---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:5835] Re: What kind of sign is a "gene"
From:    "Sungchul Ji" <[email protected]>
Date:    Fri, April 11, 2014 5:24 pm
To:      [email protected]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Edwina wrote:

"I don't see a bar graph as an icon, for an icon,             (5835-1)
by definition, will bring to mind almost immediately
the definition of that to which it refers."


Don't you see "immediately" the similarity between the bar graph, an
iconic sign,

                         H
                         |
                         N
                        / \
                      H     H

and its object, the ammonia molecule ?

Or perhaps you don't because you have not taken any chemistry course (?).
I  agree with Jerry that

"The knowing chemical principles (e.g., the concept          (5835-2)
of valence) may be as essential as knowing the
philosophical concepts of Plato and Aristotle to
understand Peirce."

With all the best.

Sung
__________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net



> Ulysses - we'll just have to disagree on quite a few things.
>
> I don't see a bar graph as an icon, for an icon, by definition, will bring
> to mind almost immediately the definition of that to which it refers. So,
> a photograph of a bear is an icon of a bear. But a bar graph's 'bars' are
> symbols, in that the bars, as images, have no connection to a human
> population. Instead, what has taken place is that the attributes of a
> human population are reified into symbols, such as the number of people
> who speak x, y and z languages - and this is further shown in a visual
> image of bars. That's not iconic in my view.
>
> And no, an icon is not defined as a 'shared quality' between the
> representamen and the object'; that's too vague, for that could also
> suggest an index. An icon has to be 'like' that object, such that the
> dynamic object determines the icon as similar.
>
> I do not, for reasons already outlined, consider that the semiosic triad,
> even to look at as a graph or a diagram, is a 'three-edged network', for
> the definition of 'what is a network' has to lead one to conclude that the
> semiosic triad has no properties of 'being a network'.  It is an error to
> simply stand outside an object and declare that because it 'looks the
> same', then it 'is the same'. Real flowers and fake flowers do look the
> same but have nothing in common and therefore it is an error to consider
> that they behave the same.
>
> I don't see that a bar graph is, as I noted, an icon. I'd rather call it
> a Rhematic Symbolic Legisign - which is an attribute of a commonality (eg
> population languages) expressed in general and symbolic terms.
>
> Edwina
>   ----- Original Message -----
>   From: U Pascal
>   To: [email protected]
>   Sent: Friday, April 11, 2014 12:33 PM
>   Subject: [biosemiotics:5834] Re: What kind of sign is a "gene"
>
>
>   John, Edwina,
>
>
>   Between us, there are too many unstated assumptions about what a diagram
> is for this conversation to proceed logically. In my view diagrams are
> subsets of icons, and a bar graph is a diagram, not a symbol. In my
> view, icons are a matter of qualitative possibility, and to make
> definitive claims about what they denote is a double error. The only
> condition for an icon to be a sign is if there is a shared quality
> between the representamen and the object. Taking the three edge network
> as a representamen and the triadic sign as the object of the
> representamen, there is at least one qualitative similarity. Both embody
> the quality of "threeness". Therefore the network is an icon of the
> triadic sign.
>
>
>   That being said, the icon is a degenerate representation because it
> represents thirds as firsts. This however is not a normative error or
> "perversion". In some instances such degeneracy can have pragmatic
> benefits. For instance if you reduce the complexities of a growing
> population to the "tallness" of an edge of a bar in a bar graph you can
> communicate some information much quicker. The size of a population is
> not "tallness", but representing it as such may have cognitive benefits.
> In my mind, the question is not whether Sung made a normative error in
> his diagram, but if his diagram has any pragmatic benefits. In a
> previous post I outlined one potential benefit and one danger.
>
>
>   In summary, Sung's diagram is not "wrong" but it also not genuine.
> Moreover, the pragmatic benefits of his representation are questionable
> at best.
>
>
>   ---Ulysses
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>   On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 12:27 PM, John Collier <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
>     Ulysses,
>
>     A network can as be something in the world that can be represented by
> various means. To represent something that is not a network in this
> sense as a network is a misrepresentation.
>
>     I see no advantage in representing something that is not a network as
> a network. It seems to me to be perverse.
>
>     John
>
>
>
>     At 07:21 PM 2014-04-09, you wrote:
>
>       Edwina, Sung, List,
>
>       I must say I am confused.
>
>       The question of whether a sign is or is not a network sounds
> nonsensical to me. A network is a mode of iconic representation. In
> so far as a network contains an icon of a quality that is also
> present in every triadic sign, a network is a valid form of iconic
> representation. A three edge network is isomorphic to a tripod, and
> does represent 'triadicy' iconically. Note: I am *not* saying it is
> useful to represent the triadicy of a sign iconically. One danger of
> the tripod/three edge network icon is that it merely represents one
> formal element of the sign, not the triadic sign itself/in its
> entirety (whatever that would be). Perhaps this is the point that
> you claim Sung does not understand? Nevertheless, representing an
> object 'entirely' is not a necessary condition for representation.
> Whether or not Sung's icon is a *good* representation is governed by
> its purpose. As a gestural summary of the form of a triadic sign, I
> think it is a passable representation, however as a key to a deeper
> understanding Peirce's theory, it does not make the mark.
>
>       ~~~Ulysses
>
>
>       On Wed, Apr 9, 2014 at 5:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
>         Tommi, your suggestion of a network-approach within biosemiosic
> realities has nothing to do, I suggest, with Sung's redefinition
> of the semiosic process itself as a network - a redefinition which
> I feel shows a profound misunderstanding of the semiosic process
> in itself.
>
>
>
>         Sung's action of applying network graph theory to the semiosic
> triad is a fundamentally flawed approach- and declaring, in a
> fallacious 'appeal to authority' that Peirce 'would have approved'
> doesn't validate that approach.   Equally, declaring that 'if you
> don't reply to me, this means that you agree with me' is yet
> another fallacious tactic of 'argumentation'.
>
>
>
>         As others have attempted to point out, the basic problem in Sung's
> approach is that the semiosic triad cannot itself be a network
> since it is not made up of individual existentially real elements
> (whether you call them vertices or nodes or points) nor
> connections (whether you call them edges or lines or links)
> between these individual points.
>
>
>
>         Sung doesn't understand this, despite the many attempts of others
> to explain - and both John Collier and Tommi have been very clear
> in their explanations. I suspect this failure to understand the
> Peircean semiosic triad is due in part to his not having read much
> of Peirce but also and possibly above all,  to Sung's tactic of
> first finding a template (eg, Bohr's complementarism, network
> graph theory) and then, trying to fit Peirce's terminology into
> that template. This, of course, doesn't work and results in a
> completely false outline of the Peircean semiosis.
>
>
>
>         Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>           ----- Original Message -----
>
>           From: Tommi Vehkavaara
>
>           To: [email protected]
>
>           Sent: Wednesday, April 09, 2014 3:52 AM
>
>           Subject: [biosemiotics:5806] Re: What kind of sign is a "gene"
>
>
>           Dear Sung
>
>
>           You may have missed (no wonder because of the amount of mails in
> this list) that I have several times suggested that some kind of
> network-approach might be better in order to define the
> appropriate semiotic concepts for some biosemiotic phenomena
> rather than stretching, formalizing, ontologizing, and diluting
> Peircean semiotic concepts so that their connection to their
> original derivation and meaning will be lost. I have not yet
> developed such a network-theory of semiotics, because I have so
> far concentrated to study what might be the limits of
> application of Peirce's individual-based logical semiotics.
>
>           The basic semiotic concepts (sign, meaning, finality,
> intentionality, normativity, etc.) can be derived starting from
> first-person perspective of individual cognition (even if it
> later is objectified) or as some kind of systemic network
> properties or patterns, but such starting points lead
> fundamentally different approaches and they should not be
> confused even though some connections at some level of
> organization may be found.
>
>
>           Yours,
>
>
>           -Tommi
>
>
>           Sung, you wrote:
>
>           By saying "no" to both my questions, it seems to me that you are
> ignoring
>
>           the fundamental significance of the concept of network in
> contemporary
>
>           sciences. If Peirce were alive today, I think he would have not
> missed
>
>           the connection betwween his semiotics and modern-day "network
> science". To
>
>           me a network is a Peircean sign.
>
>           --
>
>           *******************************************************************
>
>
>           "Cousins to the ameba that we are, how could we know for
> certain?"
>
>           - Donald T. Campbell
>
>
>           *******************************************************************
>
>
>           University of Tampere
>
>           School of Social Sciences and Humanities - Philosophy
>
>           Tommi Vehkavaara
>
>           FI-33014 University of Tampere
>
>           Finland
>
>
>           Phone: +358-50-3186122 (work), +358-45-2056109 (home)
>
>           e-mail: [email protected]
>
>           homepage: http://www.uta.fi/~attove
>
>           https://uta-fi.academia.edu/TommiVehkavaara
>
>
>           *******************************************************************
>
>
>
>
>
>
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