Lists,
Continuing my earlier post to the biosemiotics list, here’s a very condensed summary of the semiotic ideas I consider most relevant to the question in the subject line. The kind of sign that is complete enough to convey information is traditionally called a proposition. A verbal proposition is a symbol, and pieces of it (such as words) are traditionally also called “symbols.” But it conveys information by combining an indexical sign with an iconic one, and it's the combination of those two functions, rather than the symbolic function, that enables the sign to convey information about its object to its interpretant. Peirce defines information as the logical product of two quantities traditionally called “breadth” and “depth”. [[ … logicians have recognized since Abélard's day and earlier that there is one thing which any sign, external or internal, stands for, and another thing which it signifies; its denoted breadth, its “connoted” depth. They have further generally held, in regard to the most important signs, that the depth, or signification, is intrinsic, the breadth extrinsic (CP 8.119). ]] Breadth is extrinsic because it refers to the object, which is necessarily other than the sign and related to it indexically. Depth is intrinsic because it refers to the (more or less specific) form of the sign itself, which is related iconically to the object and to the interpretant determined (and thus informed) by the sign. In the logic of relations (as opposed to the more traditional syllogistic logic), the predicate of a proposition provides any depth it has, by signifying (iconically or symbolically) the recognizable form which is shared by object and sign, and conveyed to the interpretant by the act of recognition or the event of interpretation. The subject of the proposition denotes (indexically) its object, and thus the indexical relation provides the proposition with its breadth. Information increases when the breadth is increased, when we learn that a known form actually applies to an object that we didn't already know it applied to. Information also increases when depth is increased, when the form applied to a known object is specified or determined more fully than it was before. A sign must have some breath and depth in order to represent a fact. [[ What we call a “fact” is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to express “fact,” and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe (EP2:304; italics Peirce’s, bold mine). ]] Now here's where MS 7 comes in — http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/ms7/ms7gf.htm — because it helps to remind us that both a sign and its object can have any degree of complexity, right up to the complexity of the Universe itself. This complexity can be regarded either analytically or synthetically, in the case of an informative proposition, or any sign sufficiently complete to convey information. If the sign we're talking about is the genome, it should be obvious that both the sign and its object are very complex indeed. I'll finish this (for now) by quoting some of the most relevant statements about this from MS 7, and invite you to apply these to the genome and its object. I think this is likely to increase the depth of our concepts of both sign and object, and elucidate the relations between them. Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of a sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a more complete sign. Thirdly, a sign sufficiently complete must be capable of determining an interpretant sign, and must be capable of ultimately producing real results. For a proposition of metaphysics which could never contribute to the determination of conduct would be meaningless jargon. On the other hand, the cards which, slipped into a Jacquard loom, cause appropriate figures to be woven, may very properly be called signs although there is no conscious interpretation of them. If not, it can only be because they are not interpreted by signs. … Fourthly, a sign sufficiently complete must in some sense correspond to a real object. … like all other signs sufficiently complete, there is a single definite object to which it must refer; namely, to the ‘Truth,’ or the Absolute, or the entire Universe of real being. Sixthly, a sign may refer, in addition, and specially, to any number of parts of that universe. Seventhly, every interpretant of a sign need not refer to all the real objects to which the sign itself refers, but must, at least, refer to the Truth. Eighthly, an interpretant may refer to an object of its sign in an indefinite manner. … Tenthly, a sign sufficiently complete must signify some quality; and it is no more important to recognize that the real object to which a sign refers is not a mere sign than to recognize that the quality it signifies is not a mere sign. [gf note: This “quality” is what I referred to earlier as the “form” (in information).] Since this semiotic analysis was made by Peirce in relation to “the foundations of mathematics,” we might expect some problems in applying it to the genome, to its object, and to its interpretation by the internal dynamics of the organism. But I think it’s general enough to apply to them too, and I’d be happy to address any of the problems that readers would like to pose. gary f. -----Original Message----- From: Gary Fuhrman [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 6-Apr-14 10:09 AM To: [email protected] Tommi, I was perfectly serious when I said earlier that I thought you should pursue your line of thinking further and see where it takes you. Just because I don't see the point of it doesn't mean that other people won't. And our conversation has been helpful to me too, by forcing me to refocus on the sign-object relation as a factor in triadicity (that is, as an aspect of Thirdness). Some recent developments on the Peirce list are relevant to this, and to the question of our subject line, so I'll try to summarize this relevance. First of all, I think I tried to emphasize before that a "gene" only functions semiotically as part of a much more complete sign, namely the genome. And the genome itself can function as a sign only because it can be interpreted as such by the ongoing process which is the life of the organism whose genome it is, in such a way that this process is *informed* by that interpretation. Now, Peirce's definition of "information" has definite implications for the relation between the genome as sign and its object. On the Peirce list, Vinicius Romanini posted a manuscript of Peirce's (MS 7, c. 1903) which makes some important general points regarding that relation and the "completeness" of signs. My transcription of MS 7 is now online at Arisbe, <http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/ms7/ms7gf.htm> http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/ms7/ms7gf.htm . I'm called away to be busy for a few hours now so I'll have to finish this later ... gary f.
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