Vinicius,

I guess I wasn't clear enough when I said that I found that you said that by 'purpose' you meant conscious, deliberate purpose. I should add that I have _/not/_ been using the word 'purpose' in that way. I just mean an end, a _/telos/_. Every sign has its utility, that for which it is useful such that it is a sign, and that it is its interpretability, its potential interpretants; those are its ends. Peirce didn't say, so far as I know, but I would say, that an immediate interpretant is a sign's immediate end, a dynamical interpretant is a sign's dynamical end, and a final or normal interpretant is a sign's final or normal end.

It is hard to think of a single final interpretant of a footprint in the sand because that footprint does not constitute just a single unequivocal question.

Best, Ben

On 3/26/2014 3:32 PM, Vinicius Romanini wrote:

Dear Ben, Gary R., Edwina, Kees, list,

Ben wrote:

I agree with Gary about the role of purpose in interpretation. Vinicius does, however, seem to allow of it in connection with the final interpretant, and to wish merely that Kees had somehow put it into those terms. On the other hand, I think Vinicius underplays the role of purpose. It's hard to see why interpretation would take place at any level except for an end, bringing standards and norms of value into play. The world in its thermodynamic decay scrambles information, and life prospers in sorting some information out as more important, valuable, to the purpose, for life; some call it 'decoding', which makes sense provided that one remembers that there is in life a purpose or function of extracting information from mixed and scrambled signs and sign systems, both as to particular questions and in general ways that 'add value' (e.g., not just deducing whatever is deducible, but, since no deduction concludes in anything really new or complicative, deducing that which nonetheless brings a new or nontrivial perspective to the premisses). If one conceives of inference or interpretation as taking place in some more or less 'quasi' way at purely material and dynamic levels, then one still needs to suppose an end, even if that end merely be thermodynamic decay or the conservation of certain physical quantities - i.e., probable and (in the classical limit) extremal outcomes. These things do not involve retroactive causation by ends. In inference, aim or purpose 'solicits' (to borrow a Scholastic term) and guides determination by the premisses; the reasoner hopes and supposes that there are ways to do that without stacking the deck, i.e., without interfering with the determination to truth.

V: Ben, my analysis was quite down to Earth. A footprint found by chance when your are taking a walk on the beach does not necessarily carry in itself a lesson to be learned. To believe that every sinsign must have a purpose is disturbing. Actually, there is a name for this: schizophrenia. If that were the case, every husband on Earth would have be right to think that his wife is cheating him when finds a footprint on the beach near the house, or that the FBI is following him, or any other purpose that would give a reason for that footprint a priori.

Another very different thing would be if the husband has already a belief that he is being cheated and go around looking for evidence. In this second case, we have inquiry. A self-controlled process. The husband has a hypothesis, draws a necessary consequence (there might be vestiges of a lover around the house, probably on the nearby beach) and them goes out to look for them. Now we see purpose driving the process.

Ben then wrote:

In the case of the _/question/ _ asked about the weather, Peirce identifies the purpose with the question's final interpretant and has it depending in some sense on the asker of the question, but, yes, one can consider the purpose merely as 'given' with the final interpretant of a given posed question. Letter to William James, CP 8.314, 1909, http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/*finalinterpretant* .html <http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/finalinterpretant.html> :

    [....] But the Significance of it, the _/Ultimate/ _, _/Final/
    /Interpretant/ _ is her _/purpose/ _ in asking it, what effect
    its answer will have as to her plans for the ensuing day. [....]

V: Again, in this example, the whole semeiotic process is driven by a doubt and a search for a belief: "How is the weather today?", asks the wife. The final interpretant is a purpose that will guide the action of peeping through the window, and given the answer. We have inquiry going on. The husband will think: "If the weather is good, the window will show now clouds". Next step: "if I take a look through the curtain, I will get information". This is drawing the necessary consequence of the previous hypothesis.

The classes of signs are there to help us make useful logical distinctions. If every sign had a purpose, every sign would be an argument.

And there would be only one sign, since the argument is the most developed and complex of all them.

Best,

--

Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D.
Professor of Communication Studies
School of Communications and Arts
University of Sao Paulo, Brazil
www.minutesemeiotic.org <http://www.minutesemeiotic.org/>
www.semeiosis.com.br <http://www.semeiosis.com.br/>

Skype:vinicius_romanini

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