Thanks for this overview of your work, Howard, which I’m copying to peirce-l
(since your work is not as well known there as it is to the biosemiotics
list). I don’t know why you say that it shows my thumbnail sketch to be
“incorrect”; to me it confirms (in greater detail) my view as expressed and
thus shows it to be “dim” only in the sense of being parsimonious.

 

gary f.

 

From: Howard Pattee [mailto:[email protected]] 
Sent: 20-Mar-14 11:25 PM



 

At 11:43 AM 3/20/2014, Gary F wrote:



On the biosemiotics list, we have at least two "semiotic" analyses which
differ from the Peircean because their purposes are different. One is Howard
Pattee's, and his purpose, as far as I can tell, is to restate (I won't say
"solve") the traditional "symbol-matter problem" in physics.


HP: Gary F takes a dim and incorrect view of what I have been doing
<https://www.academia.edu/2767702/Historical_introduction_to_LAWS_LANGUAGE_A
ND_LIFE>  for the past 75 years (see esp. pp. 3-8 of link). So I need to
make my activities clear. My purpose has been to understand the nature of
life and how it might have originated in a lifeless physical universe. I
accept the current scientific views of physical laws and the latest
knowledge of molecular biology and evolution as a given framework. I also
accept von Neumann's logical conditions for Self-Reproduction
<http://cba.mit.edu/events/03.11.ASE/docs/VonNeumann.pdf>  (see pp. 84-87)
that requires the conceptual separation of symbolic "description" and
material "construction" for evolvable life. This symbol-matter problem
<https://www.google.com/#q=%22symbol-matter+problem%22>  is not just a
physics problem! It exists at all levels of evolution in including the
philosophers classic mind-body problem. [The current argument about genes as
symbols misses the essential fact that there are no isolated symbols.
Symbols exist only as elements of a language. That is why  the origin of
life is a hard problem.]

So far, I have explained in some detail, at least to the satisfaction of
many physicists and biologists (disclosure: some of them were my doctoral
students), the necessary conditions for material symbol vehicles to function
as informational boundary conditions (constraints) on physical laws that
satisfy both the empirical facts life and von Neumann's logical conditions (
Physics of Symbols
<https://www.academia.edu/233726/The_physics_of_symbols_bridging_the_epistem
ic_cut> ).




GF: Since [Howard] limits himself to the specialized lexicon of physics, and
has no interest in logic (not even in the forms of reasoning employed by
physicists), he has no use for the Peircean analysis of signs, and
generalizes from this to the vociferously expressed opinion that
biosemiotics has no use for the minute Peircean analysis of semiosis.


HP: Again, a dim and a false view. Anyone who has read my papers will find a
vocabular common to wide areas of science and references to philosophers,
even Peirce! I have been interested in Peirce for many years beginning with
his pragmatism, which obviously requires a commitment to empiricism as well
as parsimony, both of which physics requires. I also agree substantially
with what I have read of Peirce's philosophy of science and many other of
his ideas.  It was his "thought experiments" about what he called logic that
did not fit with the empiricism so obvious in his extensive scientific work.

So, about 13 years ago I questioned Jon Awbrey about empiricism on his
Arisbe blog. If you read our discussion
( http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2001-August/000833.html
<http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2001-August/000833.html>  continuing for
several links) I think you will see that 
Jon wants to talk about his favorite logic, but is reluctant (or maybe
evasive) talking about empiricism. Our current discussions are deja vu all
over again, only with Jon being replaced by Gary F acting as Peirce
interpreter-in-chief. The current participants (except Sung) on the
biosemiotics list and Peirce-L are not interested in talking about empirical
issues either.

The only issue where I fundamentally disagree with Peirce (and agree with
Poincaré and modern physics) is the foundations of logic. My opinions about
Peirce's refinements and classifications of signs are "vociferous" simply
because cannot understand why they are helpful. Eventually they may be
useful, but at present they appear to be producing more arguments than
enlightenment. I have no doubts about Peirce's formal logic and mathematics
where he is an expert, and I agree with most of his opinions.

For most modern physicists the properties of logic and reason are considered
neither psychological nor anti-psychological. Also, physicists and
mathematicians think in such diverse and often mysterious ways that any
attempt to impose "right reasoning" or how one "ought" to reason becomes, as
Poincaré says, nothing but shackles. The choice of logics is just an
empirical issue like the choice of concepts of probability. If a logical
process does not lead to correct empirical results, don't use it. Classical
(Boolean) logic does not lead to correct QM results, so we try something
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_logic>  else
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_logic> . (Ironically, this requires a
formal mathematics that Pierce helped develop, lattice
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orthocomplemented_lattice> theory
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orthocomplemented_lattice> .) 

This result does not invalidate any logic, common sense, or even Peirce's
"right reasoning" when they work, as they often do in normal life. What
non-Boolean logic and the "spooky" unreason of QM strongly suggests is that
logic of any type is neither normative nor universal, but like sensorimotor
controls and languages, has evolved from many evolutionary levels,
empirically tested by natural selection and all types of experience. 

Howard

 

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