List, As Peirce analyzes and develops it, hypothesis formation itself is not 'metaphysics'. Rather, *hypothesis formation is a function of logic*, viz., abduction as applied to inquiry. Peirce's view of the *science of metaphysics* is that, like all sciences, its hypotheses need to be "judged in the same way as other scientific hypotheses." However, the very nature of metaphysics is that empirical tests aren't readily available, indeed, not really possible.
So, how are we to judge metaphysical hypotheses? Since metaphysical hypotheses can't be tested by direct experiments, yet they must be judged by the same *methodological logic* as occurs in all of science: They are abductively proposed, remain open to modification, and are viewed as fallible; *and*, they have to answer to experience in the long run. If they don't, they're discarded. For Peirce, a metaphysical hypothesis, like any promising abduction, is *forced* upon the prepared mind as the best way to make sense of some unexplained feature of reality. Metaphysical hypotheses -- such as the ontology expressed in the blackboard analogy -- are "judged" *indirectly*, so to speak. “Metaphysical propositions are to be judged in the same way as other scientific hypotheses” (CP 6.13). Note that he does not say that they are to be 'tested'; rather, they are* judged* as to whether they can help explain pervasive features related to an inquiry into some aspect of reality itself, into such matters as continuity, generality, lawfulness, chance, growth, and mind (for some obvious Peircean examples). And this includes whether they can remain coherent as knowledge grows. Their scientific relevance doesn't lie in empirical experiments but, rather, as to whether they might usefully and effectively guide research over time. This is all to say that they stand or fall by whether, in the long run, they throw methodological light on some actual inquiry, or some practice of inquiry*. * For example, Peirce's hypothesis that *physical laws evolve from chance and habit-taking* cannot be tested directly. Yet Peirce judged it to be a sound metaphysical hypothesis because it helps explain the origin of law itself and aligns with evolutionary inquiry. Further, and perhaps most importantly, it helps explain why laws are intelligible at all. Another example: *The categories themselves are metaphysical*, yet they are judged by Peirce (and many Peirceans) as fairly indispensable for their value in inquiry across almost all the sciences represented in Peirce *Classification of the Sciences.* Still, Peirce strongly rejects what I've called "bad metaphysics," namely, a priori metaphysics which holds itself exempt from correction, and this includes, of course, "theological metaphysics." It is well known that Peirce was opposed to theology and theologians and their a priori reasoning. "What passes for metaphysics among theologians is usually little more than an attempt to make a show of reason for conclusions already reached on other grounds.” (CP 6.5); and more generally, *“*A priori reasoning is essentially of the nature of theology” (CP 1.50). Stated simply, "bad metaphysics" is, for Peirce, that which is not 'amenable' to inquiry. So, *metaphysics is not exempt from scientific judgment*; however, it is judged on a basis requiring broader forms of evidence and, characteristically, on a longer temporal scale. And this, as I see it, is also how much of contemporary theoretical physics and contemporary cosmology operate. Best, Gary
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