Gary F., List, Gary, I'm especially glad you entered this discussion because your bringing the Dynamic Object into it points toward a question that hasn't received sufficient attention: Under what circumstances, if any, can an AI system be said to be related to a Dynamic Object? I would imagine that most here would agree with you that present LLMs do not possess collateral experience since they obviously do not see, hear, touch, or otherwise encounter the world as we do.
What I might question is whether collateral experience must always belong to the individual sign-user. Scientific inquiry, especially, has long depended upon signs produced by investigators whose observations become available to others through books, journals, diagrams, etc. In truth, most of us know the majority of scientific objects only through signs produced by others. Still, as I see it, our inquiries remain connected to the DO because the community of inquiry continually accumulates, tests, and can -- and often does -- extend the collateral experience on which those signs depend. So, I guess I'm suggesting that *collateral experience may itself be distributed throughout the community of inquiry* rather than residing exclusively within each participant. If that is correct, then the relevant question isn't whether the machine itself experiences the DO but, rather, *whether the inquiries in which AI participates remain correctable by living communities whose signs continue to be constrained by experience*. I am far from certain that this is the only way, let alone the best way to think about AI and collateral experience. Be that as it may, thank you for bringing the Dynamic Object into this discussion as it seems to me to be an *essential* line of inquiry. After all, it is possible that future systems might interact with observations from sensors, scientific instruments, experiments, robots, and human investigators. Best, Gary R On Sat, Jul 11, 2026 at 10:37 AM [email protected] <[email protected]> wrote: > List, > > I've hesitated to enter this thread because, while it's had much to say > about signs, interpretants, inquiry, intelligence and (perhaps) > communication, it hasn't said much about dynamic objects. But as Ahti > Pietarinen said in his open access article (p. 10), “Without the facts of > the matter, which from the semiotic point of view comprise signs’ dynamical > objects, there would be no shared meaning in communication.” > > According to Peirce, engagement with the dynamic object involves > experience of it as something other than, but dynamically connected with, > the sign itself. As he wrote in a 1909 letter to William James: > [[We must distinguish between the Immediate Object,— i.e. the Object as > represented in the sign,— and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object is > altogether fictive, I must choose a different term, therefore), say rather > the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign cannot > express, which it can only *indicate* and leave the interpreter to find > out by collateral experience. For instance, I point my finger to what I > mean, but I can't make my companion know what I mean, if he can't see it, > or if seeing it, it does not, to his mind, separate itself from the > surrounding objects in the field of vision.] EP2:498] > > Peirce also defines the Dynamic Object of a Sign as “that with which it > presupposes an acquaintance in order to convey some further information > concerning it” (CP 2.231, 1910). Clearly this prior acquaintance can only > be supplied by *experience* of that object. > > My question is: under what circumstances can a chatbot or any AI be said > to be *experiencing* a dynamic object? Obviously it cannot get collateral > experience of an object from the database on its server, because that > consists entirely of signs which are no longer (if they ever were) > dynamically connected with a real object. > > While Jon was saying that what goes on within an AI is entirely “dyadic,” > it seems to me that it's not nearly dyadic enough to function indexicallly, > which it must do in order to convey information in the Peircean sense, or > to “share meaning in communication.” > > Love, gary f. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
