Edwina wrote: ". . . my contention that the semiosic Sign is (5469-1) a single set of three interactive Relations, while you consider that it is a 'single triadic relation'."
Jon Awbrey and I recently came to the agreement that "The Peircean sign can be viewed as a mathematical (5469-2) category characterized by the composition condition symbolically represented as Object|Sign = Interpretant, meaning that a sign is determined by its object and determines its interpretant so that the latter is indirectly determined by the object." A corollary of (5469-2) would be that The Peircean sign cannot be represented as a single (5469-3) set of three relations, i.e., the R-R, R-O, and R-I relations, since these dyadic relations alone, without any specific composition condition of a mathematical category, cannot represent a triadic relation. With all the best. Sung __________________________________________________ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net > On a further note, John (and I know we will probably never agree), with > regard to my contention that the semiosic Sign is a single set of three > interactive Relations, while you consider that it is a 'single triadic > relation'. A relation is not just a simple connection but an active > informational process. > > ... Peirce's ten classes clearly refer to three relations and he > frequently uses the term 'correlate' to refer to both the interaction (ie > the Relation) and the categorical mode of a relation. [See his Division of > Triadic Relations 2.233). If we take the most basic Peircean sign, the > rhematic indexical legisign - each of the three Relations in this Sign is > in a different categorical mode. If the Sign was ONE, was a single > relation or even just mere connections, those different categories could > not remain distinct. The triadic sign most certainly is not built up of > dyads for dyads, as pointed out, refer primarily to existentialities. He > writes that 'Signs are divisble by three trichotomies; first, according as > the sign in itself [ET:also called the Representamen] is a mere quality, > is an actual existent, or is a general law; secondly, according as the > relation of the sign to its object (my emphasis) consists in the sign's > having some character in itself, or in some existential relation to that > object, or in its relation to an interpretant.... > > The Peircean model, that three-pronged umbrella, (1.347), a 'triadic > identity', is made up of a set of three relations; three 'prongs', so to > speak, each one can operate in a different categorical mode and all, as an > interactive process, form The Sign. > > So- we continue to disagree. > > Edwina > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Edwina Taborsky > To: [email protected] > Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2014 7:07 PM > Subject: [biosemiotics:5461] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called "a > > > John, see my comments below: > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Deely, John N. > To: [email protected] > Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2014 6:33 PM > Subject: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called > "a > > > 1) The ârepresentamenâ is not a relation, but one of three terms > within or âunderâ a single triadic relation, the one that serves > as the sign-vehicle (one of Peirceâs terms, by the way). The > âsignificateâ (or object) may or may not be an existential unit in > itself: Napoleon as Emperor of the French at one time was such an > âexistential unit in itselfâ; Hamlet as Prince of Denmark never > was. So there can often be a dyadic interaction with resultant dyadic > relation between representamen and significate. > > > > EDWINA: Yes, the Representamen is a 'term' (which has no existential > meaning!) but it exists within three Relations or interactions: that > between itself-and-the-Object; that within itself; and that between > itself-and-the-Interpretant. > > > > The SIGN exists as a single triadic relation - but within that triad, > are those three Relations as I outlined above; this set of three are > irreducible. > > Napoleon was a physically existential unit in itself. And Hamlet is an > existential unit as well, a conceptually existent unit. > > > > Yes, one existential unit can dyadically interact with another > existential unit, eg, Napoleon and his horse. That's not the same type > of relation or interaction within a semiosic action. The semiosic > relation is an informational interaction; where data from the > input/external source is transformed within the organizational > mediation of the Representamen to result in an intepretant 'meaning'. > That's not made up of dyads; it's a full triadic interaction. > > > > > > 2) > > A relation I not an action but rather a > suprasubjective connection or link that arises from > actions. The representamen as such is such because of > the postion it occupies in a given triadic relation; > but the representamen is indeed often a thing, like > that red-colored octagon with white markings commonly > called âa stop signâ. What doesnât represent > another than itself, insofar as it does not, is simply > not actually a representamen. > > > > EDWINA: No, here I disagree. That stop sign is a material object, a > dynamic object. It functions as a sign (the triad) when it becomes > part of a semiosic interaction...where I see the sign (input of data > from the red sign object); my cognitive Representamen Process mediates > that input of sense data according to my knowledge base: into the > final part of the Sign, the Interpretant which means 'stop'. The Stop > Sign is never in itself a Representamen, because the Representamen in > the triad is a generalizing action that mediates specific particular > data and interprets that data into information. > > > > 3) > > It remains that what you call the âtriadic signâ is the > consequent of one relation irreducibly triadic; whence > there is no such thing as âa non-triadic signâ; a > system of signs indeed is a set of relations; but a given > âsignâ is a set of terms united under one relation. > > > > EDWINA: And here, I agree that there is no such thing as a non-triadic > sign, but a don't see that a Sign is a 'set of terms' (I see that a > Sign is a set of Relations, not terms)...and don't see that it is > united under ONE Relation. > > > > Regards, > > Edwina > > > > > > (Try that video -- > <http://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=E9651802BCDC14BF> > -- all five parts, however.) > > > > Cheers > > > > > > From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2014 17:19 > To: [email protected] > Subject: [biosemiotics:5458] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING called > "a > > > > John, the interactions, or the relation that exists between the Object > and Representamen is not a dyad, for a dyad operates only when both > 'end points' are existential units in themselves. These connections or > relations are not between two existential units and can't even exist > except within the triadic set of three such interactions. > > > > The mediative Relation, the Representamen, doesn't exist in itself > and therefore, its interactions with the object and interpretant > cannot be dyadic. In addition, I don't think that the Representamen > Relation 'represents another than itself, for, again, it cannot exist > 'per se'. The Representamen Relation is, as a generalizing action > rather than particular, always embedded within a particular. Generals > are real but not spatiotemporally existential in themselves. > > > > Yes, the molecule as a 'sign', i.e., as an existential entity (made up > of three Relations) does act WITHIN an object-Relation with another > molecule... > > > > No, I don't agree with the notion of 'ONE relation uniting the three > semiosically'. I like your three terms, though I define them > differently and don't consider them positions but rather 'relations': > the 'foreground', the 'significate' and the 'interpretant'....and I DO > call the whole set the SIGN - but I reject the notion that this 'Sign' > (the whole set of three) is itself a Relation. > > > > Things or 'signs' that are in relation ...that's a different type of > relation than what I am talking about within the triadic Sign. > > > > Edwina > > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: Deely, John N. > > To: [email protected] > > Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2014 5:42 PM > > Subject: [biosemiotics:5455] Re: What kind of sign is ANYTHING > called "a > > > > Whatever stands in the foreground position of representing another > than itself to or for a third is (what is commonly called) a > âsignâ. So if what happens to occupy that position is a > molecule, then the molecule in that circumstance is called âa > signâ. > > But what occupies that foreground position (1) under > one set of circumstances or for one person at one > time may well under other circumstances or for other > persons occupy the position of the other represented > (2) or again occupy the to or for position (3) â > the semiotic spiral of ever-growing experience. > > But what makes, say, some molecule in given > circumstances a âsignâ may make that same > molecule in other circumstances an âobjectâ or > again an âinterpretantâ, etc. > > So we need to have a name for the three positions to > be occupied, and a name for ONE relation uniting the > three semiosically. The best term for position 1 or > the foreground position is probably > ârepresentamenâ; for position 2 > âsignificateâ (rather than âobjectâ); for > position 3 âinterpretantâ. Then the irreducibly > triadic relation uniting the three to constitute an > instance of semiosis is what âactuallyâ or (as > Peirce puts it) âformallyâ constitutes the sign. > That also explains, relations as relations being > only indirectly instantiable to sense, why > alloanimals make use of signs but only human animals > can come to know that there are signs, as Maritain > put it, because only human animals can come to know > relations, dyadic or triadic, in their difference > from related things. (This summarizes the discussion > on YouTube > <http://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=E9651802BCDC14BF>. > > Edwinaâs position, if the position common to > Peirce and Poinsot is correct, is simply wrong. A > set of three dyadic relations does not a triadic > relation make (as Shakespeare might say through some > character or other). > > > > From: Kalevi Kull [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2014 16:28 > To: [email protected] > Subject: [biosemiotics:5453] Re: What kind of sign is a "gene"? > > > > Okay. Sign is just a triadic relation. But a molecule is not just a > triadic relation. Therefore, molecule is not a sign. > > Best > > Kalevi > > 19-03-2014 23:18 kirjutas Edwina Taborsky: > > Kalevi- you are having fun with me! I say that a sign consists of > three relations - and no, it is not 'something else other than > these relations'. A sign is a function..ie, where x(f)=y. Or X, > the input Relation (the Object-Representamen Relation) is mediated > within/by the function or Representamen Relation (f) to result in > the output Y, the Representamen-Interpretant Relation. > > > > Taken together, these three interations or relations (for the sign > is always active!!!) are..The Sign. So, the Sign is an irreducible > set of three Relations. And no, the Sign is NOT something else > other than these Relations. The Sign IS...nothing other than the > whole three Relations as they interact. > > > > X, or the Object-Representamen Relation can provide input data > within three modes, and so, provide data that is iconic, indexical > or symbolic to its Dynamic Object > > > > f, or the Representamen-in-itself Relation can mediate, generalize > within three modes, and so, can constrain, organize that input > data within either a qualisign, dicisign or legisign form of > organization; that is, it will organize that input data as > generalized qualities, as habitual connections or as habitual > patterns of organization. > > > > Y, or the Representamen-Interpretant Relation can provide a > resulting closure of these Relations within three modes, and so, > will present that input data (X), mediated by the Representamen Y, > as either a rheme ..a cloned version of the Object so to speak; or > a dicent..requiring a physical connection...or..a pure abstract > thought (there is only one sign that does this). > > > > But all together, the Sign is an active, interactive process, made > up of three Relations. > > > > Edwina > > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: Kalevi Kull > > To: [email protected] > > Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2014 4:40 PM > > Subject: [biosemiotics:5451] Re: What kind of sign is a "gene"? > > > > Edwina, > > hm, you are saying here that sign is not a triadic relation. You > say that sign only consists (mainly of?) some relations, > actually being itself something else than these relations. How > so? > > John is hinting to the same problem, as I understand. > > Best > > Kalevi > > > > 19-03-2014 18:04 kirjutas Edwina Taborsky: > > Kalevi, to me, a sign is a morphological existence (in space > and time) made up of three basic relations; those between the > Object and Representamen; the Repre. in itself; and that > between the Repre. and the Interpretant. Each Relation can be > in one of the three categorical modes (though their > correlation is another issue). > > > > So, the 'sign' is not in itself a relation, but a > morphological reality (which I call a morpheme) made up of > relations...and able to relate to other morphemes. Therefore, > I consider the molecule a sign. I know that many biologists > reject this inclusion of the physico-chemical realm within > semiosis, but so far, no-one has provided me with a strong > enough argument to make me reject that inclusion. > > > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: Kalevi Kull > > To: [email protected] > > Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2014 10:00 AM > > Subject: [biosemiotics:5430] Re: What kind of sign is a > "gene"? > > > > Dear Gary, > > thank you. But, well, a molecule never can be a sign. > Because sign is a relation, while molecule is not a > relation. > > Best > > Kalevi > > 19-03-2014 15:26 kirjutas Gary Fuhrman: > > Kalevi, if I might play a variation on your theme: a > âgeneâ defined as a piece of a physically existing DNA > molecule can be regarded as an indexical sinsign (which is > a replica of a legisign); but its object is certainly not > a cell. Its dynamic object can only be the dynamic process > which produced it, which is of the type that generates DNA > molecules of a structure which includes that gene. And > like the gene, that process can only make sense (or exist) > in its context, which includes both its (cellular) > environment and the evolutionary history of that type of > process. Itâs indexical because it has a real (causal) > relation to that object, which determines it to determine > its interpretant (say, a protein). > > > > It is certainly not a sign in the symbolic way that the > word âchairâ is a sign of the static physical object > we call by that name. The cell is not the geneâs object > but the quasi-mind informed by the gene, which carries the > semotic process forward. > > > > A âgeneâ, like a letter of the alphabet, can only mean > something as part of a larger sign. The concept of > âgeneâ is a product of analysis; it has no independent > physical existence. Thatâs why I say it can be regarded > as an indexical sinsign (just as a letter can be regarded > as a symbol). > > > > gary f. > > > > From: Kalevi Kull [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: 18-Mar-14 10:55 AM > > Dear colleagues, > > if to define gene as a piece of DNA molecule, then it is > not a sign (of whatever kind) for a cell. It may only be a > sign for a biologist, or for somebody who does not pay > attention to the intracellular processes. > > Or you mean something else by gene. > > :-)) > > Best, > > Kalevi > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
