Jack, Jon, Jeffrey, List, Thanks for your response, Jack, especially as your emphasis on the *metaphysical **atemporal *gets exactly to the heart of the matter. It would seem that we agree that any viable metaphysics has to take seriously what it means to speak of a “before time,” again, *not* an achronological fiction, but the* non-temporal condition of intelligibility* (to express it more logically than ontologically). I'd hoped to suggest in my post that Peirce’s metaphysics has not been explored nearly as fully as it deserves to be, especially considering his strictly logical and scientific way of looking at *all of science* including, of course, metaphysics.
What distinguishes his metaphysics from anyone else's I've studied is that it is not *merely **speculative* in the sense of not being supported by exacting scientific experience and experiment. In fact it is not only supported but, indeed, *constrained* by science as Peirce understood its method and ethics. His metaphysics *grows out of*, and remains a piece with his logic of inquiry, semeiotic, theory of categories, continuity theory, and his fallibilistic realism. That is why his arguments for an aboriginal, atemporal continuity is not some sort of a metaphysical 'fantasy' but *an abduction as to the requirements of intelligibility itself.* In this regard, I would be remiss if I didn't mention Jon Alan Schmidt's work in logic and metaphysics. While like you, I don’t always agree with him -- and he most certainly doesn't always agree with me! -- yet, his posts to Peirce-L and his papers on many a Peircean topic especially, most recently, his ongoing work on *semiosic** continuity* strike me as among the most carefuly research, carefully thought out, most penetrating treatments of the topics he's undertaken that I know of -- certainly as deep as and perceptive as anything I’ve encountered, including, no doubt, my own feeble attempts. And further, I think that the reason that Jon is such a good metaphysician is because he is such a good logician. And if I may add a personal note: Although I've made this point on- and, when necessary, off-List a number of times, what I respect and pay attention to and, yes, try as moderator to protect, especially because I am learning from it so that I know the value of it, is Jon's *philosophical work.* In any event, I take your response as encouragement that this logico-metaphysical line of thought is worth pursuing much further. The fundamental idea can be rather simply expressed, but, I think, it may be hard to comprehend without some investigative study, and its implications have just begun to be explored: *Continuity does not arise within time; rather, time, law, and cosmological order arise within continuity. * That claim has been and will be resisted, of course. But for we Peircean (and even some partial-Peirceans) it cannot be dismissed *tout court *without also dismissing the full ramifications of the scientific realism which is integral to Peirce's entire philosophy. Best, Gary On Tue, Jan 13, 2026 at 4:36 AM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R, list > > Just a quick response. More praise than critique. In your long post you > hit on some crucial aspects with respect to what would be any valid > metaphysics. I speak of the atemporal. This is vital. I don't agree with > all Jon has to say here but do agree that it is vital one includes and > understands what it is this means within all philosophical and scientific > contexts. > > So yes, more applause from me for your efforts here. > > Best > Jack > > Sent from Outlook for Android <https://aka.ms/AAb9ysg> > ------------------------------ > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> on > behalf of Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Tuesday, January 13, 2026 4:20:58 AM > *To:* Peirce List <[email protected]>; Jeffrey Brian Downard < > [email protected]>; Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Ontological and Cosmological Continuity (3ns) > > > List, Jeff, Jon, > > This post is an attempt to address the tension that can arise when > discussing Peirce’s *evolutionary cosmology* -- in which laws (3ns) grow > out of chance (1ns) and habit-taking (3ns) with the effects those produce > (2ns); > and this in contrast with the *metaphysical ontology* seen in the > 'blackboard' diagram discussion in the 1898 lectures, *Reasoning and the > Logic of Things* (hereafter, *RLT*, the standard abbreviation of the > lecture series as published) in which a primal continuity (3ns) is outlined > as the precondition, actually the *sine qua non*, of any universe even > *possibly* coming into being. > > To be clear, I will not be arguing the correctness of one view as opposed > to the other but, rather, suggesting that, 1st, *both* views were held by > Peirce and, 2nd, that they are not contradictory. This is to say that while > the *cosmologica*l analysis is basically correct from the perspective of > the categories as 'operative' in this existing universe, it misses > something *metaphysically* essential and which Peirce speculated on in > Lecture 8 of * RLT*. > The problem seems to be that, since Peirce speaks *metaphysically* in > *RLT* of the logical necessity of an aboriginal continuity (3ns “before > Time was”), how can he also logically claim *cosmologically* that law > (3ns), as it appears in this existing universe, emerges relatively > categorially 'late', that is, 'after' 1ns and 2ns? (I should note that it > has been suggested in this forum by Jon that from the involutional > perspective of 3ns involving 2ns/1ns, 2ns involving 1ns, that they likely > appeared simultaneously). The tentative answer to this question lies, I > believe, in distinguishing two senses/levels of continuity as 3ns, namely, > the *Ontological* and the *Cosmological* (in my view it's unfortunate > that Peirce did not clearly distinguish these *two senses of 3ns > qua continuity*). > > One sense, which I've been calling *On**tological 3ns,* represents > *continuity as > such*, the blackboard meant as a diagram of an aboriginal continuum that > is *not* temporal, *not* causal in Peirce's sense of representing physical > laws. Ontological 3ns -- aboriginal, metaphysical continuity -- does not > involve actual events, physical laws, etc. To say, as Peirce does, that > this ontological continuity has its being “before time" is to say that* > its* *reality *(note, *not its existence*) is *a non-temporal > precondition of the possibility of a cosmos coming into being at all*. > > At this juncture I think it is important to recall that *Peirce > distinguishes between reality and existence,* which distinction informs > the context of what I'm discussing. *Reality* is characterized > categorially essentially by 3ns so, continuity *as such,* involvies > *possible* lawfulness, mediation, intelligibility. *Existence*, on the > other hand, is characterized categorially especially by 2ns, brute > reaction, the *hic et nunc *(albeit 'in time' governed by 3ns and > necessarily involving 1ns as the qualities and characters of existence)*.* > > > Seen metaphysically, that which is "before time" is *not *an earlier > moment 'happening' before cosmogenesis takes off, but *that which is the > precondition of anything* -- including both the cosmological *and* the > ontological categories (recalling that the ontological categories latter -- > proto-1ns and proto-2ns -- mere possibilities for an existential universe > -- some of which 'stick' on the metaphysical 'blackboard', that will be > iterated, etc. Almost needless to say, some possible characters and > qualities, from an infinite number of them, will never appear at all -- at > least not in *this* cosmos. > > Within this aboriginal continuity, then, is *proto-1ns* (qualitative > possibility as such) and *proto-2ns* (the possibility of otherness as > such) within a metaphysical 'field' of possibility, the ur-continuity. This > is the aboriginal continuum where, at this level, *nothing in particular* > *exists* while *everything in general* is * possible**, *to paraphrase a > famous phrase of Peirce's. > > On the other hand there is, obviously, *cosmological 3ns*, that is, law > and habit *operative in time *in our universe. This is 3ns within > semiosis, specifically *semiosic symbolicity* involving all three > categories. And since "symbols grow," it follows that the cosmos *can* > evolve -- and obviously it has. When 1ns, as qualities, and 2ns, as > brute action-reactions appear, time and habit-taking and law, as 3ns, > appear with them 'simultaneously'. In other words, as existential events > recur in time, habits are already beginning to form, some of which > stabilize, some hardening into 'laws of nature' governing the existential > being of the Universe. > > All of this is merely to say that there is no necessary contradiction > between these two senses of 3ns just discussed. What is emergent as a cosmos > is *not** primal continuity (*not 3ns * as suc*h)*,* but *lawfulness > within time*. From a Peircean perspective, continuity does not come into > *existence*; rather, it is the* real ground of being*. > > So, for Peirce, existential law is not the source of continuity; rather, > it is continuity’s expression in time (necessarily involving both > spontaneity and action-reaction). This existential order belongs to the > temporal universe, not to the aboriginal continuum from which a universe > *might* spring. What evolves is not continuity itself but, again, *habit* > and* lawfulness within continuous time.* > > Again, this interpretation is congruent with Peirce’s distinction between > *reality* (where 3ns dominates) and *existence* (where 2ns is dominant, > but under the rule of 3ns). Peirce’s metaphysical–cosmological framework > avoids the enigma of something arising out of nothing or, as one current > theory would have it, arising from a chain of former universes. But that > view only pushes the problem back: how did that very 1st universe arise? > > No doubt there are many who will reject Peirce's metaphysical abduction of > "a time before time" out of hand, but for those who remain open to it, I > believe it may prove not only metaphysically coherent, but ontologically > useful. I would contrast Peirce's view with many, if not most, > other theories of cosmogenesis, especially those that would make > *something* -- *a Universe! *-- appear out of *nothing*, say, some > quantum field (as an alternative theory to the Big Bang would have it; but, > again, where did *that* come from?) > > Peirce's metaphysical-cosmological view of the continuity of 3ns as > an intriguing complexus is, in my view, well worth further reflection by > philosophers, cosmologists, and other scientists. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > >
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