Gary R, list I don’t want to get into a long debate on this as a number of the premises are outside of the Peircean framework –Plus, I think that JAS’s views on God, which I consider contrary to those of Peirce– are extremely important to his self-identity and therefore beyond debate.
But- a few comments: I agree in large that the ‘the only possible motive for the hypothesis of God is the need of accounting for the reasonableness of the universe” (CP 6.300). But also, possibly, to support human beings within the oft disastrous results of their own unreasonableness. But of course, I define the term [god] as Peirce does, as ‘Mind’. However, you refer to the classical theistic premise: “God’s being must be necessary, self-sufficient, and independent of all existential being”. Since I am accepting Peirce’s definition of ‘god’ as Mind, which is pervasive in his writings [ see 6.73, 6.101, 6.277, 6.502 and on] then, I will accept only the adjective of necessary, but certainly not self-sufficient and independent of all existential being. To the contrary, Mind [3ns] requires Matter [1 and2ns] and therefore is not self-sufficient and independent. Such a triadic interactive relationship is basic within Peirce’s outlines. With regard to the definition of the Dynamic Object, I reject JAS’s use of the term, which I consider a misuse, since, my understanding of the DO is that it functions and ‘exists’ only within the semiosic interaction. That is, to differentiate the Dynamic Object from the External Object, [5.525] “an external Object is anything that is not affected by any cognitions, whether about it or not” . See also 7.335 for a discussion about external reality and 7.336 “there are realities, which are not only independent of the thought of you, and me, and any number of men, but which are absolutely independent of thought altogether”. In contrast, to the External Object, the DO emerges only within the semiosic interaction [ See outline in the weather example. 8.314] where Peirce writes “The Dynamical Object is the identity of the actual or real meteorological conditions at the moment”- which identity emerged only when Peirce looked out the window at the weather. In other words, the DO functions in time and space and within a semiosic interaction. Therefore, to define ‘God’ as the DO – and also declare that it is outside the universe [ which would mean self-sufficient and independent] – when, again, the DO is most certainly not self-sufficient nor independent - is an outline of a DO that has nothing to do with Peirce. See also 7.512 and on – the evolution of the laws of nature which defines the laws as evolving within the universe. This is why I reject your ontological vs cosmological evolution. And I am not aware that Peirce felt that there was an’ outside of the universe’ [ ie, the ‘assumed location so to speak of a theistic god]. Indeed, in 8.312, Peirce says that God is in time which, of course, means – within the universe. Edwina > On Jan 25, 2026, at 8:04 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > > Jon, List, > > Jon, although at times you have seemed open to a possible panentheistic > interpretation of Peirce’s views, in this paper you have apparently rejected > that possibility. Here I'll outline the case for a Peirce-based panentheism. > [Note: For those who find the idea of 'God' problematic, I see no harm in > substituting 'Mind' for it in the discussion below, although I think Jon > might disagree. Peirce writes that “the only possible motive for the > hypothesis of God is the need of accounting for the reasonableness of the > universe” (CP 6.300), and elsewhere that “there is an element of mind in the > universe, and it is that element which is the cause of the growth of reason” > (CP 4.536).] > Your argument against panentheism seems structured around this classical > theistic premise: God’s being must be necessary, self-sufficient, and > independent of all existential being. You maintain that panentheism > illegitimately makes the universe a component of God’s being and allows > natural processes to affect God and, in doing so, they compromises the > aforementioned divine attributes. That is, if God’s being were in any way > internally constituted by cosmic processes, God could no longer be understood > as necessary, self-sufficient, and independent, that a claim that the > universe is 'in' God implies a two-way constitutive relation. However, I > would argue that the idea of being 'in' God need not be symmetric but can be > viewed asymmetrically (to be argued below). This is to say that a > panentheistic view need not hold that the universe alters God’s being, that > it 'feeds back' into God’s independence and self-sufficiency, or that it > affects God in any way that compromises God's attributes just mentioned. > > Considering that the universe is ongoing, evolutionary, such that it involves > novelty and growth, if reality is genuinely continuous it becomes at least > plausible to say that the universe is 'in' God, not as an externally created > 'product', but as a continuous divine utterance: an internal relation of > expression, meaning, and final causation, by which I mean that God draws the > universe toward intelligibility (and coherence and value). > > Semiotically, God is not only the dynamic object of the universe, its > ontological Alpha, but also cosmologically its Omega, fully revealed in the > final interpretant of the universe's semiosic process. Seen this way, the > universe is intrinsically ordered toward God as its telos. And God, as the > dynamic object of the universe as symbol, constrains and orients its growth > without determining it. God, as telos of the cosmos, governs (in the sense of > constraining) the universal process, but is in no way constituted by it. > > I think that the theistic argument perhaps may be conflating immanence with > constitutive dependence. As I see it, immanence represents a manner of > present involvement: The world 'in' God is, in my panentheistic view, both > the expression of God (the Word of God) and sustained by God. Constitutive > dependence, on the other hand, is an ontological claim: God’s being is > partially composed of, or somehow dependent upon the universe (in the sense > of 'feedback'). If I'm correct, in your paper -- and in other papers, and on > List and off List discussions -- immanence is treated as if it necessarily > entails constitutive dependence. > > If one reads transcendence solely ontologically then it requires God to be > metaphysically external to the universe. Now I am sure that we both agree > that (a.) God is not an object among objects and (b.) is known only through > signs. So a panentheist might offer the analogy that God transcends the > created universe in the way the meaning of any dynamic object transcends its > (possible and actual) individual signs. As I read him, what Peirce denies is > causal feedback that would alter God’s necessity and independence. I can > fully accept this while still holding that the universe is God’s ongoing > self-expression, and that the fullness of God includes the utterance of his > Word in the world. > > So I would hold that Peirce’s religious metaphysical language, in combination > with certain facets of his semeiotic, doesn't exclude a panentheistic > interpretation. God fully revealed at/as the Omega of cosmic evolution > suggests that creation is ongoing and that the universe functions as a symbol > of God: God is both Alpha (the creative dynamic object) and Omega ("God fully > revealed" in the final interpretant of the argument that is this grand cosmic > symbol, our universe). We are drawn to the reality of God. These ideas tend > to support panentheism unless one insists on a sharp creator/creation dualism > which, it would seem, classical theism does. As a theist, Peirce rejected > immanentism, agreed. But at least some of his views (not necessarily all of > those of "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God") can be seen to point > toward panentheism. > > So the question as I see it is this: Does Peirce hold that God is related to > the universe merely as its explanatory ground or, also, as its immanent > meaning and the final cause to which the universe/we are drawn? You argue for > the former; some panentheists argue for the latter. I, and arguably, Peirce > see the possible 'truth' in both, and the ambiguity seems to me not to be a > defect but, rather, a consequence of his (perhaps unconscious) and my refusal > to precide that which ought to (perhaps must) remain vague. > > Another way of stating all this is that a Peirce-inspired panentheism doesn't > make the world a mereological part of God, does not place God as some sort of > 'part of' or 'object' within the three universes, doesn't make God dependent > on the world in any way. > > This theistic/pantheistic dispute would seem to mirror a related tension that > I’ve elsewhere framed as that between ontological 3ns and cosmological 3ns. > Ontological 3ns names the aboriginal condition of mediation, continuity, and > intelligibility as such, i.e., the condition of there being a cosmos at all. > Cosmological 3ns names the emergence in time of qualities, habits, laws, and > sign relations. You argue for ontological 3ns as ground; panentheists of my > ilk can agree with you there, but see cosmological 3ns as unfolding upon the > utterances of that ground. So I see God as both primal creator of and also > the telos of the cosmos such that ontological 3ns and cosmological 3ns are > ultimately united. A full-blown theory of continuity would seem to me to > demand something like that. > > My view of panentheism (which, I admit, is not universally held even by > panentheists), is that 'in' God names, shall we say, a kind of teleo-semiotic > involvement, but not a constitutive one. The universe grows toward God "fully > revealed" through physical and spiritual evolution (Peirce's 'evolutionary > love'). > > Peirce believed that if the reality of a benign God could be proved that it > would be a great benefit to mankind, indeed "a good outweighing all others." > In my view, failure to keep the logical-metaphysical levels discussed above > distinct -- for example, by collapsing immanence into dependence, and viewing > transcendence as exteriority -- is where metaphysical/cosmological inquiry > can get blocked. I believe a broader view than the classic theological one is > needed should we ever hope to evolve anything approaching a universal > religious understanding, and I believe that a fuller, deeper reading of > Peirce's semeiotic as it relates to his metaphysical ideas may yet point a > way to the development of that universal summum bonum, that "good outweighing > all others." > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Wed, Jan 21, 2026 at 10:16 AM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> List: >> >> The subject line of this post is the title of my paper >> (https://doi.org/10.2979/csp.00048) that appears in the latest issue of >> Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society >> (https://muse.jhu.edu/issue/56250). If you do not currently have access to >> that journal, then I encourage you to consider subscribing electronically >> for less than $40 per year (https://iupress.org/journals/transactions/), >> which includes membership in the Society (https://peircesociety.org/). >> >> As I acknowledge in the final endnote, I prepared this text on the basis of >> a series of List discussions that took place in August-November 2024, >> initiated by Gary Fuhrman and joined by others including Jeffrey Downard, >> Helmut Raulien, Gary Richmond, and Edwina Taborsky. Here is the abstract. >> >> Charles Peirce begins his best-known text about religious metaphysics by >> defining the proper name "God" as Ens necessarium. In two previously >> unpublished manuscripts, he advocates the hypothesis of such a "necessary >> being" as the only "rational explanation" that is "adequate to account for >> the sum total of reality," namely, "the three universes" that together >> encompass "all the phenomena there are." Combining key statements from those >> passages into a series of distinct steps yields a cosmological argumentation >> for this conclusion, one resembling that of Gottfried Leibniz. In >> conjunction with Peirce’s other relevant writings, it has implications for >> the attributes of God, as well as for the relationship between God and the >> universe, while also raising questions that call for further study. >> >> One of the anonymous reviewers suggested several such questions, which are >> listed in the conclusion as follows. >> To what extent was Peirce directly influenced by Leibniz’s writings in >> developing his own cosmological argumentation? How do the differences >> between their approaches affect the persuasiveness of their formulations, >> especially in the context of each one’s overall logical and metaphysical >> views? >> How does Peirce’s cosmological argumentation interact with his better-known >> "Neglected Argument"? Are they fully complementary, or conflicting in at >> least some respects? >> Exactly what does Peirce mean by advocating theological anthropomorphism? >> How does it square with his insistence on a concept of God that is "vague in >> the extreme"? >> If God is only vaguely conceived as a hypostatic abstraction, "that which >> creates this universe," does anything testable or practical follow from that >> hypothesis? If not, does it violate Peirce’s pragmaticism? >> In what sense does this universe that we know through experience follow as a >> necessary consequence from the hypothesis of Ens necessarium as "that which >> would Really be in any possible state of things whatever"? Why this >> universe, rather than any other? >> Please consider this an invitation to share your thoughts about possible >> answers and/or comment on the content of the paper itself. As I state in its >> very last sentence, "My sincere hope is that others will now build on the >> preliminary groundwork laid here by pursuing these and related topics." >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]> . >> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>">UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, >> if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go >> to >> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> > . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, > then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
