Gary R., List: As I spell out in my recently published paper <https://doi.org/10.2979/csp.00048>, Peirce's answer to Holt's question is very similar to Swinburne's; and while it is certainly a *theistic* explanation, I suspect that he would bristle at having it characterized as *theological* since (unlike me) he was just as skeptical about "the doctrines and dogmas of the churches" as Holt evidently is. On the other hand, Peirce surely *did not* consider the associated "metaphysical commitments" to be at all "unwarranted"; on the contrary, he explicitly maintained that the hypothesis of a "necessary being" is the *only *"rational explanation" that is "adequate to account for the sum total of reality," namely, "the three universes" that together encompass "all the phenomena there are."
There are elements of truth in axiarchic and scientific explanations, but the problem with them is that they always end up calling for *further *explanation unless one is willing to settle for positing some kind of brute fact. In short, I agree with Peirce that the only *ultimate *explanation is "that which would Really be in any possible state of things whatever, that is, an *Ens Necessarium*" (R 339:[295r <https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$554i>], 1908 Aug 28). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, May 16, 2026 at 5:02 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > List, Helmut, > > It would appear that the discussion on linguistic matters has come to a > close, so I'd like to introduce another topic. > > Helmut wrote: " I think meaning and syntax are a matter of co-evolution." > > To me that makes perfect sense and, as far as I'm concerned, it puts the > linguistic matter of origins we've been discussing to rest (for me, at > least, for now). Thank you, Helmut! > > I'd like to consider taking the inquiry into origins beyond the > acquisition of language (as profound a semiotic advance as that must have > been), even beyond the advent of life itself (as unlikely, miraculous, and > stupendous a semiotic leap as the universe has ever seen). In any event, > this discussion of the nature and structure of language at its origin got > me thinking again on origins *most *generally. Not coincidentally, I've > also been reading Jim Holt’s *Why** Does the World Exist?: An Existential > Detective Story*. > https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/8854815-why-does-the-world-exist > While it's more a 'popular' than a scholarly text, Holt has a solid grasp > of a great deal of contemporary science and philosophy as well as facets of > their histories. One example to support that remark: Holt makes brief > reference to Peirce twice in the book, at one place referring to him as > "the great nineteenth-century pragmatist philosopher" (170). > > Holt approaches the recurrent existential question through a kind of > “cosmological travel narrative” built around conversations with a number of > prominent scientists and other scholars of cosmology, philosophy, religion, > and the arts. He writes as an insightful amateur naturalistic philosopher > who treats theological, scientific, metaphysical, and axiarchic > explanations as hypotheses and other abductions rather than settled > doctrines. The book never arrives at a single solution; instead, Holt > surveys and compares multiple explanatory frameworks, ultimately > highlighting both the depth and limits of any one perspective. > > These are the thoughts of *individuals*, so there is no way to fully > grasp the logic or, really, anything of the character of any of the > 'answers' given in a brief post. Perhaps the representative examples > offered below hint at facets of several of the major answers that have been > posited to the question of why there's something and not nothing. Of course > there are myriad more possible answers to the question which don't fall > into these selected categories. > > *Axiarchic explanations* (the idea that the universe exists because it is > good that it does): This position is represented in the book principally > by the philosopher, John Leslie, who proposes that reality exists because > it is in some sense valuable or ethically required that it should. Leslie > comments that "if nothing at all existed, there would still be all sorts of > logical possibilities" (198), a rather Peircean idea, I think. Among that > infinite number of possibilities he valorizes one: goodness. "I don't think > of goodness as just another quality slapped onto things. . . Goodness is > required existence". . . in the absence of a nihilistic force fighting > the existence of things [. . .] any valid reason for their existence would > tend to bring about their realization" (203-4). Holt situates this > axiarchic view in an intellectual succession extending from Leibniz’s > formulation of the problem to modern debates about whether *intelligi* > *bility* or *goodness* ought serve as ultimate explanatory principles. > > *Scientific explanations*: These are explored especially through > conversations with several physicists including Steven Weinberg,David > Deutsch, and Roger Penrose. Here Holt looks at whether cosmological models > (such as inflationary models, multiverse, and quantum theories) can make > the emergence of a universe intelligible. Penrose, for example, has a > kind of trichotomic theory of his own. "Each of the three worlds -- the > physical world, the world of consciousness, and the Platonic world [of > mathematics, and of possible qualities] -- emerges out of a tiny bit of one > of the others. . . [T]his is perhaps the greatest mystery of all: how the > Platonic world 'controls' the physical world" (198-9). Again, one might > point to similar ideas in Peirce. > > *Theological explanations*: Holt's discussion of the theological approach > involves > thinkers like Richard Swinburne. Swinburne explains the universe by > positing a necessary divine creator who grounds contingent reality and > makes the orderliness of nature intelligible. Holt treats this view as a > serious but debatable 'closure' (because the doctrines and dogmas of the > churches insist that the answer has already been given). He sees it as a > kind of 'metaphysical regress' since it raises further questions about > divine necessity, simplicity, and the existence of disorder (and much > more). So while it functions as an alternative to scientific and axiarchic > explanations, in Holt's view it yet adds additional, unwarranted > metaphysical commitments. > > It might be quite interesting to read (and *not* yet critique, since who > can say for sure?) what forum members consider to be the best answer to > the question proposed by Holt's book. It might be interesting to see some > further explicantion of these proposed 'answers' to the question.. Of > course there are many possible answers not even suggested by the three > types adumbrated above which might be interesting to consider. > > Indeed, I hope that this positing of possible answers might be taken up in > the spirit of a kind of philosophical game where every post contributes to > the discussion in the sense of getting folk thinking about such *ultimate > questions *in fresh ways. > > Best, > > Gary R >
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