Hi John, list,

John surely feels a lot stronger about this issue than I do. I'm largely
following Fisch indeed and, John may be dismayed to hear this, I'm following
John Locke. I don't have the earlier editions of Locke's Essay on my desk
for obvious reasons (they're quite expensive), but judging Nidditch's
critical edition, the fourth edition (the last edition to be published
during Locke's life) clearly and unmistakably included the epsilon, as do
all subsequent editions that I personally know of. Now it may be that
Nidditch has it all wrong, as John claims he has (for one thing Nidditch
found only four editions overseen by Locke, whereas John found five), but
that notwithstanding, the spelling with the epsilon had become the textus
receptus long before Peirce's time, obliterating, for good or for bad,
Locke's idiosyncratic spelling (and just as John is challenging my
speculations, I would like to see some concrete evidence that Locke truly
intended to distance himself from its use in medicine by deliberately
spelling it differently.) To give one example of the term's received form,
the Delasartians, the influence of whom on Peirce Iris recently wrote about,
included the epsilon, and they no doubt got that from their reading of
Locke. As far as I know, spelling it semiotics is a twentieth-century
post-Peirce affair, but I may be wrong about that. In sum, even if Locke had
deliberately decided  to struck the epsilon and that for clearly articulated
reasons that were preserved, as John intimates he did, it evidently didn't
stick.

Peirce often changed his mind on how to spell his terms or on how to name
something, and he came always with good reasons for his choice, even though
these reasons seldom included an account of why he changed his mind and why
the reasons he provided earlier no longer hold (assuming he even
remembered). Now I have to admit that this doesn’t necessarily make it a
trivial issue, but it does put some question marks to the great importance
sometimes given to a particular spelling or word choice by Peirce and the
need to single out one of them as "the correct one."

Notwithstanding any disputes about the word's spelling, however, I still
fully stand behind what I wrote about Locke, namely  that “in essence, Locke
proposes to apply the method developed for interpreting the symptoms of
diseases to all knowledge, and his Essay, particularly Book 4, is an attempt
to do this.” That "Locke did not propose Σημειωτική as his name for a
general doctrine of signs," as John claims to be the case, strikes me as
odd, as Locke himself  says that his "Third Branch may be called
Σημειωτική, or the Doctrine of signs" (IV.xxi.4; italics in original),
unless this part of the  critical edition of Locke's Essay is also wrong.

Cheers,

kees



From:  "Deely, John N." <[email protected]>
Reply-To:  "Deely, John N." <[email protected]>
Date:  Thursday, March 27, 2014 7:50 PM
To:  "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
Subject:  RE: [PEIRCE-L] Kees Chapter 5: TITLE, Post 1 of 2 -- spelling of
first word in title

Bear with me. I am going to make this post in two parts, 1. proper spelling,
and 2. the actual coinage in Locke. Both posts are extracts from a lengthy
review I am writing of Kees’ book that will appear this summer in The
American Journal of Semiotics (TAJS 30), there with the full scholarly
apparatus of footnotes and dated references historically layered.
      I interject these extracts here online only because this Chapter 5 of
Kees’ generally fine book really goes off the rails: beginning with the
first word of its title, and continuing to the end (as Vinicius has already
called to the list’s attention) by failing to point out to the readers the
true arc of semiotics as subtending the whole of Peirce’s work, it being as
cenoscopic science the framework presupposed in all idioscopic development.
(Also, in that full TAJS review will be explained why, rather than following
Peirce’s own idioscopic/ideoscopic distinction, I prefer to substitute the
latter for the former spelling; but that is a side-issue here.)
 
Properly Spelling “Semiotics”: a “Trivial Issue”? (Hardly!)
 
      When it comes to deciding on what single word might best be used to
describe or name today the inquiry into what has been called “the doctrine
of signs” (from its beginning with Augustine [397ad]) to its Latin
culmination in the work of Poinsot [1632a], and from its renaming as
Σημιωτική with Locke [1689/90] to its usage by Sebeok [e.g., 1971, 1976] as
earlier by Peirce), Kees grants (p. 75) that ‘semiotics’ “is the variant
most commonly used today” in the academic community at large. But he
precedes this remark by claiming (ibid.) that “proper spelling of the word”
is “one rather trivial issue”; and he chooses (for trivial reasons?) to use
a variant found in Peirce (note: the most rare of the variants found in
Peirce) — “semeiotics”, in preference to “semiotic” (the variant most used
in Peirce) or “semiotics” (the variant that has come to prevail for naming
the community of inquirers into the doctrine of signs today for reasons we
will see in Post 2.).
      Mats Bergman (2009: 38–39) agrees with Kees in his own choice of
one-word spelling as including the “ε” not included in Locke’s coinage (as
Post 2. will show), but Bergman also advises frankly (and rightly, I would
say) that “This is not a trivial matter” (or should not be for Peirceans),
as Peirce “argues that a crucial phase of the effort to render philosophy
scientific is a reform of its vocabulary”. Peirce went so far as to urge the
adoption of an “ethics of terminology” in relation to which we have an
obligation to develop a “suitable technical nomenclature”. Given what
scholarship has since established concerning Locke’s coinage, as we will see
in Post 2., and as Kees either does not know or has inexplicably chosen to
ignore, there is no way that “semeiotic” or “semeiotics” any longer can be
legitimately proposed etymologically to distinguish the cenoscopic science
of signs from the idioscopic branch of medical science concerned with the
study of symptoms of illness.
      Max Fisch (1911-1991) was one of the greatest Peirce scholars indeed,
but he worked prior to the accomplishment of a detailed investigation of the
actual editions of Locke’s Essay as Locke himself supervised them before his
death. Fisch was the main figure to popularize the “semeiotic” spelling for
Peirce’s development of the doctrine of signs. Peirce followers latched on
to this variant spelling precisely to distinguish Peirce within, and
sometimes from, the broader development that has come to be known today as
“semiotics”, without any second “e” (one cannot help but think of early
anti-Obama voters supposedly latching on to guns and bibles).
      That this variant was actually Peirce’s own centrally “preferred
spelling” I recently had occasion to expose as a terminological mythology
(“Clearing the Mists of a Terminological Mythology”, posted to Peirce-L by
Joseph Ransdell at 
<http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/deely/clearing.pdf>); but, as
logic (even when supported by scholarship) seldom triumphs quickly (and
sometimes never) over custom, the discovery that their choice of spelling
for Peirce’s doctrine of signs is based on myth rather than fact, while
causing some discomfort, has so far not dissuaded Peircean epigones from
clinging to their variant when speaking of Peirce’s views on the general
matter of signs. Kees carries this clinging to a new extreme, latching on to
the variant spelling least used in Peirce’s own writings; we can only hope
that this extreme may mark the end of the “semeiotic/semeiotics” line
outside of medicine, even in relatively closed Peircean circles!
      So we have to ask ourselves, in the larger intellectual culture, why
has the variant “semiotics” become the one “most commonly used today”,
despite the ongoing insistence of the post-Fisch Peirceans to use
“semeiotic” or (after Kees) “semeiotics”? Why, furthermore, do these
Peirceans prefer to swim against the tide (especially if the matter is
“trivial”)? 
      The answer to the first part of our question is quite simply that the
English variant “semiotics” has “come to be preferred” because it stands
alone in directly rendering Locke’s proposal to rename the doctrine of signs
using the Greek characters Σημιωτική, as I will demonstrate in the details
of post 2. 
      As to the second part of our question, obdurateness seems the most
likely answer.
      Consider one of Peirce’s own direct comments, rather late in the game
(1907), on the matter of this second part (bold added):
 
I have often thought that if it were not that it would sound too German ...
I would entitle my logic-book (which is now coming on) “Logic considered as
Semeiotic” (or probably Semeotic without the i); but everybody would think I
was translating als Semeiotik betrachtet, which I couldn't stand.
 
Or again, a little earlier (c.1902):
 
With Speculative Rhetoric, Logic, in the sense of Normative Semeotic, is
brought to a close.
 
      Besides this “semeotic” (three occurrences in CP), we find in Peirce
three other variant spellings proposed as one-word synonyms for the doctrine
of signs: semiotic (as in “Semiotic Society of America”; six occurrences in
CP); semeiotic (four occurrences in CP); semeiotics (nowhere in CP, and one
[!] occurrence in EP 2.327 — the least frequent in all Peirce’s usages).
      What might scholarship contribute to the understanding of this matter?
      There is a considerable difference between scholarship and philosophy,
a difference not always well understood by many professors. Pushed to the
extreme, philosophy pursued without much accompanying scholarship is well
illustrated in the work of Wittgenstein, in that the success of his work in
the hands of late-modern readers is largely consequent upon the ignorance of
the Latin Age which Descartes (1628) and his followers (in this regard
including even the “empiricists”) so successfully promoted as essential to
the “new beginning” they believed philosophy needed to achieve
Enlightenment. (Nonetheless, be it said that, in that context, the advice to
stop reading the Latins was not a bad idea, even though, in retrospect, from
the specific point of view of semiotics as “the doctrine of signs”, the move
was overwhelmingly damaging in the delay it has caused for later thinkers to
realize the importance of historical consciousness as, in effect, the
equivalent for cenoscopic enquiries to what the laboratory is for idioscopic
advances). 
                End of Post 1.
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