List: I have moved this to a different thread to reflect its broader subject matter. The question is indeed which view as outlined in our various posts is more consistent with Peirce's own relevant writings, and as I have said before, it is up to each reader to evaluate our respective cases and draw their own conclusions. Unfortunately, it seems that others cannot even accurately present my side in their efforts to rebut it.
I have never asserted that *all signs whatsoever* are individual replicas/instances of general legisigns/types. On the contrary, I maintain that *all concrete sinsigns/tokens* are individual replicas/instances of general legisigns/types. This is fully consistent with Peirce's unambiguous position--again, please see my initial post <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00084.html> in this thread--that all *individuals *whatsoever are instantiations of real generals. Put another way, everything that *exists *(2ns) has been actualized from a *real *continuum (3ns) of *real *and indefinite possibilities (1ns), not some kind of "pre-reality" (whatever that means). I have never used the terms "a priori" and "deterministic" to describe what Peirce himself calls "the *original *vague potentiality," "the *original *generality," "the *original *continuity which is inherent in potentiality," and "The *original *potentiality" (CP 6.203-5, 1898; bold added). On the contrary, I have repeatedly expressed my agreement with him in rejecting determinism/necessitarianism, which relies entirely on efficient/mechanical causation, and instead affirming the reality of final causation as *governing *(not dictating) events. I have never denied the reality of novelty, and I have not failed to explain it nor totally ignored it in recent List discussions. On the contrary, I have explicitly and repeatedly acknowledged that the sequence of events for the *very first* actualization of any possibility--i.e., the emergence of any genuine novelty within our existing universe--is spontaneity (1ns) followed by reaction (2ns) and then habit-taking (3ns). I trust that I need not explain to anyone why the actualization of a non-possibility is, quite literally, impossible. I have never advocated the separation of mind and matter. On the contrary, I heartily agree with Peirce that "The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws," i.e., ""the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial" (CP 6.24-5, EP 1:292-3, 1891). Moreover, any concept that is "more Aristotelian realism than scholastic realism" is unlikely to be one that he endorsed, given his statement, "I should call myself an Aristotelian of the scholastic wing, approaching Scotism, but going *much further* in the direction of scholastic realism" (CP 5.77n, EP 2:180, 1903; bold added). Finally, it baffles me that anyone claiming to be a Peirce scholar could seriously dispute the pragmaticistic definition of truth as what an infinite community *would *believe after infinite investigation. I will say more about this in a forthcoming reply to Ben Udell's post yesterday. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Dec 2, 2025 at 11:12 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > JAS, Robert, List > > > > The definition of insanity is to keep repeating the same things – and we > seem to be doing that. As I’ve said before – these are two opposite views > of the semiosic nature and emergence of objects. The question then becomes > – which one is what Peirce advocated? > > > > JAS wrote: > > Peirce's semeiotic studies *all *signs, not just concrete > sinsigns/tokens; and in accordance with his thoroughgoing synechism (see > that thread <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00084.html>), > each of those is an individual replica/instance of a general legisign/type. > Human minds do not *construct *such representations, they are *real*--they > are as they are regardless of what anyone thinks about them, including > whether humans happen to have invented *linguistic *legisigns/types for > them. > > > > ET- I consider that the above is an incorrect interpretation of Peircean > semiosis > > > > 1] Problem: that All signs are individual/replica/instances of a general > legisign type. This ignores the FACT that four of the ten sign classes lack > a legisign in their composition and cannot be logically or indexically > linked to a legisign. In addition, despite the frequent use by JAS of the > blackboard analogy, I do not consider the blackboard to be a well of > Legisigns/Thirdness habits in some mode of pre-reality, [a mode never > referred to by Peirce] but to be a ‘well’ of pure energy [ chaos, the > ‘original vague potentiality’] – which then becomes instants [2ns] which > then form their own habits [3ns]. See 1.412 and 6.203. And note that this > new instant/mark, which is ‘a mere accident’, must ‘stay for a while ‘until > some beginning of a habit has been established’ 6.204. The habit, thus, is > a posteriori- not a priori. > > > > 2] Problem: The insistence that ALL signs are connected to a legisign or > habit, ignores the FACT that, as Peirce wrote, habits/Types are logical a > posteriori developments and thus, enable totally new objects connected to > Types in the universe. There is no evidence that Types are, as JAS > insists, a priori even as potential forms. Habits function as ‘the > principle of habit [1.412] not as the habit form itself. Indeed, one must > acknowledge Peirce’s constant insistence on the concept that mind exists as > matter – which is more Aristotelian realism than scholastic realism; the > two cannot be separated. > > > > 3] Problem: Human Minds DO construct the representations of real objects > in the world – and there is no certainty that these Interpretant signs are > the full data content of the External Object that we actually encounter as > the Dynamic Object. > > > > 4] Then- I don’t see how denying infinite investigation by an infinite > community has any relationship to scholastic realism. Or pragmaticism. I > don’t see that either theory requires this infinite community and infinite > exploration. And as has been pointed out, reliance on such a community is > non-empirical speculation. > > > > Again, and this has been said many times - JAS fails to explain the > emergence of novelty – ie – objects which are novel and are unlike any > previous habit but are able to form new habits and replicate. To say, as > JAS does, that their nature and habits are linked to an a priori Thirdness > is without evidence and is a deterministic theory- and in addition, > separates Mind and Matter, while Peirce unites them. Peirce on the other > hand, repeatedly explains novelty – something which JAS totally ignores! > > > > As Peirce notes: “In biology, the idea of arbitrary sporting is First, > heredity is Second, the process whereby the accidental characters become > fixed is Third” [6.33]. Note the order – a posteriori. > > > > And Peirce writes: “the tychastic development of thought, then, will > consist in slight departures from habitual ideas in different directions > indifferently, quite purposeless and quite unconstrained whether by outward > circumstances or by force of logic”, these new departures being followed by > unforeseen results which end to fix some of them as habits more than > others” [6.307] > > And notes: “that specification, pure spontaneity of life as a character, > infinitesimal departures from law are constantly taking place” [6.64] > > > > Peirce rejects that “‘all the arbitrary specifications of the universe > were introduced in one dose, in the beginning, if there was a beginning, > and that variety and complication of nature has always been just as much as > it is now, But I, for my part, think that the diversification, the > specification, has been continually taking place”. [6.57]. > > > > And Peirce writes: “By thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a > character of the universe, acting always and everywhere though restrained > within narrow bounds by law, producing infinitesimal departures from law > continually, and great ones with infinite infrequency, I account for all > the variety and diversity of the universe” [6.59]. > > > > None of the above outlines by Peirce support the analysis by JAS that > > *all *signs, not just concrete sinsigns/tokens; and in accordance with > his thoroughgoing synechism (see that thread > <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00084.html>), each of > those is an individual replica/instance of a general legisign/type. > > > > I note again what Peirce wrote: - he acknowledges spontaneity, > infinitesimal and great departures from law…and that these new departures > from law [Thirdness] will *form their own habits or laws [Thirdness]. * > > > > What else is there to say? Even insanity has its limits. > > So I’m finished with this thread. I have no wish to change JAS’s views > [impossible!] but I just want to be clear about what I see as Peirce’s > analysis. > > > Edwina >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
