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, > > I'm pretty sure that I misread the conclusion of your post. I imagined > that by "identifying its antecedent object and its consequent interpretant" > that you were placing the prescinded sign within the continuous flux and > were suggesting that we identify what signs immediately preceded and > followed* that* sign. So, no need to respond to my momentary confusion. > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Sun, Nov 9, 2025 at 10:04 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, List, >> >> Jon: ". . . at any scale *within* that continuum--zooming in or out, one >> *always* finds an object determining a sign to determine an >> interpretant." You continue: >> >> >> >> I suggest that *this* is why Peirce asserts, "There is a science of >> semeiotics whose results no more afford room for differences of opinion >> than do those of mathematics, and one of its theorems ... is that *if >> any signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes >> one sign*" (R 1476, 1904); why he says that "*the aggregate formed by a >> sign and all the signs which its occurrence carries with it ... will itself >> be a sign*" (EP 2:545n25, LF 3/1:184, 1906); and why he declares "*that >> there can be no isolated sign*" (CP 4.551, 1906) [emphasis added by GR]. >> >> >> You've made it clear in your posts in this thread that in Peirce's mature >> view the statements (*boldfaced above*) together express a single >> principle: semiosis is inherently continuous and systemic such that every >> sign is linked to others in an ongoing relational process; thus, any >> network of interrelated signs forms a single sign (a 'higher-order' sign?); >> further, I believe that you've suggested along the way that each sign >> participates in a continuous 'web' of interpretation where meaning emerges >> from the interconnection of signs rather than from any discrete sign or >> signs. >> >> So far I'm with you and in agreement. But I wonder about the conclusion >> of this statement: >> >> Jon: It is also why I insist that the first step toward analyzing *any* >> individual >> sign is *prescinding* it from the real and continuous process of >> semiosis, followed by *identifying its antecedent object >> and its consequent interpretant, both of which are likewise of the nature >> of a sign.* >> >> >> While I agree with your 'first step', that we need to prescind any >> individual sign from that portion of the continuous semiosis in which it is >> located, I don't see how we go about "identifying *its* antecedent >> object and *its* consequent interpretant*.*" Please explain and give an >> example or two. >> >> >> Best, >> >> >> Gary R >> >
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