John C,

It is clear that we have some serious differences in our views on and
theories of signs.

You wrote:

"In the case of diagram 2 (i.e., Figure 2 below;            (5681-1)
my addition) you have the object, interpretant
and representatmen as nodes, but in fact it would
be better to represent them as the edges, since
they are relations."

Wrong.  Representamen, object and interpretant are not relations but
relata.  That is why they are represted as nodes in Figure 2 and not as
edges as you suggest.  The three relations for which reprsentamen, object,
and interpretant are relata are indicated by the three edges labeled
(1),(2) and (3) in Figure 2, each numbered edge representing three
relations (thereby giving rise to the famous trichotomy of trichotomies of
Peirce): (1) = qualisign, sinsign, and legisign; (2) icon, index, and
symbol; (3)= rheme, dicisign, and argument.

With all the best.


Sung
___________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net

> No. You have my critique so wrong I think it is time for me to give up on
> trying to explain to you how your reasoning has gone astray. I am not
> criticizing your ideas; we haven't got that far yet. I make a few more
> specific points interspersed below in one last try.
>
> You may well have something that is worth expressing. But when you are
> having this much trouble communicating what it is, the problem is yours,
> not ours.
>
> John
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Sungchul Ji [mailto:[email protected]]
> Sent: March 27, 2014 7:43 PM
> To: [email protected]
> Subject: [biosemiotics:5680] Re: What kind of sign is a "gene"?
>
> (Undistorted figures are attached.)
>
> Dear John C,
>
> (A) I appreciate your thorough-going criticisms of my diagrams which you
> believe contains some inconsistencies.
>
> JDC: No inconsistencies. They are not right enough to have
> inconsistencies. You must correct the category errors in your thinking.
> This will require a complete rethink of what you are trying to say. Small
> adjustments or revisions won't help.
>
>  Let me first reproduce those
> diagrams:
>
>                         a                b
>              Object  ------- >  Sign  ------->  Interpretant
>                 |                                     ^
>                 |                                     |
>                 |_____________________________________|
>                                   c
>
> Figure 1.  The Peircean sign represented as a mathematical category with
> the commutativity condition satisfied, i.e., a|b = c, which states that
> "the combined effect of a followed by b is the same as the effect of c".
>
> Please note that Figure 1 is not a square but a triangle, since there are
> only three edges, a, b and c.  In other words, Figure 1 is topologically
> identical with the triangles used in category theory.  The reason I use
> the square rather than a triangle is because it is much easier to draw the
> former than the latter on emails.
>
>
>                 Representamen
>                       |
>                       |(1)
>                       |
>                      Sign
>                      / \
>                 (2) /   \(3)
>                    /     \
>              Object        Interpretant
>
> Figure 2.  A  4-node network representation of the Peircean sign triad.
>
>
> If  I understand you correctly, you think these diagrams are inconsistent
> with each other because, for one thing, sign appears as a node with two
> edges in Figure 1 while it appears as a node with 3 edges in Figure 2,
> which made you think that I made a kind of a category error.  You may be
> right or may  be not, because the seeming inconsistency can be removed if
> Figure 1 is considered to be a  prescinded (or reduced) version of  Figure
> 2 including only edges (2) and (3).   I hope this explains why I used the
> two seemingly inconsistent Figures 1 and 2.
>
> JDC: No, I have separate criticisms for each case. In the case of diagram
> 2 you have the object, interpretant and representatmen as nodes, but in
> fact it would be better to represent them as the edges, since they are
> relations. In Peirce's semiotics this structure connects to other signs at
> the points, so that one sign can be a representamen for another, and is
> interpreted by further signs. You just aren't thinking in terms of
> Peirce's whole approach, but both Edwina and I have been complaining about
> that for a dog's age now.
>
> (B)    You wrote:
>
> "The error that I accuse Sung of in his oft repeated        (5673-1)
> now called "edge" diagram (which if seen as edges should not have
> representamen, object and interpretant as the edges, not as nodes of
> putting sign on a par with the components is another category error."
>
> I can’t understand what you are trying to say here.  Can you rephrase your
> criticism in light of the explanation that I provided in (A) ?
>
> JDC: No, because you are using a category for sign in 1, and arguing that
> since categories are not reducible this explains the irreducibility of
> sign. It doesn't. The argument makes a category error.
>
> Are you
> trying to say that I should have replaced “sign” in Figure 1 with
> “representamen”, leading to the following revised version ?
>
> JDC: No.
>
>  If so, I would reject this suggestion on the ground that doing so would
> lead to the following problems: (i) Sign is missing from Figure 3, and
> (ii) representamen has two edges in Figure 3 and only one edge in Figure
> 2.
> Even if you could avoid Problem (i) by asserting that “sign” is just a
> name or a label for the object-representamen-interpretant triad and has no
> reality, you still have Problem (ii).  In contrast, Figure 2 has “sign” in
> it but no “representamen”, because, as I said above, “representamen” is
> prescinded out in Figure 1.
>
>                    a                        b
>          Object ------ >  Representamen  -------> Interpretant
>             |                                           ^
>             |                                           |
>             |___________________________________________|
>                                   c
>
> Figure 3.  An alternative diagram of the Peircean sign triad replacing
> “sign” with “representamen”.
>
> (C)    If my argument presented in (B) is right, the following conclusion
> may result:
>
> “The word ‘sign’ is not a name or a label designating         (5673-2)
> the ‘object-representamen-interpretant’ triad but a real entity which has
> three irreducible aspects called ‘object’, ‘representamen’ and
> interpretant.”
>
> JDC: you haven't shown irreducibility
>
> In other words,
>
> “A sign is not just a name standing for the triadic       (5673-3)
> relaiton among object, representamen, and interpretant but a real entity
> underlying these three aspects of a sign.”
>
> JDC: sounds like the magical theory of reference to me.
>
> “There are two interpretations of the word  ‘sign’ –       (5673-4)
> the norminalistic as shown in Figure 3 and the realistic as shown in
> Figures 1 combined with 2.”
>
> JDC: You haven't shown anything of the sort. Assertion that you have shown
> something is not a proof. I see both your accounts as nominalistic so far
> in your explication. With the discussion of 3 you have gone off after a
> red herring that has nothing to do with my criticisms. I refuse to follow
> you there.
>
>
> With all the best.
> Sung
> ___________________________________________________
> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of
> Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers
> University Piscataway, N.J. 08855
> 732-445-4701
>
> www.conformon.net
>
>
>
>>   Dear Sung and List,
>>
>>  I caution that not all categories are irreducible, as Peircean signs
>> must be. Sets forma category, for example, but they are defined
>> nominalistically in terms of set membership. The category set is
>> equivalent to the set of sets, and would be best seen as the concept
>> of set. As a concept it is triadic, but what it refers to is not.
>> Likewise if we have a category theory concept of sign that is triadic
>> is does not follow from that alone that signs are triadic. Assuming
>> otherwise would be to commit what philosophers call a category error
>> (not related to category theory), which is an imputation of the
>> characteristics of one sort of ontological kind to another to which it
>> is related.
>>
>>   From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and example of a
>> purported category error (
>> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nicolai-hartmann/#OntCat):
>>
>>  The attribution to space of determinations that pertain exclusively
>> to what may eventually be in space is a serious category error.
>>
>>  Whereas things are extended in space, space in itself is neither
>> extended nor has extension. Space is the medium in which what is
>> extended extends itself (N.4a). For instance, position, distance,
>> movement, length, width, and height are spatial determinations. They
>> are in space, but space itself has no position, distance, movement,
>> length, width or height (N.4a). It is not space that is extended;
>> rather, distances are extended in space (N.4c). Extension is not a
>> determination of a dimension, but a determination of the entity that
>> is extended in a given dimension. For space, only what is extended is
>> properly real (N.12d).
>>  See also  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/categories/ and look for
>> 'category mistake'. Here is a famous example that all philosophers know:
>>
>>  Most famously, Ryle (1949) introduced the idea of the category
>> mistake as a way of dispelling the confusions he thought to be rampant
>> in the Cartesian theory of the mind, and thus of dissolving many
>> apparent problems in philosophy of mind. According to Ryle, one makes
>> a category mistake when one mistakes the logical type or category of a
>> certain expression (1949, 16–17). Thus, e.g., a foreigner would make a
>> category mistake if he observed the various colleges, libraries, and
>> administrative offices of Oxford, and then asked to be shown the
>> university. The foreigner mistakes the university for another
>> institution like those he has seen, when in fact it is something of
>> another category
>> altogether: “the way in which all that he has already seen is organized”
>> (1949, 16). The category mistake behind the Cartesian theory of mind,
>> on Ryle's view, is based in representing mental concepts such as
>> believing, knowing, aspiring, or detesting as acts or processes (and
>> concluding they must be covert, unobservable acts or processes), when
>> the concepts of believing, knowing, and the like are actually
>> dispositional (1949, 33).
>> Properly noting category distinctions may help alleviate a variety of
>> philosophical problems and perplexities, and the idea of the category
>> mistake was widely wielded (by Ryle and others) with this aim.
>>  See also  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake
>>
>>  I belabour this because ignoring the problem could lead to serious
>> misunderstanding about what is required to show that signs are not
>> reducible.
>>
>>  The error that I accuse Sung of in his oft repeated now called
>> "edge" diagram (which if seen as edges should not have
>> representamen, object and interpretant as the edges, not as nodes of
>> putting sign on a par with the components is another category error.
>> Even good philosophers make these mistakes, so there is no shame.
>>
>>                    -ooOoo-
>>
>>  There is a good philosophical discussion of category theory at
>> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/category-theory/
>>
>>  Personally, I think that you can't do anything substantive with
>> category theory that you can't do with set theory. Constructive set
>> theory is entirely reducible, but like a number of realist
>> intuitionist logicians (my former colleague Verena Huber-Dyson and
>> Penelope Maddy, for example) I think that constructivism in
>> mathematics (or physics or science in general -- pace Stan and perhaps
>> Søren) is wrong. The foundations of category theory are still a bit
>> murky, though, so this is just a conjecture I (and others) have.
>>
>>  As an aside, there is an interesting article in the most recent
>> Scientific American (April 2014) that describes early disagreements
>> about the cogency of integral calculus between Jesuits and Jesuats on
>> precisely this issue.
>>
>>  I will be limiting myself in the near future on this list mostly to
>> pointing out errors of logic like this that make communication
>> difficult.
>>
>>  John
>>
>>  At 08:51 PM 2014-03-26, you wrote:
>>  Vicinius,
>>
>>  I see clearly the sets of three nodes in physics and psyhs you
>> describe
>> --
>>  (i) particle, information soread out, and informed measurment, and
>> (ii)  precision, continuous predicates, and informed assertion.  In
>> order for  these two sets of nodes to emobdy triadic relations, don't
>> you have to  specify the relations among the edges between nodes ?
>>
>>  The set of three ndoes, sprinkler, grass and rain, does not embody a
>> triadic relation, i.e., they do not form a mathematical category,
>> indicating that having three nodes is necessary but not sufficient for
>> embodying a triadic relation or a mathematical category.
>>
>>  With all tghe best.
>>
>>  Sung
>>  ____________________________________________________
>>  Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
>>  Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology  Department of
>> Pharmacology and Toxicology  Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy  Rutgers
>> University  Piscataway, N.J. 08855
>>  732-445-4701
>>
>>  www.conformon.net
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  > Sung: Thanks for the quote of Peirce on space, force, and particles.
>> He
>>  > almost
>>  > sounds like Einstein talking !  How did he come up with such an idea
>> ?
>>  > Amazing.
>>  >
>>  > Vinicius: The idea was obvious to him because it is a corollary of
>> his  > cosmology. If matter is just mind constraint by very strict
>> habits, then  > the law of mind should be valid in physics too.
>>  >
>>  > Peirce believed that gravitation, acceleration and association of
>> ideas  > have all the same form: to bring things in relation - triadic
>> relation.
>>  >
>>  > In psychs, to get information we must attend to something while
>> neglecting  > others. Peirce calls this type of abstraction
>> "precision".
>> The object of
>>  > our attention becomes an index and what is neglected becomes
>> continuous  > predicates. Together, they produce an informative
>> assertion. We have a  > triad.
>>  >
>>  > In physics, what is perceived becomes a particle, what is not
>> perceived  > becomes the information spread throughout space in
>> relation to the  > particle. Together, they produce an informative
>> measurement.  We have a  > triad.
>>  >
>>  > So we don't need postulate "collapse of the wave
>> function", "multiverses"  > etc. Neither a cartesian
>> distinction of body and soul. It is the most  > parsimonious
>> description you can have of reality.
>>  >
>>  > Vinicius
>>  >
>>  >
>>  > 2014-03-25 21:27 GMT-04:00 Sungchul Ji :
>>  >
>>  >> Vinicius,
>>  >>
>>  >> Thanks for the quote of Peirce on space, force, and particles.  He
>> >> almost  >> sounds like Einstein talking !  How did he come up with
>> such an idea ?
>>  >> Amazing.
>>  >>
>>  >> With all the best.
>>  >>
>>  >> Sung
>>  >>
>>  >>
>>  >>
>>  >>
>>  >> > Dear Sung,
>>  >> >
>>  >> > You might enjoy this quote as well. As you see, Peirce thought
>> that a  >> > particle is spread throughout space. It shows as a
>> particle only when  >> it  >> > acts in little space.
>>  >> >
>>  >> >   Peirce: CP 7.534 Fn 4 p 318
>>  >> >
>>  >> > †4 (Ed.) "When the idea of space forms itself in our
>> minds, or being  >> > inborn, connects itself with sensations, those
>> things come to be  >> regarded  >> > as near together which act
>> strongly on one another, and are intimately  >> > related in regard to
>> forces; while those things come to be regarded as  >> > remote which,
>> as far as those forces of which we have any primitive  >> > experience
>> are concerned, have little to do with one another. Hence,  >> when  >>
>> > gravitation was found to act at a distance, and even at vast  >>
>> distances,  >> > men were astounded; they thought it could not be. It
>> seemed somehow to  >> > involve absurdity. The absurdity which was
>> obscurely felt was that the  >> > idea [of] nearness was the idea of
>> close connection; and therefore men  >> > felt that immediate
>> connection supposed confinity. But that  >> instinctive  >> > idea has
>> been corrected. Any particle may be regarded as extending  >> >
>> throughout space. It is where it acts. But it acts extremely little
>> >> except  >> > in a very little space; and its place is peculiarly
>> where it acts the  >> > most." From a fragment in Widener IA-8,
>> undated.
>>  >> >
>>  >> >
>>  >> > 2014-03-25 20:14 GMT-04:00 Sungchul Ji :
>>  >> >
>>  >> >> (For undistorted Figure 1, see attached.)  >> >>  >> >>
>> Vicinius wrote:
>>  >> >>
>>  >> >> "Would not that mean that every part of the  >> (5627-1)
>> >> >> universe represents, even if in a very blurry  >> >> way, the
>> whole other? So every part of the  >> >> universe would be a symbol of
>> the totality,  >> >> even if no human mind has assigned the
>> relation."  >> >>  >> >>  >> >> The quantum field theory (as I
>> understand it) may support the kind of  >> >> views expressed by
>> Vicinius. For example, the gravitational field (or  >> the  >> >>
>> curved spacetime of Einstein) may be viewed as a sign in the Peircean
>> >> >> sense since it mediates the interaction between the whole
>> universe  >> and  >> >> the motions of material objects at given
>> spacetime points, just as a  >> sign  >> >> mediates the interaction
>> between object and interpretant (See Figure  >> 1).
>>  >> >>
>>  >> >>                  a                      b
>>  >> >> The Universe --------->    Fields   -------->   Motion
>>  >> >>    (Object)                (sign)            (Interpretant)
>>  >> >>        |                                           ^
>>  >> >>        |                                           |
>>  >> >>        |___________________________________________|
>>  >> >>                               c
>>  >> >>
>>  >> >>
>>  >> >> Figure 1.  The “isomorphism” (i.e., the similarity) between
>> >> >> “gravitational field” and the “semiotic field” or the
>> >> “semiotic  >> >> system”.  The relation, a, i.e., the
>> object-sign relation, can be  >> >> iconic, indexical or symbolic in
>> semiotics, and it is possible that  >> this  >> >> is also true in
>> cosmology.
>>  >> >>
>>  >> >> With all the best.
>>  >> >>
>>  >> >> Sung
>>  >> >> ___________________________________________________
>>  >> >> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
>>  >> >> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology  >> >>
>> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology  >> >> Ernest Mario School
>> of Pharmacy  >> >> Rutgers University  >> >> Piscataway, N.J. 08855
>> >> >> 732-445-4701  >> >>  >> >> www.conformon.net  >> >> > Edwina, I
>> totally agree with all you said.
>>  >> >> >
>>  >> >> > Again, I just do not accept that every symbol must have its
>> >> relation  >> >> to  >> >> > the  >> >> > object assigned by an
>> external agent.
>>  >> >> > Let's suppose Lee Smolin is right about his holographic
>> principle  >> and  >> >> > evolutionary universe.
>>  >> >> > Would not that mean that every part of the universe
>> represents,  >> even  >> >> if  >> >> in  >> >> > a very blurry way,
>> the whole other?
>>  >> >> > So every part of the universe would be a symbol of the
>> totality,  >> even  >> >> if  >> >> > no human mind has assigned the
>> relation. And this symbol is  >> >> developing?
>>  >> >> > Vinicius
>>  >> >> >
>>  >> >> >
>>  >> >> > 2014-03-25 14:47 GMT-04:00 Edwina Taborsky :
>>  >> >> >
>>  >> >> >>  Vinicius - to  continue with my concerns about the
>> symbol...as  >> >> Ulysses  >> >> >> has pointed out, it doesn't refer
>> to the sign vehicle but to the  >> >> >> relation between that
>> sign-vehicle and the object. Both the icon  >> and  >> >> >> index are
>> physically or mimetically at least, connected to the  >> >> object.
>>  >> >> In
>>  >> >> >> this way, because of the requirement for some actual
>> connection,  >> the  >> >> sign  >> >> >> is constrained in its
>> ability to develop new morphologies (signs).
>>  >> >> >>
>>  >> >> >> But the symbol, in my view, has no spatiotemporal or
>> material  >> >> >> connections to the object. It is 'assigned' by an
>> external agent.
>>  >> >> >> Actually, this contributes to the enormous capacity of the
>> human  >> >> >> imagination and technological adaptiveness. After all,
>> a symbol  >> can  >> >> say:
>>  >> >> >> "I can refer to anything; you just have to tell me what
>> to refer  >> to'.
>>  >> >> >> Such enables the use of money, of language, of writing, of
>> trade.
>>  >> >> >> Admittedly, this is also the basis for the three
>> non-scientific  >> modes  >> >> of  >> >> >> belief (tenacity,
>> authority and a priori) but these are also the  >> >> basis  >> >> >>
>> for the cohesiveness that is found within human societies. After  >>
>> all,  >> >> >> human societies are not based merely on scientific
>> truths but on  >> >> beliefs  >> >> >> - beliefs of origin, of
>> morality, of kinship obligations, of  >> >> political  >> >> >> mode,
>> etc...most of which, frankly, are outside of the realm of  >> >>
>> science.
>>  >> >> >>
>>  >> >> >> Edwina
>>  >> >> >>
>>  >> >> >>
>>  >> >> >>
>>  >> >> >> ----- Original Message -----  >> >> >> *From:* Vinicius
>> Romanini  >> >> >> *To:* [email protected]  >> >> >> *Sent:*
>> Tuesday, March 25, 2014 10:01 AM  >> >> >> *Subject:*
>> [biosemiotics:5621] Re: What kind of sign is a "gene"?
>>  >> >> >>
>>  >> >> >> Howard,
>>  >> >> >> I think some of our disagreements are just terminological.
>> We are  >> >> >> reasoning using words to explain words which do not
>> help  >> consensus. I  >> >> >> try  >> >> >> to scape this
>> tautological chain by using examples.
>>  >> >> >>
>>  >> >> >> I define symbol as a general. You cannot isolate a general.
>>  >> >> >> Take the idea of "man". Not the written word, but
>> the concept. It  >> is  >> >> a  >> >> >> general.
>>  >> >> >> You can put every single man on Earth in jail and the
>> concept is  >> >> still  >> >> >> free to go.
>>  >> >> >> You can isolate its replicas, though.
>>  >> >> >>
>>  >> >> >> Replicas are existents (they have physical body), concepts
>> are  >> real  >> >> >> abstractions.
>>  >> >> >> Some real symbols represent fictional objects. For example,
>> the  >> >> concept  >> >> >> of  >> >> >> a unicorn is real (I, you
>> and all of us can learn what a unicorn  >> is),  >> >> >> but  >> >>
>> >> its object is a fancy.
>>  >> >> >>
>>  >> >> >> In the same vein, "freedom",
>> "democracy", "friendship" are all  >> real  >> >>
>> >> concepts which represent fictional objects. But we fight for  >> >>
>> democracy  >> >> >> and  >> >> >> freedom and even give our lives for
>> them. To deny their reality is  >> >> deny  >> >> >> what makes
>> mankind above animal behavior.
>>  >> >> >>
>>  >> >> >> Now, a context IS an index.
>>  >> >> >> I write "fire" here. It's a symbol without any use.
>>  >> >> >> We sit to talk in a coffee shop and I suddenly shout
>> "fire", my  >> face  >> >> is  >> >> >> stressed as I start
>> running.
>>  >> >> >> Now an index is attached to the concept. Cognition is
>> formed, an  >> >> >> assertion  >> >> >> is made, information is
>> transmitted.
>>  >> >> >>
>>  >> >> >> best,
>>  >> >> >> Vinicius
>>  >> >> >>
>>  >> >> >>
>>  >> >> >> 2014-03-25 7:47 GMT-04:00 Howard Pattee :
>>  >> >> >>
>>  >> >> >>>  At 08:11 AM 3/24/2014,Vinicius wrote:
>>  >> >> >>>
>>  >> >> >>> By itself, the symbol is useless. To function, a symbol
>> needs  >> >> indices  >> >> >>> attached to it. Indices are
>> quantifiers. Frege and Peirce  >> >> independently  >> >> >>>
>> developed the theory of quantification in logic. When indices are  >>
>> >> >>> attached  >> >> >>> to a symbol, it becomes a cognition, a
>> "know-how" and only then  >> it  >> >> can  >> >> >>> do  >>
>> >> >>> its job.
>>  >> >> >>>
>>  >> >> >>>
>>  >> >> >>> HP: I have explained why isolated symbols are useless. I
>> say  >> symbols  >> >> >>> must  >> >> >>> be part of a "symbol
>> system" I call a language. In the context of  >> a  >> >> >>>
>> cell, I  >> >> >>> do not understand the necessity of *indices*. In my
>> view, a  >> symbol  >> >> >>> requires only a *material symbol
>> vehicle*, like a molecule (the  >> >> >>> molecule  >> >> >>> and an
>> *interpreting mechanism *such as the cell's translation  >> >> >>>
>> machinery).
>>  >> >> >>>
>>  >> >> >>> Does the* index* have an *index vehicle*? Or is it a
>> non-material  >> >> >>> relation? Is the index a part of the DNA base
>> sequence-to-protein  >> >> >>> translation machinery?
>>  >> >> >>>
>>  >> >> >>> Howard
>>  >> >> >>>
>>  >> >> >>>
>>  >> >> >>
>>  >> >> >>
>>  >> >> >> --
>>  >> >> >> Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D.
>>  >> >> >> Professor of Communication Studies  >> >> >> School of
>> Communications and Arts  >> >> >> University of Sao Paulo, Brazil  >>
>> >> >>  www.minutesemeiotic.org  >> >> >>  www.semeiosis.com.br  >> >>
>> >>  >> >> >> Skype:vinicius_romanini  >> >> >>  >> >>
>
>


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